KOSOVO: CZECH GOVERNMENT ON AHTISAARI PROPOSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000195

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR ERIC FICHTE, EUR/SCE FOR JOSHUA BLACK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM YI ZL EZ
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: CZECH GOVERNMENT ON AHTISAARI PROPOSAL

REF: 2006 PRAGUE 0744

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mike Dodman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The Czech government continues its firm
support for the Ahtisaari plan. The Czechs are concerned
about EU unity on Kosovo, particularly if a new UNSC
resolution fails. The opposition CSSD, whose leader has
expressed skepticism about Contact Group efforts, is not
making it easy for the Czech government. The MFA believes
that the CSSD may be expressing criticism of the Ahtisaari
plan at the request of the Slovak Prime Minister (CSSD
Chairman Paroubek and Slovak PM Fico are close). We will
engage with the Czechs on Kosovo in the weeks ahead, and
would strongly support possible consultations between the
Czech government and EUR DAS DiCarlo. End summary.


2. (C) Poloff met with MFA Director of South-East and East
European Department Tomas Szunyog on February 21 to discuss
the Czech position on Kosovo. Szunyog confirmed the Czechs
continue to "fully support" the Ahtisaari proposal, including
the recommended schedule and way forward.


3. (C) Szunyog expressed hope that the proposal will move
quickly to the UNSC for consideration (ideally in early
March) and that a resolution expressly superseding UNSCR 1244
and authorizing the continuing presence of NATO and EU troops
will be approved. He said it is important to act quickly to
keep the momentum.


4. (C) If the UN resolution were to fail, Szunyog feared that
EU unity could splinter. He thought that Slovakia in
particular may move to block consensus, thereby preventing
the EU from recognizing an independent Kosovo. Other possible
EU opponents of unilateral recognition include Cyprus,
Greece, Spain, and Romania, he said. Szunyog also predicted
that some of Kosovo's neighbors may refuse to accept Kosovo's
independence without a UNSC resolution. For example, he
thought Montenegro may not recognize Kosovo for fear of
antagonizing Serbia.

5.(C) Regarding Serbia's prospects for EU accession, Szunyog
noted the February 12-13 GAERC conclusions expressly state
that Serbia "remains welcome" to join the EU. He added this
position is not likely to change. Nevertheless, the EU member
states continue to disagree on the extent to which ICTY
compliance should be required prior to resuming SAA talks.
Restarting SAA talks will encourage Serbs to focus on their
future, thereby minimizing the rise of nationalism and/or the
risk of conflict (although Szunyog was skeptical about the
possibility of violence). Other member states, such as the
UK, are sticklers on ICTY compliance. In the GAERC
conclusions, the foreign ministers finally agreed on text
that requires "concrete actions" towards ICTY compliance.


6. (C) In the Czech Republic, Szunyog foresaw increased
debate about the Ahtisaari package. Szunyog noted that the
opposition Social Democrats (CSSD) have become more outspoken
in their opposition to the Ahtisaari proposal. Specifically,
the Chairman of Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee Jan
Hamacek (CSSD) recently stated that he believes final status
should emerge from an agreement between the Serbs and the
Kosovars, and should not be imposed on one or the other
party. CSSD has called for further debate on the issue within
Parliament. Szunyog believed the Slovaks had urged CSSD to
state this position more openly than they had in the past.
(Comment: CSSD Chairman Jiri Paroubek has long stated this
view openly, including when he was prime minister. Despite
this -- Paroubek's "personal opinions" on Kosovo -- his
government, like the current one, supported the Contact Group
position. End comment).


7. (C) Looking ahead, Szunyog was confident that Czech policy
would not change in the immediate future. He hesitated,
however, on the question of what happens if the UNSC fails to
authorize a new resolution. Szunyog did not want to
speculate, but did offer that the government could have to
take into account the views of CSSD in such a situation. In
a separate meeting on February 27, MFA Political Director
Martin Povejsil told DCM that the GOCR hopes that the current
"debate" in Slovakia on Kosovo will not "spill over" into the
Czech Republic.


8. (SBU) Szunyog recalled the success of his bilateral
consultations with DAS Rosemary DiCarlo and Kosovo Desk
Officer Joshua Black last spring. He said these meetings
helped the Czechs better align their Kosovo policy with U.S.
policy, and he hoped that another meeting with DiCarlo might

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be arranged in Washington or during one of DiCarlo's visits
to Europe.


9. (C) Comment. We will engage with the GOCR on the UNSC
resolution and on Czech thoughts on leverage they or others
may have with the Slovaks. The Czech government believes it
has little chance of turning around Slovak PM Fico; the one
person who could -- CSSD Chairman Paroubek -- firmly believes
that the approach Ahtisaari has recommended is wrong. The
MFA also appears to fear that Czech intervention in
Bratislava could backfire domestically, giving greater voice
to the CSSD and opponents of the deal and complicating the
government's task of maintaining firm support for Ahtisaari.

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