KOSOVO GOVERNING COALITION GROWS PROGRESSIVELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000224

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL YI UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO GOVERNING COALITION GROWS PROGRESSIVELY
WEAKER; OPPOSITION EMBOLDENED


Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Weak leadership, opposition enticements,
and the departure of AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj for the
Hague have all combined to progressively undermine the
governing coalition of Kosovo, which continues to limp along
despite intensified pressure from a variety of sources. The
internal politics of the largest party in the coalition, the
LDK, took a turn for the worse March 20 when one of the
party's Vice-Chairmen (and government Deputy Prime Minister)
Lutfi Haziri brazenly announced -- without the party
hierarchy's approval -- that the LDK would enter into
coalition with the opposition PDK in key eastern Kosovo
municipalities, implying strongly that a central-level
coalition between the LDK and PDK could be anticipated
sometime soon. The PDK has seized on the disarray in the LDK
to gain advantage both for its municipal branches and for the
voracious political ambition of PDK president Hashim Thaci.
It is not clear where Haziri's rogue actions will take the
LDK, or whether his actions will in fact stand, but the
likelihood of the national coalition holding over time is
steadily diminishing. The primary element holding Thaci back
from a full-blown assault on the government is USG insistence
(echoed this past week by Brussels in a strong message to
Thaci) that a reformulated government would result in chaos,
the walkout of key AAK government ministers, and a
corresponding black eye for Kosovo just at the time when its
case is being considered in the UN Security Council. End
summary.

LDK Disarray Increasingly Apparent


2. (C) While the departure of LDK rebels after current
party president Sejdiu's victory over rival Nexhat Daci last
fall was not enough to tear the LDK apart, it appears that
Sejdiu's own indecisiveness and lack of attention to party
and coalition matters is having much the same effect. As
post has reported, Daci was able to carve off six of the
LDK's caucus members in the Kosovo Assembly, though none of
these new "LDD" caucus members has yet chosen to challenge
the LDK's positions or collude with the opposition in a
no-confidence motion. More significantly, however, the
hemorrhage of LDK members in important LDK-dominated eastern
and central Kosovo municipalities -- Gjilane, Ferizaj,
Kamenica, and others -- has left the LDK in those localities
vulnerable to their newly-anointed LDD opponents and
susceptible to PDK blandishments. The focal point for this
stew of local politics has been Gjilane, where the almost
wholesale defection of LDK members to Daci's LDD
(orchestrated by the corrupt and incorrigible mayor Hyseni,
previously LDK and now LDD) led the rump LDK municipal
leadership to turn in desperation to their PDK colleagues for
support. PDK, never a party to let an opportunity slide, was
gladly there to pick up the pieces of the LDK-LDD split.


3. (C) In what many considered to be an astounding
development, LDK Vice-Chairman (one of five) and Kosovo
Deputy Prime Minister Lutfi Haziri -- a Gjilane native still
active in the political scene there -- announced March 20 in
a joint press conference with PDK Deputy Chairman (and E.O.
listee) Rrustem Mustafa (Remi) that the LDK and PDK would
form a broad series of coalitions in seven municipalities
throughout Kosovo, mainly in the east. Haziri would not
discount speculation that a national level coalition was in
the offing, going so far as to proclaim that he would
"welcome Thaci as his boss" (i.e., as the prime minister).
LDK party leaders, including acting president Eqrem Krieziu
-- who had only the day before publicly deemed the LDK-AAK
governing coalition alive and well -- were rocked back on
their heels by Haziri's bold move. It is uncertain that the
LDK hierarchy will allow Haziri's announcement or the new
municipal coalition arrangements to stand, and the
possibility that they will take action against Haziri for
blatantly ignoring party policy is real, raising the specter
of escalating infighting within the LDK as a result of these
divisions.

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PDK Gleefully Ready to Reap the Spoils


4. (C) Watching the melee is Hashim Thaci, whose undisguised
pleasure at the optic of LDK weakness has been evinced in
bolder and bolder statements about the likelihood of a new
coalition and the corrupt nature of the existing government.
Thaci's timing, of course, is also linked to the departure of
Ramush Haradinaj to the Hague; with Ramush gone, the inherent
fragility of the AAK has become startlingly evident and its
government ministers appear increasingly adrift in the
absence of firm guidance by the Prime Minister or Haradinaj's
appointed party successor, the congenial but ineffective
Ahmet Isufi. The AAK has made it clear that, in the event of
an LDK-PDK coalition, its ministers would walk out of the
government, and in truth it is certain that Thaci would want
as much.

Comment


5. (C) With fewer barriers to his ambitions in either the
LDK or AAK context, Thaci smells an opportunity almost too
good to pass up. Most distubing, even beyond the temptation
of the opposition and LDK rebels to bring the current
government down, are the increasing calls -- emanating mainly
from Thaci's camp -- to disband the Unity Team. The
reasoning is simple: who needs a Unity Team when a Unity
Government is the preferred option? Our view, of course, is
quite the opposite; the Unity Team is still very much needed
to accomplish the transition-related objectives of the next
few critical months, while a Unity Government would throw the
governing apparatus of Kosovo into chaos for a prolonged
period and provide proof positive to those in the
international community who argue the immaturity of Kosovo's
political leadership. We have conveyed to both Thaci and the
LDK leaders that the need for stability remains paramount
while Kosovo's case is being considered in the Security
Council, and EU Foreign Policy chief Solana delivered an
equally strong message in Brussels to Thaci last week. We
may not be able to give this fragile government a boost
forever -- and certainly not if coalition leaders are
unwilling to do the hard work themselves to maintain order
and discipline -- but we will be firm with all parties that
Kosovo's interests (not their own ambitions) must be
preeminent in this period.


6. (U) Post does not clear this message for release to UN
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW