KOSOVO: SECURITY COUNCIL VISIT TO KOSOVO LEAVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000336

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTED DATES THROUGHOUT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK UNSC YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SECURITY COUNCIL VISIT TO KOSOVO LEAVES
DELEGATION FAVORABLY IMPRESSED, BUT DOUBTS STILL LINGER FOR
SOME MEMBERS


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Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Whatever Russian hopes may have been for an
April 27-28 UN Security Council trip that would leave
permreps more sympathetic to the plight of Kosovo Serbs and
hostile to the prospect of Kosovo independence, it appears
that goal was not achieved; instead, delegation members
appeared pleasantly surprised by the attitude and
presentation of Kosovar Albanians, who convincingly spoke to
the issues of standards fulfillment, their commitment to
multi-ethnicity, and the historical context of their desire
for independence. In contrast, permreps heard a strident,
uncompromising, and obviously pre-cooked message from Serbs
in Mitrovica and from the hardline Serb Orthodox prelate
Artemije, who overplayed his hand by including two of Serbian
PM Kostunica's advisers in his meeting with the UNSC. Serbs
consistently raised refugee and IDP return as a basic issue
for them, although SC delegates were taken to see the rebuilt
village of Svinjare, where Serbs have refused to return
despite the availability of housing. Non-Serb minorities
were abundantly clear that they support independence and
believe Ahtisaari's plan can be the basis for a promising
future for Kosovo. EU representatives briefed on
preparations for the Interntional Civilian Office and the EU
Rule of Law mission, prompting initial irritation among some
delegation members that the Europeans had proceeded with
planning for Ahtisaari implementation even in the absence of
Security Council action, but that irritation subsided when EU
reps expained the need for prudent preparation for what might
well be the largest such EU mission anywhere in the world.


2. (C) Summary, cont. Permreps left Kosovo noticeably
impressed, though several -- including the South African and
Indonesian -- still appeared to feel that Ahtisaari had
skewed the settlement too far in the Albanian direction and
that some sort of "third way" (between the status quo and
independence),in line with the "substantial autonomy"
proposal Belgrade had floated with the delegation the day
before, might be possible. Further work will need to be done
to explain that the Ahtisaari document is the compromise
option between the initial Serb position of substantial
autonomy (never changed and never fully articulated) and the
Albanians' desire for full independence. In one interesting
aside during the trip, Russian permrep Churkin sounded out
Amb. Khalilzad on how a UN resolution on Kosovo might be
formulated to endorse Ahtisaari but take into account Serb
concerns and call on the EU to develop a comprehensive
strategy for integrating both Kosovo and Serbia. Whether
that sounding represented anything more than Churkin's own
personal rumination will have to be seen. End Summary.

Kosovars Succeed in Impressing


3. (C) Kosovar authorities did a good job of presenting
themselves and their aspirations to the visiting Security
Council members. In a punishing schedule of meetings on
April 27, the delegation met with the multi-party Kosovar
Albanian "Unity Team," the Kosovo government, Assembly heads
of caucus, and, later in the day, with Albanian political
representatives in south Mitrovica. The next day, the
delegation traveled to Krushe e Vogel, a small village where
Albanian men and boys were massacred by Serb forces in March

1999. In the Unity Team and government sessions, Kosovar
leaders made clear that the historical context of their
treatment under the Milosevic regime in Serbia meant that
they could never again contemplate living under Serb
sovereignty, no matter what government was now in place in
Belgrade. In vivid terms, they expressed their commitment to
multi-ethnicity and tolerance in Kosovo, as well as refugee
and IDP returns, though they acknowledged more needed to be
done on all fronts. Several permreps, including the
Peruvian, noted to COM at a reception that night how
surprised they had been to see the maturity of the Kosovo
government and its apparent readiness to take on the
independence challenge. Permreps also heard a strong message

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of support for independence and the Ahtisaari package from
non-Serb minority leaders (Bosniak, Turk and Roma) in a
separate meeting; this was particularly important to
counteract the accusations of Serb assembly members (note:
almost all Serb parties boycott the Kosovo Assembly, but a
few take part in committee deliberations),who complained
that their positions were ignored and overvoted by the
Albanian parties.

Serbs Take an Uncompromising Hard Line, But May Have
Overplayed


4. (C) In contrast to the Kosovars' moderate tone, Serb
interlocutors were harsh and uncompromising in their
condemnation of Ahtisaari, his plan, and the prospect of
Kosovo independence under any circumstances. A large meeting
of Serb reps in northern Mitrovica (including the three
northern mayors and local CCK officials) was dominated by a
loud and overbearing Marko Jaksic, together with his cohort
Milan Ivanovic. Amb. Khalilzad noted that at least one
comment was made during the meeting inferring that if the
Albanians asserted their independence, "why shouldn't the
Serbs?" implying that the declaration of a separate Serb
entity in Kosovo had not been ruled out by the hardline
leadership as a possible response to Kosovo's independence.
The same unyielding Serb attitude was evident in the
delegation's meeting in Gracanica with firebrand Serb
Orthodox Bishop Artemije, who referred to the threat posed by
Albanian extremists and described what he termed as the
mistreatment and abuse suffered by the Serbs at the hands of
Albanians under UN administration. Present at the Artemije
meeting were two of Serbian PM Kostunica's key advisers,
Slobodan Samardzic and Leon Kojen, the latter of whom spent
the entire meeting whispering into Artemije's ear -- a fact
noted with vocal annoyance by UK deputy permrep Karen Pierce.
The obvious confluence of Serbian state authority and the
Church's stand did not escape the attention of the UNSC
delegation members (Artemije subsequently showed up uninvited
at the next day's site visits to Orahovac and Brestovik in an
effort to squelch any possible note of moderation from local
Serb residents),nor did the stridency of the Serb tone
throughout, giving SC delegates the clear sense that
compromise on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan was a
non-starter for the Serbs, who uniformly demanded new
negotiations with a new negotiator.

EU Brief Brings Burst of Irritation from Indonesian, South
African


5. (C) Local EU planners for the International Civilian
Office and the EU Rule of Law mission, both slated to be
established in Kosovo under the Ahtisaari plan, briefed
permreps on their activities. The briefing elicited a short
burst of irritation from the Indonesian and South African
permreps, who complained that, while EU equities in Kosovo
were obvious, the planning activity preceded any decision by
the Security Council. South African permrep Kumalo
elaborated on this at some length, at one point exclaiming
that "if this is a European issue, why don't you just say so
and ask us to endorse your plans -- like we in African Union
do -- rather than present us with only one option for a
solution and claim it is the best way?" (Note: Kumalo took
up this theme again, though in a slightly more constructive
tone, with USOP DPO at the evening reception, reported
septel.) ICO Planning Team head Torbjorn Sohlstrom and EUPT
head Casper Klynge responded that prudent and timely planning
was necessary ahead of any SC resolution if the ambitious
transition timelines envisaged under the Ahtisaari plan were
to succeed. The French permrep also intervened to point out
that this would be by far the largest EU-led mission anywhere
in the world to date, and it would be irresponsible not to
plan ahead; however, he said, the content and structure of a
resolution remained in Security Council hands. Kumalo and
the Indonesian permrep appeared mollified by these answers.


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Russian Permrep Broaches Content of UNSC Resolution with Amb.
Khalilzad


6. (C) Late on April 28 as the visit progressed, Russian
permrep Churkin broached the subject of the UNSC resolution
with Amb. Khalilzad. Amb. Khalilzad emphasized that the
votes were now in place for endorsement of the Ahtisaari plan
and that the U.S. was prepared to move quickly. Churkin
noted that it would be better if the vote were unanimous, a
point heartily agreed by Amb. Khalilzad. Churkin asked,
however, how we could expect Moscow to support Kosovo
independence in light of other challenges Moscow was facing
(alluding to U.S. missile defense plans in Europe and the
Russians' own domestic political calendar). He raised the
possibility of a resolution on Kosovo endorsing the Ahtisaari
plan, but also stating something affirmative on refugee
returns, perhaps establishing a Special Envoy to deal with
the issue. In addition, Churkin said, the resolution could
call on the EU to develop a comprehensive strategy for
integrating both Serbia and Kosovo. Amb. Khalilzad responded
positively to both suggestions.

Comment


7. (C) While the trip may not have swayed all the
fence-sitters in the Security Council, it looks as though it
left permreps with a more positive vision of Kosovo than
either they or the Russians would have imagined at the
outset. The most important lingering doubt among some
permreps is whether there exists some other option besides
the Ahtisaari plan; this reflects their lack of understanding
of the 15-month process of negotiations and the failure of
the Serbs to engage in fruitful discussions or move off their
original negotiating position -- never clearly articulated --
of substantial autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia. Ahtisaari
himself will have a chance to brief the delegation the
evening of April 28, and we have relayed to him the
delegation's concerns ahead of that meeting. Most
interesting was the Russian permrep's ruminations on the
possible content of an affirmative UNSC resolution on Kosovo,
though whether this was simply a product of Churkin's own
mind or a reflection of what Moscow might contemplate we
leave to Embassy Moscow's judgement. Post wishes to thank
USUN for its invaluable assistance in negotiating a useful
and successful schedule for the visiting delegation to
Kosovo; the visit seems to have made a positive difference.
End Comment.


8. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release to
U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW