KOSOVO: COM EMPHASIZES REDLINES IN FRANK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000208

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DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: KCRM KDEM PGOV PINR PREL YI UNMIK EAID PHUM
SOCI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: COM EMPHASIZES REDLINES IN FRANK
CONVERSATION WITH NOTORIOUS NORTHERN HARDLINER

REF: A. 06 PRISTINA 518


B. PRISTINA 169

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. During a conversation with E.O.-listed
northern Kosovo Serb hardliner Milan Ivanovic on March 15,
COM emphasized that Serbs are free to express their opinions
about Ahtisaari's proposals and the UN-led status process
underway, but that if their rhetoric spills into violent or
provocative action, KFOR and the international community will
respond decisively and robustly. Ivanovic maintained that
northern leaders would not breach the redlines outlined by
the COM, and he particularly denied that there was any
intention to force Serb members of the Kosovo Police Service
to resign or change uniforms. He claimed that the
leadership's objective was to preserve the status quo, in
which Kosovo Serbs have direct ties to Belgrade without
interference from Pristina. COM made it clear that the
status package would not alter day-to-day life for Serbs in
Kosovo, except insofar as it would improve conditions and
resources for the Serb communities, and repeatedly pressed
home that the ball was in the Serb leadership's court to
ensure that peace and stability continued to obtain in
Kosovo. END SUMMARY.

COM Engages Northern Hardliner


2. (C) On March 15, COM met with E.O.-listed northern Kosovo
Serb hardliner Milan Ivanovic in northern Mitrovica.
Ivanovic is a medical doctor and currently serves as the
director of the large Serbian-state run parallel institution
hospital in northern Mitrovica. He is also the deputy mayor
of Zvecan municipality, chairman of the Mitrovica branch of
the hardline Serbian National Council (SNC) and co-founder,
along with fellow E.O.-listee Marko Jaksic, of the hardline
Association of Serb Municipalities and Settlements (ASMS).
Ivanovic and Jaksic are considered to be behind the June 2006
decision by northern municipalities to cut ties with Kosovo
institutions (ref A),and are also notorious for using their
influence at the hospital to "encourage" employees to
participate in the protests they organize. Their control
over financial inflows to northern Kosovo from Belgrade's
Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija (CCK) contributes
to their influence (and to their reputation for corruption).
Despite this, Ivanovic is regarded as more pragmatic that the
violent and unpredictable Jaksic, who many characterize as
the "king" of northern Kosovo.


3. (C) Ivanovic began the meeting by reiterating the
well-known Serb positions on the Ahtisaari package and the
"illegitimacy" of Ahtisaari's role as negotiator, saying that
Kosovo Serbs categorically reject the status process as
incompatible with their long-term survival in Kosovo. He
also asserted his belief that Russia would block any effort
to pass a UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo
supplanting UNSCR 1244 and leading to Kosovo independence.
In response, COM told Ivanovic that she did not wish to have
a fruitless conversation debating the merits of the Ahtisaari
plan or comment on the supposed Russian position; rather, she
wanted to have a frank and open discussion of the coming
period and what was expected of the Serb leadership in Kosovo.

Ball is in Serb Leadership's Court; IC Will Respond to
Provocation


4. (C) COM emphasized that it was within the rights of the
Serb leadership and all members of the Serb community to
assert their opinions about Ahtisaari's proposals and Kosovo
independence; where that rhetoric crossed into the realm of
action, however, and particularly any violent or aggressive
action, the international community would respond decisively
and without hesitation. She pointed to clear redlines that
would spark international response: inciting or engaging in

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violence against the international community or Kosovo
Albanians; preventing employees of UNMIK or other
international organizations from doing their jobs or
accessing their workplaces; barricading streets or otherwise
impeding freedom of movement; and pressuring Serb members of
the Kosovo Police Service to leave the KPS or change uniforms
and assert their allegiance to a local Serb authority.


5. (C) In any of these instances, COM underscored, the
international community would be forced to react, leading to
the possibility of confrontation and an escalating
international police and military presence in the north -- an
outcome that would clearly not serve the interest of the Serb
leadership. In essence, she said, the ball was in the
northern Serb leadership's court to maintain peace and
stability and avoid tragic consequences for the Serbs of
Kosovo. She made plain that no one would seek to force the
pace of implementation of the Ahtisaari provisions nor
disrupt the daily life of Serbs north or south of the Ibar,
but noted that the possibilities for additional resources and
authorities inherent in the Ahtisaari plan could only redound
to the benefit of Serbs. She also pointed out that Ivanovic
and Marko Jaksic had made no friends and won no support for
themselves in the Kosovo Serb community when they insisted
some months back that Serb civil servants give up their PISG
salaries; Ivanovic laughed and acknowledged that this was so.



6. (C) Ivanovic himself raised the recent attempt to create
an alternate Serb leadership in the form of an inaugural
Serbian National Assembly in Gracanica on March 4, an effort
brutally quashed when northern-organized thugs (under Jaksic
and Ivanovic's instigation) broke up the session by shouting
the speakers down (ref B). Ivanovic insisted that the
session's disruption was engineered not by the northern
leadership but by "citizens" angry with the effort to "split
the Serb community," and hinted that any attempt to reconvene
the Assembly would be met with the same fate. COM observed
that she would have to be pretty foolish to believe that
ordinary citizens were behind the violence. She noted that
while Ivanovic likely regarded the message of intimidation to
moderate Serbs as a success for the northern leadership, he
should remember that the international community was closely
following these developments and would draw its own
conclusions -- and plan its future responses -- having
witnessed the northern leaders' willingness to pursue an
aggressive and threatening course. She emphasized again that
it would rest in the leadership's hands to avoid provocations
and confrontation over the coming period.

Ivanovic Careful, Cautious


6. (C) An alert Ivanovic, listening attentively, maintained
several times that northern leaders had no intent to engage
in unilateral actions that would breach the redlines COM had
expressed. (Note: We have sources indicating that just such
actions have in fact been contemplated recently by the top
northern Serb leadership, as they weigh their responses to
the upcoming presentation of the Ahtisaari plan to the UN
Security Council and the possibility of a future UNSC
resolution on Kosovo.) He referred to any claims to the
contrary as "misinformation," adding very carefully (looking
as though he and his cohorts had indeed considered this) that
there was no reason to tamper with the workings of the Kosovo
Police Service. (Notably, he said nothing about alternate or
clandestine "civil protection forces" and at one point early
in the conversation claimed that Kosovo Serbs, if forced to
accept independence, would "defend what was theirs.")
Ivanovic argued that Serbs in the north want only to preserve
the status quo and continued access to Belgrade institutions
and funding, without interference from Pristina. COM noted
that no one was threatening to disrupt or end those ties, and
stressed that if any misfortune befell the Serb community
because of an escalating spiral of violence, it would be due

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to bad decisions made by their own leadership; no one wanted
to see a repeat of Knin or Krajina in Kosovo.

Comment


7. (C) Ivanovic was quite clearly in listening mode. He
was far more restrained in his views and comments than in
previous meetings, politely referring to Albanians as
"Albanci" rather than the derogatory "Shiptari" he and other
northern hardliners usually favor, and quickly falling off
the customary rant about historical grievances once he
understood the seriousness of COM's message. It is plain
that he and his comrades are contemplating their options in
advance of the events of the approaching political season in
Kosovo. We will make plain the advantages to the Serb
leadership of keeping the current environment in place, no
matter what the political outcome in New York, and the real
consequences should they choose to swing from angry rhetoric
into a serious breach of the peace. We believe that there is
some room to affect their calculations, though logic will
likely be the first casualty in the north and elsewhere as
soon as the "independence" word becomes a reality and
emotions -- on both the Serb and Albanian sides -- take
center stage. END COMMENT.


8. (U) Post does not clear this message for release to UN
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW