Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PHNOMPENH429
2007-03-16 09:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Phnom Penh
Cable title:  

FRIENDS OF THE ECCC OR RGC?

Tags:  PHUM KJUS PREL EAID CB 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPF #0429/01 0750942
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160942Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8205
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0154
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2270
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0404
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0546
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0565
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3140
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2223
C O N F I D E N T I A L PHNOM PENH 000429 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: PHUM KJUS PREL EAID CB
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF THE ECCC OR RGC?

REF: PHNOM PENH 422

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Margaret McKean; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L PHNOM PENH 000429

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: PHUM KJUS PREL EAID CB
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF THE ECCC OR RGC?

REF: PHNOM PENH 422

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Margaret McKean; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The main donor coordinating body for
Cambodia's Khmer Rouge Tribunal, the Friends of the ECCC, has
proven an effective information-sharing group for reviewing
ECCC progress and donor activities in support of the
Tribunal's work. The ECCC's problems since the November 2006
plenary and issues related to RGC interference, however, have
highlighted the inadequacy of the mechanism, as presently
organized by the French and Japanese Embassies. Both
missions have shown no willingness to discuss contentious
issues surrounding court management, the rules debate,
funding inadequacies, let alone the allegations of corruption
hanging over the court. Engaging Japan and France is the
only way to get their attention. Some like-minded diplomatic
missions in Cambodia are willing to request their capitals
send demarche cables to Tokyo and Paris, and possibly join
with the U.S. in expressing concern over the lack of donor
coordination on serious issues related to the ECCC. End
Summary.

ECCC Coordination and Limitations of the Friends
-------------- ---


2. (SBU) The Friends of the ECCC group of interested states
was proposed by DPM Sok An at the May 10, 2006 briefing to
donors as a mechanism for providing advice and support to the
ECCC. DPM Sok An also asked that the French and Japanese
missions consider playing a coordinating role in enlisting
donors to support such a mechanism. At a subsequent planning
meeting by donors, the group decided that Embassy
representatives at the meetings would be DCMs or officials
handling the ECCC portfolio. The notion of Ambassador-level
meetings was floated but remained a nebulous concept. The
group determined that it should avoid infringing on the
independence of the Tribunal and therefore not debate many of
the legal issues that would be handled by the court. That
was the job of the judges, and the Friends group should focus
primarily on the working of the court, the administration and
finances, and whether the court is fulfilling its goal of

functioning as a model of legal reform for Cambodia.
Diplomats welcomed the French and Japanese offers to act as
co-coordinators, with meetings to be held every other month
and hosted on a rotating basis by the two missions. At every
meeting, ECCC staff provide an update of the progress of the
court, and donors announce various projects in support of
ECCC activities, particularly those organized by NGOs that
fall outside the ECCC's management. As the court began to
operate in July 2006 and nothing controversial was going on,
the Friends meetings functioned well.


3. (SBU) Since the disastrous November 2006 plenary
session, however, the Friends meetings have been less useful
in determining what has been happening with the ECCC and the
role of donors/interested states. The two meetings that have
been held since then provided little opportunity for frank
discussion as to the differences between the international
and Cambodian judges over the draft internal rules. During
the week-long November plenary, neither the French nor the
Japanese contacted other missions regarding the threat by the
international judges to suggest to the UN that support to the
ECCC be halted. The Japanese mission, when contacted by us,
indicated that their Ambassador would try to schedule a
meeting with DPM Sok An, but a meeting reportedly did not
take place until the week following the plenary; no formal
readout was given to other missions.


4. (SBU) During the review committee meeting in January,
ECCC senior staff recognized at the outset of the meeting
that the process was off to a poor start. Fearful of a
repeat of the November plenary, they contacted OSJI and asked
if the NGO would fund a trip for former U.S. Ambassador at
large for War Crimes, David Scheffer, who had a personal
history with DPM Sok An and was considered a valued
interlocutor by the RGC and strong proponent of the ECCC.
OSJI complied, and Scheffer's negotiation with DPM Sok An on
the most contentious points was largely credited for the
success that was achieved at that session.


5. (C) In the meantime, a number of other issues have
plagued the court: poor staff morale as a result of the
delays, inadequate finances, complaints about the UN
administration of the court, alleged political interference,
and, most recently, the flap over OSJI and revelations
regarding corruption allegations at the ECCC. None of these
issues has been discussed at the Friends meetings, due to
presence of ECCC staff throughout the meetings. Trying to
engage the Japanese and the French to hold ad hoc meetings
outside the normal Friends schedule does not work. OSJI
organized a briefing in January for a small group of donors
to discuss in more detail the legal issues with the draft
rules separating the two sides; we organized a briefing by
David Scheffer with the same small group so that he could
discuss his meeting with ECCC officials regarding OSJI
(reftel). The Canadian Ambassador recently invited us, the
UK and German DCMs to a meeting to discuss the limitations of
the current Friends mechanism. The Australian Embassy is
interested in some changes to the existing format, but also
does not support joint diplomatic engagement.


6. (SBU) The next Friends meeting will be March 20
following the conclusion of the latest review committee
meeting that ends on March 16. We are proposing that the
group discuss modifications to the Friends mechanism that
will provide opportunities for frank exchanges among donors
as well as allow the group to be a more proactive vehicle for
addressing issues that could threaten the ECCC's existence
(.i.e., possible violation of the 2004 UN/RGC agreement that
could lead to withdrawal of UN support under Article 28) or
its credibility. ECCC judges and staff have noted that the
donors and interested states would be most effective if they
could speak with a single voice.

How the French and Japanese View Their Role
--------------


7. (C) The French and Japanese positions are fairly
consistent: the Friends should not play an activist role;
individual missions -- if they are so inclined -- can
intervene with the ECCC or the government, but the Friends
should not act in any collective diplomatic way. We agree
that, for the most part, it is up to the UN and Cambodian
elements within the ECCC to sort out their internal problems
and that donor intervention with the ECCC or the RGC should
only be exercised under rare circumstances as noted in para.

6. Faced with two situations already where one could
reasonably argue Ambassadors should have been called together
to at least consider action, the French and Japanese
demurred.


8. (C) Moreover, we note that in the recent OSJI case, the
Japanese Ambassador reportedly gave his blessing to RGC plans
to move ahead and evict OSJI from Cambodia. In a
conversation with Pol/Econ Chief, the French DCM said that
the ECCC did not need NGO observers and if OSJI left the
country, it would not make much difference. Given that some
ECCC members as well as David Scheffer believe that an RGC
decision to close the OSJI office could constitute a
violation of the UN/RGC agreement, we are concerned that the
two countries are focusing exclusively on the preservation of
their bilateral relationship with the RGC in their
discussions about the ECCC, and are not taking a more nuanced
approach as co-chairs of the Friends.


9. (C) The Japanese position is particularly sensitive due
to the balancing act the GOJ plays with China in Cambodia.
The Chinese, Sean Vissoth believes, are placing pressure on
the government with respect to moving forward with the
Tribunal. The Japanese want the Tribunal to succeed at
virtually any cost, and therefore will be loathe to put any
pressure on the government that might make the RGC accord
more sympathy to Chinese views. Defending an NGO that
publicly has criticized the RGC is anathema to our Japanese
colleagues, but they do the RGC no favors by encouraging a
position that may bring consequences from UN/New York without
at least identifying that possibility to the government. As
co-chair of the Friends, we believe Japan and France have
some measure of responsibility to engage with the government
or the ECCC if exceptional circumstances warrant the waving
of a red flag.

Comment
--------------

10. (C) Absent a push from their respective capitals, the
French or Japanese embassies in Phnom Penh will not be
receptive to changing their views on the Friends mechanism
and their roles as co-chairs. We would welcome Washington
views on the possibility of demarching both capitals, and
would be willing to send suggested talking points to that
end. Both embassies will have a change of Ambassador in the
coming weeks (the Japanese Ambassador is leaving in two
weeks),so it would be timely to go in before the new
Ambassadors arrive at post. Several other missions in Phnom
Penh have indicated a willingness to suggest joint demarches
to their capitals. End Comment.

MUSSOMELI