Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS486
2007-02-08 08:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

TOUR D'HORIZON WITH MFA AFRICA DIRECTOR

Tags:  PREL PHUM PINR SU SO CI FR 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4760
INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 1056
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE 0354
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 1005
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 0409
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1137
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000486 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR SU SO CI FR
SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH MFA AFRICA DIRECTOR


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann. Reasons 1.4b,d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000486

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR SU SO CI FR
SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH MFA AFRICA DIRECTOR


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann. Reasons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: French MFA A/S-Equivalent for Africa
Gliniasty told DCM on February 1 that France had not invited
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe to the February 13-15
Africa-France Summit. Gliniasty confided that the Zimbabwean
delegation had complained vocally in the course of the AU
Summit about Mugabe's exclusion. Regarding Sudan, Gliniasty
feared President Bashir would harden his tone with respect to
the hybrid UN-AU mission to Darfur following the rejection of
Bashir's candidacy for the AU Chair. Gliniasty suggested a
"ruthless" sanctions policy may be necessary. He advocated
targeted sanctions on individual Janjaweed leaders and others
rather than sanctions directed against the Khartoum regime.
Gliniasty noted Eritrean interest in U.S. views on Darfur
mediation efforts in Asmara. Apprised of the continuing
detention of Embassy Asmara FSN employees, Gliniasty
requested further background and offered to engage on their
behalf. (See Guidance Request in Paragraph 3.)


2. (C) Summary Cont'd: Gliniasty viewed developments in
Somalia positively, calling the Ethiopian intervention a
total success. France favored linking EU assistance to a TFG
commitment to dialogue and inclusive government, but
Gliniasty considered EC Commissioner Michel's approach
unreasonable. He was grateful that Michel and TFG President
Yusuf had reached agreement on a more realistic roadmap for
reconciliation during the AU Summit. On Cote d'Ivoire,
Gliniasty struck an upbeat note on direct talks between
President Gbagbo and Force Nouvelles leader Soro, but
insisted that direct dialogue was insufficient without an
accelerated schedule for elections. Gliniasty argued French
forces remained necessary to stave off bloodshed. End
Summary.

3 (C) Guidance Request: Embassy seeks guidance regarding MFA
request for information about FSN detentions in Asmara and
offer by AF A/S-Equivalent to engage the Government of
Eritrea on the matter, as appropriate.


4. (SBU) The DCM hosted MFA AF A/S-Equivalent Jean de

Gliniasty and AF PDAS-Equivalent Caroline Dumas for a
luncheon discussion on February 1. Africa Watcher attended
as notetaker. Discussion covered the February 13-15
Africa-France Summit, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Senegal, Cote
d'Ivoire, and Guinea.

Africa-France Summit: No Mugabe
--------------


5. (SBU) DCM asked Gliniasty about preparation for the 13-15
February Africa-France Summit in Cannes. Gliniasty remarked
that the program was only lightly scripted, in part from
recognition that Chirac would want flexibility as he mixes
with an anticipated 40 heads of state. Gliniasty added there
would be a few ad hoc mini-summits, including a sidebar
dedicated to Darfur.


6. (C) Asked how France was handling the question of
attendance by Zimbabwen President Mugabe, Gliniasty conceded
that France had originally sought to issue an invitation on
the condition that Mugabe agree in advance to decline and
instead send a personal representative. However the GoZ
rejected that approach and France consequently did not send
an invitation. The GoZ remained upset, according to
Gliniasty, who added that the Zimbabwean delegation had
complained vocally at the the AU Summit in Addis Ababa.
Alluding to strong objections within the EU to Mugabe's
presence, Gliniasty admitted that French views on Zimbabwe
were "among the more moderate" in Europe. Mugabe, for all
his faults and disastrous domestic policies, was not an agent
of regional destabilization, Gliniasty argued. Mugabe
moreover remained an iconic figure among many Africans.


7. (C) Asked whether Rwandan President Kagame would attend,
Gliniasty said Kigali had yet to respond to the invitation
France had sent before the Rwandan president broke off formal
diplomatic relations with Paris. (Comment: Gliniasty implied
the French invitation was still valid, but Kagame would have
to take the next step.)

Sudan: A Call for Ruthless Sanctions?

PARIS 00000486 002 OF 003


--------------


8. (C) Stability in Darfur hinged, according to Gliniasty, on
the relationship between Sudanese President Bashir and
Chadian President Deby. Bashir was often maladroit,
Gliniasty remarked, yet, ironically, Deby could be equally if
not more inflexible than the Sudanese leader. Noting the
1/24 letter from the UN to Bashir regarding the three-phased
AU-UN hybrid deployment, Gliniasty mentioned he had conveyed
to Bashir at the AU Summit that Sudan should weigh its
response carefully, there being little margin for error.
Gliniasty worried however that Bashir's approach to Darfur
could harden further after his failure to obtain the AU
Chairmanship. If so, there would be no choice except the
"ruthless" application of international sanctions, Gliniasty
declared.


9. (C) In the event of additional sanctions, Gliniasty
recommended targeting warlords in Darfur. He claimed there
were divisions emerging among Janjaweed commanders, with some
now anxious for their own futures. Gliniasty believed that
targeted sanctions -- what he called "humanitarian sanctions"
-- were often highly effective. In the case of Cote
d'Ivoire, Gliniasty noted Charles Ble Goude, the once
incendiary leader of the Young Patriots, was now striving to
modify his behavior and curry favor with the international
community in Abidjan; Ble Goude had yet to overcome the
psychological shock of being refused entry into Europe on
account of his inclusion on a travel ban list. Access to
Europe was an important measure of stature for Africans,
Gliniasty remarked. Gliniasty was more sanguine with regard
to what he termed "political sanctions" targeting the
Sudanese regime. Noting Bashir's fears about Western designs
of regime change for Sudan, Gliniasty cautioned that
"political sanctions" could cause the Khartoum regime "to
crystalize" along a hard line. Such sanctions, he suggested,
were best invoked as a threat; Gliniasty said he was all for
"sabre-rattling," using the English phrase, though he then
added the qualifier of sabre-rattling "with prudence."

Eritrea: France Offers to Help on FSNs
--------------


10. (C) Gliniasty said that he had fielded inquiries from
Eritrean representatives about how the U.S. viewed Asmara's
efforts to mediate on Darfur. Gliniasty quipped that if the
U.S. truly opposed Eritrean efforts on Darfur, Asmara would
already know so and in no uncertain terms. Told of the
continuing difficulties in the U.S.-Eritrean relationship,
e.g. the expulsion of USAID and the continuing detention,
since 2001, of U.S. Foreign Service Nationals in Asmara,
Gliniasty's tone changed markedly. Gliniasty said he
regretted having missed an opportunity to chide the Eritreans
on their treatment of U.S. embassy personnel. He requested
additional information that the U.S. could provide, offering
to raise the matter in future dealings with Eritrea.
Gliniasty also suggested that he could coordinate with UN
Special Envoy Eliasson on how to pressure the Eritreans.
(See Guidance Request in Para 3 above.)


Somalia -- Optimal Outcome
--------------


11. (C) Gliniasty lauded developments in Somalia. He
described the Ethiopian mission as a "total success." He
admitted some discomfort with the U.S. airstrikes, but did
not retract his overall positive assessment of the approach
taken by the USG as embodied in SCR 1725 (2006). France did
favor conditionality with respect to assistance as a way to
induce outreach and dialogue on the part of the TFG. That
said, the approach taken by Louis Michel, EC Commissioner on
Development and Humanitarian Aid, had been unreasonable.
Gliniasty understood Michel, with the support of AF A/S
Frazer, had reached an accommodation with TFG President
Abdullahi Yusuf on the margins of the AU Summit. Michel
would now relax the demand for a National Reconciliation
Conference prior to the release of EU funds on the
understanding that Yusuf would take formal measures within
two weeks to convoke the Conference.

Cote d'Ivoire: Dialogue Should Track With Elections

PARIS 00000486 003 OF 003


-------------- --------------


12. (C) Gliniasty offered a mostly positive evaluation of the
new phase in the peace process. The January meeting of the
International Working Group had mostly gone well. South
Africa was predictably championing dialogue. Dialogue
however had to be coupled with accelerated elections, in the
French view. Gliniasty hoped it would be possible to
reconcile the two positions. Gbagbo, he noted, had tried to
use UNSCR 1721 (2006) to legitimize his own plan for direct
dialogue. Gbagbo may have erred, however, by underestimating
the negotiating acumen of Forces Nouvelles leader Guillaume
Soro. Soro would now push for a more rigorous application of
UNSCR 1721 than Gbagbo would prefer, while Gbagbo would make
every effort to corrupt Soro. Regarding the deployment of
French forces to Cote d'Ivoire under Operation Licorne,
Gliniasty admitted the French Ministry of Defense favored
pulling back. The MOD no longer believed that the Licorne
presence was indispensable in preventing a bloodbath.
Gliniasty however rejected that analysis.

Wade -- Democrat with an Authoritarian Flair
--------------


13. (C) DCM noted disquieting signals that Senegal might
again defer presidential elections. Gliniasty, who served
during 2003 as French ambassador to Senegal and The Gambia,
commented on President Wade's contradictory character:
Wade's sincere democratic convictions were in conflict with
his authoritarian nature. Reason generally prevailed,
Gliniasty claimed. That said, Wade, poorly advised by a band
of advisers whom Gliniasty branded as brutes, might have
become more prone to blunders.

Guinea: Where's the Military Leadership?
--------------


14. (C) Glniasty remained concerned about developments in
Guinea, despite the end of the general strike that had
paralyzed the country. Conte's succession was still a
problem and the military lacked constructive leadership. The
officer corps was "Stalinist," he said. Guinea suffered from
the lack of military leaders trained in the West.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON