GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA WITH DAS BRYZA; FRENCH FAVOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000636

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL FR EUN UNO GG UNMIK YI RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA WITH DAS BRYZA; FRENCH FAVOR
PRUDENCE PENDING KOSOVO STATUS SETTLEMENT

REF: A. STATE 18053

B. PARIS 363

C. 06 PARIS 7057

Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 14 meeting with EUR DAS
Bryza, MFA A/S-equivalent for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Terral argued for keeping Georgia/Abkhazia on the back burner
for the time being to avoid provoking the Russians on Kosovo;
Terral was particularly keen on the smoothest possible
renewal of the UNOMIG mandate in advance of UNSC discussions
on Ahtisaari's Kosovo package. Bryza agreed on the
desirability of lowering the temperature on the Caucasus to
the extent possible, but made clear that the U.S. would
respond to any Russian pressure tactics. He urged the GOF to
adopt a similar, reasonable but firm approach during its
upcoming February 16 meeting with First DFM Karasin and the
February 22 annual meeting in Moscow of foreign and defense
ministers. Bryza told Terral that Saakashvili intended to
take a moderate approach on UNOMIG renewal, and suggested
that Azerbaijan's recent willingness to demonstrate its
energy independence may also be playing a role in persuading
the Russians to shift to a more careful approach to the
Caucasus. In response to Terral's question about Russian
sincerity in facilitating a settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh,
Bryza suggested that Lavrov's active participation in recent
meetings suggested that positive Russian motives should not
be excluded a priori. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) EUR DAS Matt Bryza met February 14 with MFA
A/S-equivalent for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Jean-Francois Terral to discuss next steps on
Georgia/Abkhazia in the wake of the February 12-13 Friends'
discussion in Geneva. Terral had not yet seen a full report
of the meeting but commented that it appeared to have gone
surprisingly well, given Russia's increasingly hard-line
positions on any number of other issues (including Putin's
recent remarks at Wehrkunde). Bryza agreed that there had
been a positive shift in Russian attitudes on Abkhazia, at a
minimum as a tactical matter. FM Lavrov himself had assured
him that Russia was now interested in seeking improved
relations with Georgia.


3. (C) Terral agreed it was difficult to distinguish between
Russian strategy and tactics. But calling the Russian stance
on Kosovo key, he argued for maintaining "the right
temperature" in the Caucasus in view of "the long road ahead"
on Kosovo. Although France would remain "the champion of
dialogue with Russia," including Georgia/Abkhazia,
considerations of "time management" -- Terral noted that he
personally spent 30 percent of his time working on Kosovo --
argued for putting Caucasus issues on the back burner for a
while. Such an approach should not be equated with surrender
or acquiescence; but it would be prudent to try to avoid
difficulties on these issues for the next 3-4 months. Terral
then explained that Russian First DFM Karasin would visit
Paris February 19 and Moscow would host the annual meeting of
Russian and French foreign and defense ministers February 22;
he expected that both meetings would be dominated by Kosovo.
Terral assured Bryza that France would not change its
position on Kosovo and that it would resist "intellectually
dishonest" Russian attempts -- he cited Russian Security
Council Chairman Igor Ivanov's recent visit to Paris, see ref
B -- to attempt linkages between Kosovo and the Caucasus. At
the same time, even if the GOF would continue to argue that
Kosovo was unique and not a precedent (he declared that
Russia did not care a whit about Kosovo and described the
Russian position as entirely directed against the U.S.),he
repeated that France perceived a need to reduce the
temperature on Georgia/Abkhazia.


4. (C) Bryza responded that, even if the U.S. did not share
Terral's concerns about time management per se, the U.S. did
share its wish not to see any renewed flare-ups in the
Caucasus. Currently, he judged, things were moving in the
right direction: the Friends were working to breathe life
into existing mechanisms for Abkhazia; the Georgians were
going along; the results of the recent meeting in Geneva were
quite positive; and in Geneva the Abkhaz had not called into
question Georgia's right to be present in the Upper Kodori
Valley, despite other criticisms of the Georgian government.
But reducing the temperature should not be viewed as
willingness to give in; he cited the recent decision by
Azerbaijan not to purchase any Russian gas as an example of
quiet firmness that had sent shock waves through Russia and
may have played a role in persuading the Russians to pursue,
at least for the moment, a softer line on Georgia.


5. (C) Terral hoped that the next round of discussions on
UNOMIG renewal would prove less contentious than the last
one, arguing that it would be important to reduce to the
maximum extent possible clashes with the Russians in order to
increase the chances of success on Kosovo, given that the
UNOMIG mandate would be up for renewal before consideration
of any UNSCR on Kosovo. Bryza responded that the U.S.
generally agreed on the desirability of keeping the Caucasus
quiet, and ideally would welcome a purely technical rollover
of the UNOMIG mandate. He added that the Georgians also
appeared interested in a reasonable approach to mandate
renewal and recounted how, at U.S. urging, Saakashvili had
dropped an initial proposal for language criticizing the
recent elections in Abkhazia. Saakashvili was insisting now
only on language referring to IDP right of return to Gali,
which had already featured in earlier resolutions. But Bryza
emphasized again that the U.S. approach would depend to a
large degree on the extent to which the Russians were
prepared to adopt a similar approach. The U.S. would not
allow the Russians to bulldoze others, and would be prepared
to counter Russian demands with its own proposals if
necessary.


6. (C) Terral professed to have been impressed by the
quality of recent discussions between Azerbaijani President
Aliyev and President Chirac. Aliyev had taken a firm line on
resisting Russian pressure and had insisted on Azerbaijan's
full independence, including with respect to gas and oil. It
was more difficult, he said, to assess Aliyev's position on
Nagorno-Karabakh; for the moment he could afford to sit back
and portray Kocharian as the main obstacle to a settlement.
Terral solicited Bryza's judgment as to whether Russia was
truly committed to working toward a settlement or was playing
a duplicitous game. Bryza said he had no way of knowing for
certain; at the same time, it was difficult to dismiss as
pure theatrics FM Lavrov's recent willingness to spend two
hours brain-storming with the Minsk Group chairmen.


7. (U) This message has been cleared by DAS Bryza.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

ROSENBLATT