CZECHS SUPPORT U.S. POSITION ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000929

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2017
TAGS: PREL KV EUN UN EZ
SUBJECT: CZECHS SUPPORT U.S. POSITION ON KOSOVO

REF: STATE 109526

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Michael Dodman for reasons
1.5 b+d


1. (C) Summary: The Czech position on Kosovo remains strongly
supportive of U.S. and Contact Group thinking. The Czech MFA
supports the upcoming round of talks between Belgrade and
Pristina, but remains skeptical a mutual agreement will be
reached. The MFA predicts the Czechs would recognize a
unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence, but fears that
such a move will be a severe blow for EU CFSP. End Summary.


2. (C) Pol-Econ Counselor delivered reftel demarche on Aug 8
to Czech MFA Director for Eastern and Southern Europe Tomas
Szunyog. Szunyog welcomed details on the U.S. position, and
quickly agreed that the Czech view was largely in line with
the U.S. Specifically, Szunyog offered the following
thoughts:
-- the Czechs are disappointed that Russia has not engaged
effectively on the Ahtisaari plan, and that both Belgrade and
Pristina are resistant to further compromise;
-- the Czechs do not predict success in the upcoming four
months of talks, but nonetheless support a renewed effort to
reach an agreed compromise (and to bring Moscow on board);
-- that said, Szunyog sees little room for improvement over
the Ahtisaari plan, since offering any additional protections
or guarantees to the Kosovar Serbs risks giving them so much
autonomy that it would effectively split Kosovo.


3. (C) Szunyog expressed some concern about setting December
as the termination for the negotiation effort. His main
concern is that it may be hard to win a more flexible Russian
approach in the run up to the Russian presidential election.
But he also pointed to numerous other events in and around
December that may make it harder to seal a deal, including:
-- the potential for a declaration of some sort by Pristina
on Nov 28,
-- campaigns for Serbian presidential and municipal elections
in 2008,
-- the early December deadline for Russian withdrawal from
CFE, and
-- potentially a new UNSC Resolution on Iran late in the year.


4. (C) Szunyog also reviewed dynamics within the EU and the
likely Czech stance. He said the Czechs had not yet decided
how they will approach Kosovo within the EU, but expect this
will be a major topic at the September Gymnich meeting.
While they will certain express support for the coming
negotiations, they have not decided how active to be in
raising the question of what to do if those talks fail.
Szunyog predicted the stance of the French and UK on this
will drive the debate within the EU, in part because the
Portuguese presidency is not likely to play a strong role.
Regardless of how the internal debate progresses in the
coming months, the Czech MFA is sure that there will be no
unified EU stance in the event that talks fail and Kosovo
declares independence without a UNSCR. In this case, Szunyog
said, the Czechs will likely recognize the declaration, but
probably "would not be either the first or the last EU member
to do so." He expects a group of six member states with
minority concerns (Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Romania,
and Slovakia) to prevent any EU position in favor; they would
likely find support from Germany and others concerned about
legal questions but also the impact of such a move on
Russian-EU relations. This would produce a "crisis" for
CFSP, and would call into question the planned EU takeover of
UNMIK responsibilities, as well as participation of some
states in KFOR.


5. (C) The Czechs have a relatively large presence in KFOR,
and intend to maintain this deployment regardless of the
direction taken by status talks. One concern is that the
Czechs are currently part of a joint Czech-Slovak brigade,
and the Czechs expect the Slovaks would pull their troops if
there is a unilateral declaration.


6. (C) Szunyog said the Czechs are aware that supporting a
unilateral declaration carries risks, but on balance it is in
Czech interest. The major risk Szunyog sees is that Russia
could follow through on threats to support Abkhazia's
independence, leading to possible integration into Russia.
Domestically there are also risks. The opposition CSSD has
been vocal in opposing independence. While Kosovo is not a
strong domestic issue, the Czech government has other reasons
for not wanting to antagonize CSSD -- primarily because it
may need their support to win approval for the missile
defense agreement with the U.S., which should go to
Parliament for approval late this year or early in 2008.
Szunyog admitted he is not involved in discussions on missile
defense, but his overall assessment is that Czech support for
Kosovo's independence would not become a significant domestic

PRAGUE 00000929 002 OF 002


political issue.


7. (SBU) Finally, Szunyog offered some details on planned
Czech diplomatic representation in the region. The GOCR is
planning to upgrade and expand its presence in Pristina.
Currently they have one mid-level diplomat, co-located with
the Slovaks. The Czechs intend to send a "senior diplomat"
this fall, to be supported by two officers, and located
separate from the Slovaks. They have not determined how this
new Liaison Office will function. Currently Belgrade
supports the single Czech diplomat, but Szunyog would prefer
to see this office supported by Skopje. The Czechs also want
to upgrade their representation in Skopje, creating a full
embassy later this year, but budget planning for that
continues.
GRABER