Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS688
2007-02-23 09:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

JAPAN/AFRICA: JAPANESE EMBOFF DISCUSSES WEST

Tags:  PREL PINS PINR CONS ASEC XY GV IV CH JA FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2452
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1412
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0200
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0007
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0008
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3719
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1155
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1945
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000688 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR CONS ASEC XY GV IV CH JA FR
SUBJECT: JAPAN/AFRICA: JAPANESE EMBOFF DISCUSSES WEST
AFRICA, CHINA

PARIS 00000688 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political M-C Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000688

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR CONS ASEC XY GV IV CH JA FR
SUBJECT: JAPAN/AFRICA: JAPANESE EMBOFF DISCUSSES WEST
AFRICA, CHINA

PARIS 00000688 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political M-C Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Chie Kinumaki, an Africa Watcher at
Japan's Embassy in Paris, on February 21 discussed efforts to
assist 30 Japanese nationals in leaving Guinea; the impasse
in Cote d'Ivoire; concerns about China's lack of interest in
promoting democracy, human rights, and sound business
practices across Africa; and Japan's participation in the
recent Africa-France Summit in Cannes (largely ceremonial).
Kinumaki also provided details on Japanese diplomatic
representation in West Africa. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) We met on February 21 with Chie Kinumaki, one of
several Africa Watchers at Japan's Embassy in Paris.
Discussion focused on West Africa, which is currently the
main area of concern for the Japanese, notably because of the
unrest in Guinea and the continuing impasse in Cote d'Ivoire.

Guinea
--------------

3. (C) Kinumaki said that Japan's main concern in Guinea
was consular. The Japanese Embassy had drawn down to
essential staff only. Kinumaki said that there were some 30
Japanese nationals present in Guinea and the Embassy's
attention has been focused on assisting them and helping them
leave. However, of these 30, a small group consists of young
Japanese adventurers who went to Guinea to study traditional
drumming and percussion techniques. Apparently, according to
Kinumaki, there is a devoted group of young musicians in
Japan strongly interested in traditional African music.
These musicians continue to be a problem for the Japanese
Embassy because they say they want to stay in Guinea, do not
feel threatened by the unrest, and, in several cases, have
nonrefundable tickets they do not want to abandon. Even
though they are free to remain, Kinumaki said that their
presence was a worry to the Embassy, which viewed itself as
partially responsible for their safety.



4. (C) On the political side, Kinumaki said the Japanese
were concerned that unrest could increase on or after
February 23, depending on whether there is an end to the
"state of siege," its extension, and the reaction of the
unions and opposition.

Situation in Cote d'Ivoire
--------------

5. (C) Kinumaki said that Cote d'Ivoire remained at an
impasse, with President Gbagbo displaying a fair amount of
skill in retaining control, remaining one step ahead of his
critics, and avoiding implementation of the peace process.
Given the current lack of movement, Kinumaki was not
confident that elections would take place in October.
Kinumaki said that the French appeared out of ideas and were
becoming increasingly frustrated by the high costs of
Operation Licorne. Kinumaki believed that French MFA and
Elysee officials were also reluctant to press for new
initiatives in these last weeks of the Chirac Presidency, not
only for fear of provoking Chirac as he leaves office but
also for fear of initiating projects that Chirac's successor
might not welcome. The French election cycle was thus
hampering French thinking on Cote d'Ivoire and probably
elsewhere, she observed. Kinumaki predicted a thorough
review of France's Africa policy once Chirac, the last French
practitioner of the old-school, personalized way of doing
business with Africa, leaves the scene.


6. (C) Kinumaki remarked that Operation Licorne had
hamstrung France in another way, by giving other concerned
parties the impression that France was willing and able to
shoulder a substantial part of the international community's
burden in Cote d'Ivoire. The French do not want this burden;
at the same time, however, they value recognition of their
leadership role and fear that reducing or curtailing
Operation Licorne could worsen the situation in Cote d'Ivoire
and allow others to criticize France for abandoning
leadership for selfish reasons.

China
--------------

7. (C) Kinumaki referred several times to China's growing

PARIS 00000688 002.2 OF 003


presence in Africa and the aggressiveness displayed by the
Chinese in expanding this presence. Notably, Kinumaki said
at several points that the Japanese were relatively less
worried about the economic competition the Chinese
represented. "What bothers us is the completely unprincipled
way the Chinese are building these ties," she said. "When
they come bearing huge sums of money, offer assistance
unconditionally, and almost deliberately ignore such issues
as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and other
similar concepts, they are really appealing to the worst
instincts of Africa's leaders," she complained.


8. (C) Kinumaki said that Japan was following China's
policies in Africa closely, but she acknowledged that Africa
did not rank very high on the list of bilateral Japan-PRC
concerns, with North Korea occupying the top spot. She
readily emphasized Japan's inability to influence the Chinese
on Africa -- "as soon as we start mentioning to them that
they should be more responsible partners to Third World
countries, they immediately tell us to mind our own business
and express outrage that Japan, which once sought to conquer
and colonize China, should be giving lectures on good
behavior." Kinumaki said that the GOJ had indirectly tried
to advise African leaders to beware of China but that these
efforts had been largely ineffective in the face of what the
Chinese offer, with no strings attached. (See below, para
10, on how pro-Chinese attitudes may have manifested
themselves at the Africa-France Summit.)

Africa-France Summit
--------------

9. (C) Kinumaki provided a read-out on the February 15-16
Africa-France Summit in Cannes from the Japanese perspective.
Former PM Mori headed the delegation, whose Tokyo members
included Director (A/S-equivalent) of MOFA's Africa Bureau
and a number of staff. Japan's Ambassador to France, his
DCM, Kinumaki, and two or three others from Paris also
attended. Kinumaki said that Japan's participation in the
Summit was largely ceremonial, consisting of attending the
large group meetings, during one of which Mori made a short
speech. The Japanese held a brief (5-10 minutes) bilateral
meeting with President Chirac, which consisted largely of
small talk. The Japanese made a short demarche asking for
French support regarding North Korea, with Chirac responding
with an unspecific "of course, of course, we support you
concerning North Korea."


10. (C) Kinumaki said that the Japanese delegation did not
do much wheeling-and-dealing with others present at the
Summit. Much of the attendees' attention and sentiment were
focused on Chirac and the Summit as one of his swan songs.
She did note, however, that the French wanted to include as a
sub-theme for one of the sessions a discussion on China's
activities in Africa but let this drop when a good number of
African delegations indicated that they preferred that this
not be included as a formal discussion topic.

Japanese Diplomacy in West Africa
--------------

11. (SBU) Kinumaki said that Japan maintained some two
dozen Embassies across Africa, with most of them responsible
for two or more countries. Japan's Embassy in Senegal served
as the regional hub for West Africa and covered Mauritania,
Mali, and Senegal's other immediate neighbors. Abidjan was
responsible also for Benin, Togo, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
The Embassy in Ghana covered anglophone countries such as
Liberia and Sierra Leone. Japan's Embassy in Nigeria
anchored the eastern end of the West Africa region and
covered countries to Nigeria's north, east and south.
Kinumaki noted that Japan's Embassy in Conakry was an anomaly
in that it was responsible only for Guinea.

"Virtual" Embassy Abidjan
--------------

12. (C) Kinumaki said that Japan's diplomatic presence in
Cote d'Ivoire had become unique -- the Embassy left Cote
d'Ivoire about a year ago because of the unrest and
instability and has been operating in Paris as a "virtual"
Embassy since then. Some personnel have been re-assigned
elsewhere, but the Ambassador and a small staff, in offices

PARIS 00000688 003.2 OF 003


located within Japan's Embassy to France, continue to try to
function as an Embassy to the five countries to which it is
accredited. MOFA has rented apartments for the remaining
staff and a clear division of activity has developed between
the "African" Embassy and the Paris Embassy -- for example,
when there is a Japanese national holiday or other public
event, the "African" Embassy will hold its own function
separately from whatever the Paris Embassy might organize.
Kinumaki indicated that this arrangement had created a bit of
tension between the two missions.


13. (C) One of the officers from the "African" Embassy
travels monthly to Abidjan and perhaps one or two of the
other capitals on a rotating basis to check on Japan's
facilities, pay local staff, and maintain some semblance of
personal contact with host governments. MOFA's personnel and
budget sections are not pleased with the continuing presence
in Paris of the Abidjan Embassy, which is quite expensive,
far from ideal, and no longer the quick fix once envisioned.
Kinumaki explained that, in principle, the "African" Embassy
is to return to Abidjan once elections take place in Cote
d'Ivoire, but no one knows when that will occur, with the
October target date looking less and less realistic.

Bio Note
--------------

14. (C) Chie Kinumaki is not a Class A MOFA diplomat but
rather a MOFA specialist who has been at the Japanese Embassy
to France since mid-2005. She said that she spent time in
Madagascar, which allowed her to work on her French, which is
good. Kinumaki is a ready interlocutor who is often more
available than her other colleagues who cover Africa. She is
also willing to talk about "in-house" matters that others at
the Japanese Embassy may be more reluctant to discuss.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON