Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PHNOMPENH1342
2007-10-29 01:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Phnom Penh
Cable title:  

CAMBODIA ON U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM CVIS ETRD BM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1412
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #1342 3020118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 290118Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2297
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0166
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0653
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3183
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0100
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2246
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PHNOM PENH 001342 

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STATE FOR EAP PDAS SCOT MARCIEL, EAP/MLS FOR AARON COPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CVIS ETRD BM
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA ON U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA

REF: A. STATE 148530


B. STATE 146862

C. PHNOM PENH 1277

D. PHNOM PENH 1247

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Piper Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (
b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L PHNOM PENH 001342

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP PDAS SCOT MARCIEL, EAP/MLS FOR AARON COPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CVIS ETRD BM
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA ON U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA

REF: A. STATE 148530


B. STATE 146862

C. PHNOM PENH 1277

D. PHNOM PENH 1247

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Piper Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (
b, d)


1. (C) DCM October 25 delivered demarche (Ref B) to MFA
Secretary of State Ouch Borith noting newly imposed USG

SIPDIS
sanctions and inquiring about what steps the Royal Government
of Cambodia was taking to put pressure on the Burmese
leadership to release political prisoners and move toward
genuine political dialogue. Ouch Borith noted that the RGC
was working closely with ASEAN to find a peaceful way to push
for democratization. He reiterated Prime Minister Hun Sen's
earlier call to deploy an ASEAN Troika delegation to Burma
(Ref C),noting that other ASEAN states may not be interested
in pursuing the Cambodian proposal at this time. Remarking
on the larger difficulties that would emerge if the problem
were not addressed, Ouch Borith supported the "roadmap" and
"elections" as the way forward.


2. (C) Commenting on Burma's diverse ethnic composition and
noting the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the
break-up of the former Yugoslavia, Ouch Borith said that the
Burmese would have to create a peaceful solution to "keep
Myanmar as a whole nation." The problem affected not just
Burma itself, but all of ASEAN he noted. That's why ASEAN
was unhappy. Expressing uncertainty about Burma going into
the ASEAN summit in November, he remarked that a Vietnamese
embassy counterpart had told him Vietnam recently postponed
one informal ministerial to be held in Hanoi to avoid
tackling the question of Burmese representation. He also
noted that the EU troika was coming in to the MFA October 29
to speak about Burma and the upcoming EU-ASEAN summit.


3. (C) The DCM remarked that some ASEAN countries continued
military-to-military visits. This undercut ASEAN's repeated
calls for the Burmese regime to release prisoners and begin a
genuine dialogue. Ouch Borith replied that Cambodia did not
have extensive military bilateral relations. He could not
recall the last time there had been a military visit either
way. He expressed dismay with an "all-military" form of
government and reiterated PM Hun Sen's proposal to have the
ASEAN Troika become engaged. When pressed about the RGC
doing more to put pressure on Burma's military leaders,
although he noted disapprovingly a situation resulting in
demonstrations by more than 10,000 monks, he referred to
ASEAN's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of
other nations. In the meantime, he said, Cambodia would
continue to rely on the leading ASEAN nations to reach a
consensus on Burma. (COMMENT: The RGC appears consistent in
backing the Singapore ASEAN presidency on Burma. We expect
Cambodia to continue this position. END COMMENT.)
MUSSOMELI