PRACTICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

UNCLAS PORT OF SPAIN 001099

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT--MCCUNE;CIA FOR NCTC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC CVIS KVPR PGOV PINR PREL PTER TD KHLS
SUBJECT: PRACTICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
ON INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING

REF: (A) STATE 133921 (B) 06 STATE 190832 (C) 06 PORT
OF SPAIN 01035

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY


1. (SBU) This cable responds to questions in ref A.
Questions in ref B were previously answered in ref C.


Watch listing
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2. (SBU) The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT)
maintains both an &alert list8 of individuals who should be
immediately detained upon entry and a &watch list8 of
people whose entry into T and T is made known to appropriate
agencies for monitoring of movements, etc. The number of
names on this list is unknown, although interlocutors have
indicated that there are &too many8 names and that the
lists should be culled. The watch list and alert list are
maintained by the Ministry of National Security.

Traveler Information Collection
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3. (SBU) The GOTT collects information from travelers
arriving in Trinidad and Tobago based on regulations in the
Immigration Act. The travel documents of passengers arriving
by air and sea, including passengers and crew of yachts and
similar craft, are examined in the same manner by immigration
officials. Although policies are the same for arrivals by
air and sea, a slight difference in regulations calls for
more intensive monitoring of maritime arrivals, although this
is not always practiced; one difficulty is that immigration
officials monitoring maritime arrivals are generally
presented with a paper list of names of passengers and crew
and their nationality and passport information, making rapid
screening difficult. The GOTT may share information on
individual travelers with foreign governments on a case by
case basis if requested; there is no formal policy
authorizing this, and information is not shared on a routine
basis. During the Cricket World Cup in 2007, various
Caribbean nations cooperated on sharing data, but this
practice lapsed in T and T due to a sunset clause. The GOTT
collects passenger name record (PNR) data on incoming
commercial flights or vessels, but this is sometimes in hard
copy on paper. U.S. Customs is currently working with T and
T Customs and Excise officials to automate passenger lists
and enter and retrieve them electronically. PNR data is
currently available to systematically screen travelers for
intelligence or law enforcement purposes, but in practice
arrivals by sea are more difficult to screen. The GOTT does
not have any existing treaties to share PNR data. Although
the electronic travel authority systems and the data base
currently in place have been used to detect security threats,
including wanted criminals, an interlocutor has commented
that sometimes too many names are flagged without sufficient
accompanying data on reasons to detain or monitor an
individual.

Border Control and Screening
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4. (SBU) The GOTT employs new software that has certain
algorithms to screen travelers of security interest, but it
is not certain that this has been activated for daily use.
All travelers, both T and T citizens and other nationals, are
recorded and tracked. There is no data available on the
frequency with which travelers are admitted with ostensibly
bona fide documents that are not electronically recorded.
Unrecorded entries and exits by persons arriving by boat from
Venezuela at locations other than official ports of entry are
frequent; the number of such entries and exits may be between
five and ten percent of all entries and exits. There is
legislation in place authorizing border control officials to
use other criminal data when deciding who can enter the
country. Individuals attempting to enter without valid
travel documents are referred by officials of the Immigration
Division of the Ministry of National Security to the Special
Branch Police, who detain them until they can be sent back to
the country from which they arrived. Individuals are
sometimes sent back without being questioned on the
provenance of their false documents, although recently more
of them have been questioned regarding their reasons for
attempting to enter T and T illegally before they are sent
back to their previous point of origin. Government policies
on questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals

presenting themselves at a point of entry follow regulations
in the Immigration Act; the GOTT also refers to International
Conventions to which it is a signatory. Information
sharing within and among agencies of the GOTT has
traditionally been sporadic, irregular, and not adequate for
making rapid decisions or taking quick action. Recently, due
to personal contacts among agencies formed by training
together, this situation has begun to improve slightly.

Biometric Collection
--------------


5. (SBU) The only biometric in the GOTT border control system
installed by the Canadian Banknote Company is facial
recognition capability. Officials of the Immigration
Division are not legally authorized to take or collect
fingerprints. There is some discussion of using fingerprint
biometrics in the passport application process.


Passports
--------------


6. (SBU) The GOTT began to issue machine readable passports
in June of 2007; these passports include facial recognition
features. The GOTT does not share the public key to read
data with other governments. However, the system in place
can read biometric data from other countries, provided they
have made the key available. The GOTT issues a standard
passport with the normal five-year validity to replace a
passport that has been lost or stolen. There are no standard
procedures in place for bearers who frequently report their
passports lost or stolen. However, each application to
replace a stolen passport must be accompanied by a police
report. The older style passport that was easier to alter
was more likely to be reported lost or stolen than the newer
machine readable passport. In most cases, a new standard
passport with no distinctive identifying features is issued
with a full five years, validity. Post has not noticed an
increase in the number of passports with no record of prior
travel being used to apply for U.S. visas. There is an
emergency passport that has a white cover (the regular
passport is dark blue) and has its own series of serial
numbers.

Fraud Detection
--------------


7. (SBU) There is a fraud unit within the police that
investigates various instances of fraud, including the use of
fraudulent documents. In addition, as part of a training
program conducted by the IOM, immigration officials are being
issued hand-held scanners, loupes, and combination loupes and
infrared and black light devices with which to examine
passports. The GOTT will also reportedly subscribe to the
Edison database, which provides examples of all passports in
the world and their identifying features.

Privacy and Data Security
--------------


8. (SBU) The immigration and data base system currently in
use reportedly contains information on previous deportations.
Records related to questioning, detention or removal of
individuals are kept on file indefinitely, usually in locked
filing cabinets. The collection and use of sensitive data is
restricted by privacy laws; however, data is shared among
GOTT entities as required. Post is not aware of any
requirement to provide notice to the public concerning the
implementation of new databases of records; post is also
unaware of laws relating to security features for government
computer systems that hold personally identifying
information. The Freedom of Information Act would allow an
individual to request access to data, either raw data or case
file data that domestic security agencies hold about him;
however, there are some prescribed exceptions to the type of
data that must be made available. A non-citizen does not
have the right to sue the GOTT to obtain data held by a
government security agency about him.
KUSNITZ