KOSOVO: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF A/S FRIED TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000159

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (A/S FRIED, DAS DICARLO),EUR/SCE, NSC FOR
BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF A/S FRIED TO
KOSOVO FROM MARCH 6-8, 2007


Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Status fever continues to grip all residents
of Kosovo, with ethnic Albanians focused on the conclusion of
the Ahtisaari process and Serbs grimly wondering how they
will cope once the outcome is clear. With careful management
and assiduous courting of both Albanian and Serb leaderships,
we have kept tensions under control and the Unity Team intact
-- despite the delay in the status process beyond the end of
2006 and the troubling appearance of radical Albanian
protestors bent on causing havoc and disrupting international
negotiations on Kosovo. The presentation of Ahtisaari's plan
to the United Nations will edge nervousness even higher, and
could prompt a political declaration from Kosovo's northern
Serb leadership disavowing the settlement altogether. Key to
maintaining stability through all this will be resolute and
proactive leadership from Unity Team members -- a role they
are frankly unused to playing, and one that needs constant
bolstering from the U.S. government. Your visit will help
convince Kosovo Albanians that the long road to status is
nearing the final mark, but only -- only -- if they play
their part and ensure an end to violence. With Kosovo Serbs,
you can inject a note of reality on the likely outcome of the
Ahtisaari process, but assure them again of our intent to
support them both financially and politically after status is
determined. End summary.

Anxieties Building


2. (C) With UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari having pledged
publicly to bring his proposals to the United Nations by
mid-to-late March, anxieties among Albanians and Serbs in
Kosovo are building, though for markedly different reasons.
Albanians remain invested in the status process begun many
months ago, but worry -- with reason -- that the
Moscow/Belgrade axis could stymie an early UNSC resolution
and wonder where that will leave them. They also harbor
suspicions that some of the provisions of the Ahtisaari
document will unduly benefit Serbs and sustain the bifurcated
nature of Kosovo's existing institutional framework, though a
USOP-sponsored public outreach effort and meticulous
choreographing of the Unity Team's initial response to
Ahtisaari's presentation has helped ease those fears
considerably. Secure in the knowledge that the Ahtisaari
process continues to move forward, Kosovo Albanians have
shown no inclination to back the extremist
"Self-Determination Movement" led by Albin Kurti; no more
than a couple thousand people augmented the SDM ranks during
the February 10 demonstration (mainly out of curiosity --
most dispersed with the tear gas),and even the subsequent
and deeply regrettable deaths of two protestors at police
hands did not provoke a general outcry or massive negative
response.


3. (C) The Serb community in Kosovo remains torn between
wanting to believe that resolution of status will be blocked
in the UNSC and facing the possible ramifications of a
decision in favor of independence. In this, as always, the
yawning divide is between Serbs in the north and Serbs in the
south. The northern Serb leadership, tied uneasily to
Belgrade but by no means completely under Belgrade's sway, is
making its preference more and more obvious -- a partition of
the northern municipalities and north Mitrovica from the rest
of Kosovo, no matter what the consequences for Serb
communities south of the Ibar. Though the likes of Marko
Jaksic and Milan Ivanovic have denied this publicly, Serb
officials in the south have no illusions about the ultimate
aims of their northern colleagues, and they suspect strongly
that Belgrade is either tacitly or explicitly encouraging
these objectives. (The fact that, according to local
reports, numerous empty buses were sent down from Serbia to
transport northern Serbs to Belgrade for February 28th's
demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy only reinforces
southern Kosovo Serb beliefs that the Serbian government and
northern Kosovo leaders are in cahoots on policy goals.)
Equally mistrustful of the Kosovar Albanians, southern Serbs
feel abandoned and afraid, engaging with international

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community representatives in an attempt to protect their
communities and property in Kosovo. USOP has used multiple
opportunities to reach out to Serbs in both northern and
southern Kosovo, and your visit will provide another chance
to spread the message of USG support and assistance.

Your Message


4. (C) The next few weeks, without exaggeration, will be the
most critical ones in Kosovo's recent history. It rests
almost solely in Kosovar hands not to jeopardize the months
(and indeed years) of effort that have gone into the status
process, and they must accept this responsibility without
reserve. In your discussions with the President, Prime
Minister and Unity Team, you can stress that it is not enough
to simply respond to events; they must drive public opinion
and tackle the most difficult issues before/before they
become a problem. Insufficient attention to the SDM threat
and a failure to condemn the movement's activities before the
February 10 demonstration was a key contributor to the
violence that ensued. The Unity Team has proven more stable
(with much massaging from USOP) than we might have deemed
possible months ago, but it needs to be more than just a
marriage of convenience among disparate political leaders --
its members must take ownership of this process, rather than
finger point or lay the blame at the international
community's door when the glare of the public spotlight is
upon them (as, for example, the Prime Minister chose to do in
contesting the package's treatment of the Macedonia border
issue or the provisions dealing with the stand-up of a new
Kosovo Security Force).


5. (C) With your Serb interlocutors, your message can be at
once direct and sympathetic. Meeting Kosovo's northern Serb
mayors -- who are wholly beholden to their hardline
leadership -- you can stress our intent to keep an open
channel of communication, but underscore again our redlines:
Kosovo must remain peaceful; no violence can occur against
Albanians or international representatives; police must
remain under KPS uniform; and any declarative political
statements must be just that -- declarative. To act
otherwise would be to risk an elevated international response
by either KFOR or UNMIK, something neither they nor we
desire. Your interaction with Serbs in the south will be of
a quite different character: you will see Father Sava -- an
absolutely critical partner for the USG, and one we have
cultivated by taking up his monastery's case repeatedly
against hostile local officials -- at Decani monastery; you
will visit Partesh, an area outside Gjilan/Gnilane and in the
U.S. KFOR AOR destined to become a new Serb-majority
municipality under the Ahtisaari plan; and you will speak
with a Serb media outlet that broadcasts its interviews via a
network of local stations in Kosovo. You will also have a
chance to visit Camp Nothing Hill, KFOR's outpost in northern
Kosovo, where U.S. troops are serving on a month's rotation.
We hope your visit will afford you a better appreciation of
the views and concerns on all sides, but even more, that your
voice will provide needed reassurance to Serbs and Albanians
that we can fruitfully address their respective needs -- as
long as both respect the limits of international tolerance
and the norms of acceptable behavior.


6. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina does not clear this cable for
release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW