CZECH OPPOSITION LEADER ON MISSILE DEFENSE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000853

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV GE EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH OPPOSITION LEADER ON MISSILE DEFENSE:
WORRIED ABOUT EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d


1. (C) Summary: Jiri Paroubek, Chairman of the opposition
Czech Social Democrats (CSSD),told Ambassador July 18 that
he continues to have no personal objection to missile
defense, but has been placed in a bind because of the lack of
support within his party and the absence of maneuvering room
the government has permited him. He said the best hope for a
change in the atmosphere within CSSD would be proof that the
missile threat was real, which he does not expect will be
seen in the next year. Paroubek said he is very focused on
improving CSSD's relations with the German Social Democrats,
and said that he is close to reaching an agreement on
cooperation with SPD; he made clear that SPD's views on MD
will color his own. However, contradicting a statement he
made in a televised debate, Paroubek said that he would
adhere to any agreement concluded by this government if he
becomes Prime Minister, including missile defense. Paroubek
also said he looks forward to visiting the United States
later this year. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador asked to meet with Paroubek to discuss
several recent comments the CSSD leader has made that appear
to signal a toughening position on MD. The meeting took
place at the embassy. The Ambassador acknowledged Paroubek's
difficult political situation, but reminded him of his
repeated pledge to remain flexible on MD. He encouraged
Paroubek to think beyond politics and consider what is
important for his country. He reminded Paroubek that CSSD
had previously focused heavily on the importance of linking
the proposed U.S. MD assets in Europe to NATO, and noted how
much progress had been achieved on this front in a short
period.


3. (C) Paroubek's response was largely focused on politics.
He complained that he faced a dilemma in that there was
almost no support for MD within his party and further that
the Topolanek government had left him "no room to maneuver."
He assured the Ambassador he was looking for a way to make MD
work within CSSD. The only sure way to build support within
the party was to demonstrate that there is an actual threat
to the country from missile attack, not a "virtual threat."
He doubted such a shift in perception would take place in the
next 6-12 months, i.e., within the period that the MD
agreements will be negotiated and considered in Parliament.
Paroubek acknowledged the Ambassador's assessment of the
progress on NATO, but stated only that he "wished it had come
earlier."


4. (C) Paroubek focused much of the meeting on his relations
with other European social democratic parties. He said that
CSSD positions will increasingly reflect the views of
European social democrats. Specifically he focused on CSSD's
links with the German SPD. He termed this the most important
partner for CSSD, and said he wants the closest possible
cooperation with them. Paroubek revealed that he is now
negotiating a cooperation agreement with SPD. He termed MD
the first issue on which SPD had expressed significant
interest in cooperating with CSSD. He added that the
position of his "friends" in Europe -- mentioning
specifically Slovak PM Fico and Italian PM Prodi -- made it
difficult for him to take a more positive stance on MD. At
the same time, as he always does, Paroubek went out of his
way to stress that MD was the only significant issue on which
his party disagreed with the U.S.


5. (C) The Ambassador and Paroubek also discussed the trip he
plans to make (with USG support) to the U.S. in the fall.
Paroubek promised to let us know the best dates for travel in
October or November, depending on the parliamentary calendar.
He said (without notable enthusiasm) that he looks forward
to learning more about MD and U.S. policy, and said he had no
specific requests in terms of facilities that he would visit.



6. (C) Comment: Paroubek clearly feels backed into a corner
on MD. It is not clear from this meeting whether he is
responding now primarly to domestic political calculations or
some desire to boost his influence by expanding his position
on the European stage. Czech government officials told us
they had not previously heard of Paroubek's desire for closer
cooperation with SPD, and plan to use their own connections
in Berlin to see if the SPD connection can actually be a
positive. The GOCR continues to see Paroubek as a key
element in their effort to win eventual parliamentary
approval of the MD agreements. We will be encouraging the
government to find some way to counter Paroubek's perception
that the government has left him no "maneuvering room." We
(and the GOCR) continue to support the planned Paroubek trip
to the U.S. in the fall, including a visit to U.S. facilities

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where he can be briefed both on the MD system and the threat
to Europe and the United States.
DODMAN