KOSOVO: SDM MARCH 3 PROTEST PEACEFUL, RESULT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000168

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN
FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR
ACKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SDM MARCH 3 PROTEST PEACEFUL, RESULT OF
INTENSE POLITICAL PRESSURE BY KOSOVO'S LEADERSHIP

REF: A. PRISTINA 142


B. PRISTINA 164

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Self-Determination Movement (SDM),
virulently opposed to President Ahtisaari's final status
package for Kosovo and continued UNMIK presence, held a
peaceful protest March 3 in the center of Pristina that
attracted fewer than 3000 participants. No serious
incidents, injuries or arrests were reported. In contrast to
the violent SDM protest on February 10 -- at which two
demonstrators were killed and dozens injured -- the peaceful
outcome on March 3 was due to better communication between
the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and SDM; the fact that Albin
Kurti, SDM leader and firebrand, remains in jail; and -- most
important -- strong pressure on the SDM by the Kosovar
political leadership, USOP and other key internationals
condemning violence and equating support for SDM with being
opposed to the future of Kosovo. Despite the positive
outcome to this demonstration, we can expect stepped-up SDM
activity in the months leading up to final status resolution,
since resolution will render irrelevant SDM's raison d'etre.
END SUMMARY.

March 3 protest: Without incident, this time


2. (SBU) The Self-Determination Movement (SDM) held a March
3 demonstration in the center of Pristina in opposition to
the Ahtisaari final status package, the Unity Team, and the
continued presence of UNMIK. About 2000-3000 protestors
gathered at the SDM offices around 2:30 p.m. and then,
holding placards saying "Down with UNMIK!" and chanting
anti-package slogans and demanding the release of jailed SDM
leader Albin Kurti, marched past the National Theater, the
Assembly building, OSCE HQ, police HQ and, finally, UNMIK HQ.
In contrast to previous demonstrations, SDM "marshalls" in
their signature white t-shirts controlled the crowd by
forming a human cordon around the group. UNMIK and KPS
officers allowed protestors to pass but ringed them on either
side and did not allow them to enter buildings. At the
Assembly building, protestors stopped to listen to SDM leader
Glauk Konjufca rant about the Ahtisaari package and then
broke a glass and plywood box symbolizing the package.


3. (SBU) A possible confrontation at UNMIK HQ was averted
when police, after a few tense minutes had gone by, removed
barricades at the order of PDSRSG Schook and allowed
protestors to pass. They did so without incident, and then
dispersed on the way back to the SDM offices, where the
leaders called a press conference at 4:30 p.m. DOJ/ICITAP
rep, who was with the KPS leadership throughout, reported
that the SDM marshalls did a good job of contolling the
crowd; they were between protestors and police at all times.
There were no reports of violence or property damage.

Qualitatively different demonstration


4. (C) The peaceful outcome of this latest SDM protest --
as opposed to the violent demonstrations of November 28 and
February 10 -- was the result of a number of factors,
including better communication between the KPS leadership and
SDM. The two held a number of meetings in the week before
the protest; though SDM refused to renounce violence
categorically, movement leaders apparently calculated that it
was wise to avoid confrontation. To this end, KPS skillfully
used the media to pressure SDM and appeal to public opinion
by portraying the KPS as the good guys: police made it clear
they would accommodate SDM's legitimate requests, but
asserted resolutely that they would not tolerate damage to
property or people. Both KPS and UNMIK police were also
visibly better prepared; if violence had occurred (and it was
clear that demonstrators did come armed with paint bottles
ready to lob at official government and UNMIK vehicles, but
all such vehicles had been pulled back behind the
barricades),UNMIK police had both tightened

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command-and-control and employed improved tactics to confront
demonstrators (ref a).


5. (C) The continued incarceration of SDM leader and
firebrand Albin Kurti also had a beneficial effect (ref b).
Kurti has made confrontation with police the hallmark of his
leadership of the SDM movement and a means to augment his own
influence, small as that may be, over the Kosovo political
scene. He has also steadfastly refused to meet with the KPS,
regarding it as an institution of "traitors." With Kurti
held incommunicado in prison, the SDM was left without its
organizational genius and its most insidious influence.


6. (C) But key to the SDM's markedly different approach to
this demonstration was the clear condemnation of violence by
the Kosovar political leadeship. President Sejdiu, PM Ceku
and main opposition leader Thaci all strongly condemned the
February 10 violence and urged demonstrators on March 3 to be
peaceful. Sejdiu was even more bold, urging citizens not to
demonstrate at all, equating the demonstration with being
against the independence of Kosovo. Key internationals also
helped to underscore this message. COM gave a sharply-worded
televized interview on March 2, reprinted in full by the
widely-distributed daily newspaper Koha Ditore the morning of
the demonstration, describing the SDM organization as being
the enemy of the future of Kosovo.

Comment: What next?


7. (C) We can breathe a sigh of relief that the March 3
protest came off peacefully. But we can also expect
stepped-up SDM activity in the months leading up to final
status resolution, since resolution means that SDM's raison
d'etre -- opposing the status package -- will no longer be
relevant. We will keep the pressure on Kosovo's leadership
to renounce violence at every opportunity, work with them to
keep Albin Kurti in jail, and encourage them to pursue the
Ahtisaari process productively as the most effective
counterpoint to SDM's negative message. End Comment.


8. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its
entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW