KOSOVO: UNMIK POLICE APPLY LESSONS LEARNED IN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN
FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR
ACKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM KDEM MOPS UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: UNMIK POLICE APPLY LESSONS LEARNED IN THE
WAKE OF DEADLY FEBRUARY 10 DEMONSTRATION

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Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent USOP conversations with top UNMIK
police leaders reveal that UNMIK plans to use the same
overall approach toward the planned March 3 demonstration of
the extremist Self-Determination Movement (SDM) that it used
during the violent SDM protest on February 10. That is, a
first line of Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers in normal
uniform, a second line of KPS police in riot gear, backed up
by a line of UNMIK specialized riot police, which in turn
would be backed up KFOR riot control soldiers, ready to
intervene as coordinated with UNMIK police and approved by
COMKFOR. However, UNMIK civpol plans to substantially
tighten command-and-control, a key failing on Feb. 10, and
make certain that lethal force -- rubber bullets killed two
protestors during the demonstration -- is used as a last
resort in accordance with standard norms and only if the
officer's life is endangered. Although UNMIK officials
stressed that the investigation into the deaths is ongoing,
the strong implication was that Romanian riot control police
did not respect these norms when they fired their weapons on
February 10 and were likely responsible for the two deaths
(strictly protect).


2. (C) SUMMARY (cont'd): Other UNMIK adjustments include
using better crowd dispersal tactics before and after tear
gas is administered, including the use of water trucks, and
erecting concrete barriers, vice wire fences, to stop
vehicles from crashing through police lines -- a successful
SDM tactic on February 10. The Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
continues to lack equipment, especially gas masks, and this
is being remedied, but will not be resolved by March 3. At a
February 23 meeting with the KPS director of operations, SDM
leaders refused to renounce violence categorically and said
they would "throw rocks and paint at police," claiming this
did not constitute an act of violence. Meanwhile, KFOR is
supporting UNMIK police by establishing aggressive vehicle
checkpoints to search for weapons and monitoring border areas
with Macedonia and the Presevo valley to discourage
participation of any ethnic Albanian extremists from these
areas. END SUMMARY.


3. (U) On February 22 and 23 USOP discussed lessons learned
from the February 10 violent protest of the
Self-Determination Movement (SDM) and preparations for the
upcoming March 3 SDM protest with new interim UNMIK Police
Commissioner Trygve Kalleberg (Norwegian),Kalleberg advisor
and former UNMIK Mitrovica Regional Commander Lars Finstad,
Chief of Staff Uwe Marquardt, Director of Operations Meinolf
Schlotmann, and Deputy Director of Operations Larry Wilson
(U.S.).

Same Operational Plan, But Better Command-and-Control and
Tactics


4. (C) These UNMIK police officials noted that UNMIK civpol
would keep to its operational plan of having Kosovo Police
Service (KPS) officers provide a first line of defense, in an
effort to have them communicate directly with demonstrators
to decrease tension and deter them from violent acts, such as
attempting to breach the line. UNMIK specialized riot police
("Formed Police Units (FPUs)) -- made up of Polish and
Pakistani officers on March 3, with a mobile Ukrainian unit
in reserve -- would back the KPS to form a second line of
defense. In the unlikely event this line was breached, riot
control soldiers from KFOR would provide a third line of
defense.


5. (C) UNMIK police officials emphasized that the use of
rubber bullets, which killed two demonstrators on February
10, would be subject to far more stringent
command-and-control. Finstad, who will be ground commander
on March 3, noted that these bullets would only be used under
"strict order" of the command staff and only if the officer's
life was endangered. Director of Operations Schlotmann
(protect),while stressing that the investigation into the

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deaths was ongoing, gave the strong impression that Romanian
FPU had not respected the standard distance for using rubber
bullets on February 10. He made clear these bullets could
not be used at close range, unless the officer's life was in
danger. All noted that contingents of international police
came as self-contained units, with their own equipment,
uniforms and weapons, and they would not be asked to have
rubber bullets removed from their weapons. However, all
these units had trained together and were aware of the rules
of engagement for using lethal force.


6. (C) Schlotmann said police would now use concrete
barriers to stop any vehicles from crashing through police
barricades. SDM had used this tactic successfully twice
before, on November 28 and February 10, and wire fences had
proven ineffective, he added. Schlotmann also indicated
that water trucks would be available to disperse violent
demonstrators. Schlotmann's deputy, Larry Wilson, an
American police officer who was on the ground on February 10,
said that UNMIK police would from the outset employ tactics
on March 3 that had proved successful: if tear gas needed to
be used, police would not wait for demonstrators to disperse,
but would advance. On February 10, he noted, police had
remained stationary as demonstrators from the rear kept
filling the gap from those who fled the tear gas at the
front. Police would also coordinate action to engage the
demonstrators from the rear; once police had encircled
protestors in this manner on Feb. 10, they dispersed quickly.


Praise for KPS


7. (C) Wilson and others had praise for the performance of
the KPS on February 10. They said KPS officers had behaved
professionally and had remained on the scene -- without gas
masks -- after being the unintentional target of UNMIK police
tear gas vollies. Asked if KPS would have gas masks on March
3, Chief of Staff Marquardt responded that this would not be
possible, but that plans were underway to bring in around
400-700 from Germany as soon as could be arranged. (Note:
Marquardt asked whether the U.S. might be able to arrange
transportation from Germany to Pristina; post is awaiting
further communication from UNMIK or KPS to identify what
equipment or assistance might be needed. End Note.)

SDM Refuses to Renounce Violence in Meeting with KPS


8. (C) At a February 23 meeting between KPS Chief of
Operations Gen. Rashit Maliqi and SDM leaders Glauk Konjufca
and Liburn Aliu, Maliqi, who said KPS supported the right of
SDM to demonstrate peacefully, specifically asked what route
the group planned to take and what protestors planned to do.
(UNMIK police were not present; Maliqi later briefed Director
of Operations Schlotmann, who then briefed USOP.) The SDM
leaders drew a distinction
between violence against persons and property, and -- though
they claimed to eschew violence -- in the same breath said
they "planned to throw some paint and rocks" at police.
Maliqi warned against doing this, and asked whether
protestors planned to occupy government institutions; he was
told that SDM could not share this information as "it was
secret." Maliqi again warned the SDM representatives that if

SIPDIS
the protest turned violent, the demonstrators would be asked
to disperse, at which point the KPS would expect SDM leaders
to tell their followers to go home.

9. (C) Maliqi plans to meet again with SDM leaders on
February 27 and present them with a map of the route the KPS
wants them to take in order to avoid confrontation. The KPS
will then release a public statement detailing the lengths to
which the KPS has attempted to reason with the SDM, and the
expected refusal of SDM to adjust their plans and avoid
violence.

KFOR's Support Role


10. (C) With regard to the March 3 protest, DATT reports

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that KFOR plans a three-phased approach to support UNMIK
civpol in the run-up to and aftermath of the event. The
first phase, running from February 28 until the
demonstration, will focus on the following elements: an
aggressive intelligence operation; 24-hour border control
support at gates located in the U.S. KFOR sector (to deny
access to individuals bringing weapons in from Macedonia);
24-hour friendly, but highly visible vehicle control points
(VCPs) on routes entering Pristina to search for weapons or
any device that might be used as a weapon during the
demonstration, with special attention to ethnic Albanians
from Macedonia or Presevo valley; and generally increased
KFOR vigilance and force readiness to react to incidents that
could threaten a safe and secure environment Kosovo-wide.
During the second phase, at the demonstration itself, KFOR
would employ robust VCPs around Pristina that could close
access to the city on order; pre-deploy riot control capable
forces within Pristina in support of UNMIK police; and
conduct event documentation for post-operational analyis.
(Note: Similar to UNMIK's tightening of its
control-and-command over lethal force, KFOR has revised its
rules of engagement for riot control such that rubber
bullets, water cannon, pepper spray, and electric shock can
only be used by riot control soldiers with the authorization
of COMKFOR, not the commander of the multi-national task
force in question.)


11. (C) In the third phase, from the end of the demonstration
until approximately 10 p.m. on March 3, KFOR would monitor
post-demonstration activities and the departure of groups
from Pristina; be prepared to sustain support to UNMIK and
KPS to secure designated sites within Pristina; be ready to
sustain VCPs established during phase two to deny entry of
individuals seeking to join violence should it continue in
Pristina; and assist in apprehension of individuals involved
in violent acts.

Comment


12. (C) Riot control is not an exact science, and only time
will tell whether UNMIK police and the KPS have learned the
correct lessons from February 10 and covered all the
necessary contingencies that might arise if the March 3 SDM
protest turns violent. Nevertheless, both appear to have
made an effort to avoid repeating the turn of events that led
to the death of two protestors on February 10 and the
subsequent blow to UNMIK credibility and the final status
process. Police will face a determined foe on March 3, one
still determined to use violence -- and possibly serious
violence -- as a means of provoking an escalating response
from law enforcement. We have strongly urged Kosovo's
political leadership -- President Sejdiu, PM Ceku, main
opposition leader Thaci, Assembly Speaker Berisha -- to state
clearly and unambiguously that support for SDM means opposing
the status process and the aspirations of the Kosovar people.
President Sejdiu plans to address the Kosovar public via a
television broadcast on all three national networks Thursday,
March 1. We hope that these strong messages combined with a
resolute but proportional response by police will further
undercut the appeal of the SDM organization, which has no
real platform or purpose beyond destroying the Ahtisaari
process. END COMMENT.


13. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina does not/not clear this cable
for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW