PREVAL: CHAVEZ VISIT A MESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 000522

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID XM XL HA VE
SUBJECT: PREVAL: CHAVEZ VISIT A MESS

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 492

B. PORT AU PRINCE 433

C. PORT AU PRINCE 266

D. PORT AU PRINCE 78

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Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: To hear President Rene Preval tell it,
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' visit to Haiti on March 12
was a logistical nightmare and an annoyance to the GoH.
Chavez thwarted Preval's efforts to keep the public profile
of the visit low key. In the aftermath of the visit, Preval
told Ambassador and others that he is skeptical of Chavez's
promises, especially on delivery of gasoline through the
Petrocaribe agreement. Secretary General of the Presidency
Fritz Longchamps told Polcouns that the GoH viewed the Chavez
visit as the price to pay for whatever assistance Venezuela
provides to Haiti. Aside from new and renewed pledges of
assistance (ref A) Chavez made concessions on several points
allowing Haiti to more easily implement Petrocaribe,
according to Michael Lecorps, the head of the GoH office
tasked with Petrocaribe. Preval and company may be
overselling their irritation toward Chavez for our benefit,
but Preval has consistently voiced wariness of Chavez in
conversations with Emboffs going back to the early stages of
the presidential campaign in 2005. In any case, it appears
that Preval will do what it takes to elicit assistance from
Chavez, but has otherwise shown no interest in joining Chavez
in his broader "Bolivarian agenda." End Summary.


2. (C) Preval told Ambassador the evening of March 13 that
Chavez was a difficult guest. The Venezulean did not have a
GOH invitation but insisted on coming to mark Venezuelan flag
day (ref C) and only the arrival of two advance planes two
days before the visit gave Port au Prince warning Chavez was
on his way. After finally arriving at the Palace, Chavez
made Preval and his team wait 40 more minutes while he spoke
to Castro by telephone. Responding to Ambassador's
observation that giving Chavez a platform to spout
anti-American slogans here was hard to explain given our
close relationship and support of Haiti and of Preval's
government in particular, Preval stressed that he had worked
hard to stop much of Chavez' proposed grandstanding. He
vetoed a Chavez-led procession/demonstration from the airport
to the Venezuelan Embassy (substituting a wreath laying at
Port-au-Prince's monument to Bolivar) and limited the length
of the press conference. Chavez, for his part, insisted that
the press conference proceed as scheduled, thus cutting into
bilateral meeting time. Preval added that he, Preval, is
"just an independent petit bourgeoisie" and doesn't go for
the grand gestures that Chavez favors. Haiti needs aid from
all its friends, Preval added, and he is sure that the US
understands his difficult position. The President was
uncomfortable with the exchange, later noting that Haiti's
chattering classes will claim that the Chavez visit led to
cancellation of a rumored visit here by President bush.


3. (C) According to UN SRSG Edmund Mulet (who hosted an
ebullient Preval for dinner following the capture of Cite
Soleil gang leader Evans Jeune later in the week),Preval
told him that he didn't trust Chavez to follow through on his
promises and requested that the Cuban ambassador participate
in the sessions. The Cuban government went further in
sending Vice President Esteban Lazo Hernadez, who had
participated in other trilateral meetings with Haiti and
Venezuela. Preval also told fomer UNSRSG Juan Gabriel Valdez
(visiting here on behalf of the OAS) that he was appalled by
Chavez's behavior at the airport and on the way to the
palace. He refused to get out of the car when Chavez insisted
on greeting his demonstrators in the street on his way in
from the airport. Preval and others in the government
believe that the Venezuelan Charge d'Affaires orchestrated
and paid for the demonstrations by Famni Lavalas militants at
the airport, the Venezuelan Embassy, and the palace, which
numbered roughly 1,000 and also called for the return of
former President Arisitide.


4. (C) ''Now that this trip is over, a great weight has

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been lifted off my shoulders,'' Longchamps told Polcouns on
March 14, stressing that Haiti had to host Chavez if the GoH
was going to get any aid and assistance from Venezuela. The
GoH does not expect that Chavez will follow through on most
of his promises, but even half, or a quarter, would be
significant. The most valuable use of Venezuelan aid,
according to Longchamps, would be funding for salaries,
supplies, medicine, and shelter for the Cuban doctors and
advisors currently working in Haiti: the GoH hopes this
funding will come from the USD 20 million humanitarian
reserve fund that Chavez re-pledged. Longchamps told
Polcouns that Haiti has about 300 Cubans working officially
in Haiti, of whom 90 percent are doctors. Also, Longchamps
recalled, Preval brought the Cubans to Haiti during his first
term, and the continued success of this program is important
to the President. Longchamps added that the trilateral
cooperation bureau that Cuba and Venezuela promised to set up
in Port-au-Prince is ''just an idea,'' with no definite plans
for implementation. Haiti has no plans to join the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (known as ALBA),
Venezuela's free trade zone.


5. (C) The Petrocaribe agreement, through which Haiti would
get a 25-year loan on 40 percent of the fuel it purchases
from Venezuela is still in discussion stages, and Preval told
Valdes that ever since the initial shipment in May, 2006,
Venezuela has made no real attempts at progressing with the
agreement. Apparently the two countries signed off on a few
details during Chavez' visit (which Longchamps told Polcouns
the GoH pressured Chavez into signing),such as allowing
Haiti's oil industry to ship the product (Venezuela had
insisted on the shipping rights until now),and giving the
oil companies the right to receive the product in place of a
state-owned oil company, as previously stipulated by
Venezuela (ref D). Industry representatives claim that
despite the progress made during Chavez' visit, the agreement
would still take over a year to implement and suspect that it
will never take place at all. The head of Haiti's
Petrocaribe office (known as the monetization bureau),
Michael Lecorps, confirmed that Venezuela doubled its
commitment to 14,000 barrels per day and pledged to work with
the oil industry in Haiti, an unprecedented move on Chavez'
part, according to Lecorps.


6. (C) Comment. The Ambassador and Polcouns have voiced
concern to senior officials that Chavez had used his visit as
a platform for an attack on Haiti's closest and steadiest
bilateral ally, most recently with PM Alexis yesterday. It
is clear that the visit has left a bad taste in our
interlocutors' mouths and they are now into damage control.
Preval himself has no love for Chavez: Valdes reminded us
that during a private Preval visit to Venezuela prior to the
2006 elections, Chavez blind-sided him with a draft statement
pledging support for the return of Aristide. Preval has yet
to forgive him, according to intimates. At no time has
Preval given any indication that he is interested in
associating Haiti with Chavez' broader "revolutionary
agenda." We believe that the GOH will continue to argue that
hosting Chavez was an unavoidable consequence of Preval's
effort to solicit aid from any quarter, and that Preval did
his best to rein Chavez in. Preval himself will continue to
focus his public remarks on Venezuelan (and Cuban) assistance
for Haiti -- it is neither in his character -- nor in his
calcuation -- to repudiate Chavez, even as the Venezuelan
abuses his hospitality at home.
SANDERSON

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