Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PORTAUPRINCE124
2007-01-24 19:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:  

MINUSTAH SEES LIGHT AT END OF TUNNEL

Tags:  PGOV PREL KCRM KPKO MARR ASEC MOPS HA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7375
PP RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #0124/01 0241939
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241939Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5138
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 1386
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1213
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY 0695
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1107
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 000124 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM KPKO MARR ASEC MOPS HA
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH SEES LIGHT AT END OF TUNNEL

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 2459

B. PORT AU PRINCE 2472

C. PORT AU PRINCE 1796

PORT AU PR 00000124 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 000124

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM KPKO MARR ASEC MOPS HA
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH SEES LIGHT AT END OF TUNNEL

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 2459

B. PORT AU PRINCE 2472

C. PORT AU PRINCE 1796

PORT AU PR 00000124 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH continues its push into the
Port-au-Prince slums of Cite Soleil, Cite Militaire and
Martissant and, according to their political staff, they are
beginning to see light at the end of the tunnel. Residents
of Cite Soleil are welcoming MINUSTAH more openly than during
previous operations. The major gang leaders - Belony, Amaral
and Evans - have been relatively inactive since MINUSTAH
began targeted operations in mid-December. A series of
successful arrests has led to a sense of optimism both within
the slums and at MINUSTAH headquarters, and there is hope
that the kidnapping days of the Cite Soleil gangs are
numbered. End Summary.

--------------
Situation Improving
--------------


2. (C) Poloffs spoke with Mike Center (strictly protect),
deputy director of MINUSTAH's Joint Mission Analysis Center
(JMAC),on January 17. Center outlined MINUSTAH's progress
in breaking into the gang strongholds in Port-au-Prince's
slums. In general, Center described the situation as "much,
much, much better." Non-combatant residents of Cite Soleil
are happier with MINUSTAH's presence than they have been in
the past. In Bois Neuf (Cite Soleil),where MINUSTAH has
attacked most heavily, the gangs are "painting themselves
into a corner," but also making it more difficult for
MINUSTAH to get to them in their fortified enclaves. The
three major gang leaders in Cite Soleil - Belony, Amaral and
Evans - have been staying close to their home bases in the
last few weeks. Belony in particular barely ventures out at

all. Although Center admitted MINUSTAH's first major
operation on December 22 was a bit of a flop (ref A),he said
their December 28 operation (ref B) was much smoother and
coordination between HNP and MINUSTAH troops continues to
improve. Kidnappings have slowed and there are not many
hostages being held in Cite Soleil according to JMAC's
intelligence sources.

--------------
Operational Successes
--------------


3. (C) The biggest success of recent operations was the
arrest of Belony's chief kidnapper, known as Zachari, on
January 5 in Drouillard (Cite Soleil). Acting on specific
intelligence pinpointing his location, MINUSTAH made the
arrest without firing a shot, entering Zachari's house while
he was drunk and asleep. In a separate operation on December
28, MINUSTAH completely destroyed the interior of Belony's
house, injuring his girlfriend and just missing Belony
himself as he stepped out to have a cigarette (ref B).


4. (C) Additional operations:

-- MINUSTAH and the HNP conduct non-targeted sweeps of
neighborhoods during which they arrest anyone engaged in
criminal activities. They did one sweep in Martissant on
January 9, which yielded no arrests but put area gangs on
their guard, and were planning another for January 18.

-- On January 15, MINUSTAH arrested 8 people in Pele Simone
(Cite Militaire). The detainees, four men and four women,
were taken from a building JMAC knows houses kidnappers, but
Center was unsure if those arrested were actually involved in
criminal activity.

-- Members of Belony's gang returned to the GoH two missing
Russian machine guns from an APC that MINUSTAH troops
abandoned in Cite Soleil in December (ref A). MINUSTAH had
refused to negotiate or offer any concessions for their
return. The weapons were inoperable without external
electric power and used non-standard ammunition, thus they

PORT AU PR 00000124 002.2 OF 002


were of no use to the gangs.

--------------
Next Steps
--------------


5. (C) Moving forward, SRSG Mulet has to make the decision
whether MINUSTAH will wait for Belony to show himself or to
proactively go into Bois Neuf and nab him. They will also
target Amaral and Evans, who are hiding away at the moment.
Center stated that they would be much easier to catch if they
tried to resume their kidnapping activities outside of Cite
Soleil. Regardless, MINUSTAH needs to draw them out of
hiding in order to arrest them. JMAC continues to look for
targets all around Port-au-Prince, not just in Cite Soleil.
Martissant, rampant with inter-gang violence, is of
particular concern. The new force commander, Major General
Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, has a lot of work to do to
get up to speed, having just taken control of the troops on
January 11. Center said the new commander needs to hit the
ground running in order to keep the momentum going.

--------------
A View from the Political Branch
--------------


6. (C) The MINUSTAH Political Affairs chief and his deputy
added their commentary on the current operations, also on
January 17. Their feeling is that capturing or killing the
three major gang leaders will break the back of gang activity
in Cite Soleil, allowing for development projects to multiply
in Cite Soleil. Though the killing of gang leader Dread
Wilme in 2005 (ref C) did not have this effect, they believe
the political atmosphere and attitudes toward MINUSTAH and
the HNP are much more positive today -- residents are ready
to be free of the gangs. This scenario, they noted, played
out successfully in Bel Air after residents united with
MINUSTAH to force the gangs out, allowing for development
projects to enter the area. Nevertheless, getting to the
gang leaders will not be easy. They have retreated into
neighborhoods where access is tight, and as MINUSTAH moves
deeper into Cite Soleil the roads become narrower and troops
will have to move in on foot instead of in their armored
vehicles.


7. (C) Comment: Though this MINUSTAH/HNP security offensive
may look to be less than advertised -- less than perfect
execution, still no removal of the big three gang leaders,
and holidays and change-in-command further delaying
operations -- this initiative has delivered, for the first
time since MINUSTAH's mandate began, a significant blow to
the gang structure in Cite Soleil. Under SRSG Mulet,
MINUSTAH appears committed to following through on this
initiative and arresting Belony and company, though the
time-frame is likely to remain longer than we wish. We also
share MINUSTAH's assessment that there are good prospects for
pacifying Cite Soleil. The relative stability of the Preval
government and MINUSTAH's slowly expanding (if halting) reach
into Cite Soleil over the past six months have had a
cumulative effect. The population does appear ready to
support a permanent GoH and international presence that can
free them from the gangs.
SANDERSON