FRENCH PRESIDENCY STRATEGIC ADVISER RICHIER

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 004750

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM KNUP FR IR EU RU CH
SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENCY STRATEGIC ADVISER RICHIER
DISCUSSES IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, DECEMBER 13, 2007

REF: STATE 165967

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).


1. (C) We passed reftel points to French MFA DAS-equivalent
for Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf States Franck Gellet on December

13. PolMinCouns and poloff also passed these points on
December 13 to French Presidency strategic affairs adviser
Francois Richier. Richier commented that the points were
good and he appreciated that the U.S. was following up our
public release of the NIE,s key judgments with a general
message underscoring that the essence of the U.S. position on
Iran,s nuclear program had not changed. He worried,
however, that the NIE,s release had complicated French
efforts to persuade other UNSC members and the rest of the EU
to toughen sanctions.


2. (C) In Richier,s opinion, too many people have only
absorbed the key judgments related to Iran,s apparent
suspension of its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and ignored
the others about worrisome aspects of Iran,s ongoing
program. This is especially true within the EU, where those
governments resisting tougher sanctions -- Austria and Italy
-- are weakening whatever EU resolve there was to move
forward or even to issue a tough statement at the upcoming
GAERC. China and Russia, Richier continued, were using the
NIE to support their arguments to slow down or not proceed to
the third sanctions resolution. They were using others,
ignorance of the overall situation to throw up roadblocks.
The Arabs, in the meantime, were interpreting the NIE,s
release as likely to hasten a military operation to deal with
Iran's program. This was partly based on the presumption
that reservations predicated on some governments, reading of
the NIE would prevent diplomatic progress within the UNSC and
lead the U.S. and Israel to decide that military action was
the only viable alternative to ensure Iran did not develop
nuclear weapons.


3. (C) Richier argued that it was taking &too long8 to
move to the third sanctions resolution. When we asked how
long was too long, Richier noted the Russian discussions with
the Iranians about providing nuclear fuel. (Comment: This
conversation preceded the subsequent announcement that Russia
had delivered fuel supplies to Iran,s reactor at Bushehr.
End comment) He did not think a key decision point would
present itself in December, but perhaps by the end of
January. France would likely push then for explicit EU
support to move ahead at the UNSC or adopt stronger EU
sanctions. Richier repeated that those in the EU reluctant
to take stronger EU action -- Austria and Italy -- will
repeat their insistence that the UNSC first consider
sanctions. If the Germans come around to accept tougher EU
measures, "we may be able to bring along the others."


4. (C) One aspect of the timing, Richier asserted, was the
Iranian domestic political calendar. He pointed to Iranian
parliamentary elections set for March and maintained that a
third UNSC sanctions resolution could have a positive impact
on the internal situation in terms of putting hardliners on
the defensive. By contrast, the UNSC,s failure to pass a
third resolution could be presented to the Iranian people as
a triumph for President Ahmadi Nejad,s intransigent position.


5. (C) Richier concluded by identifying two key
issues/challenges facing us at this stage: countering the
negative effects of the NIE and working as quickly as
possible to bring a third sanctions resolution to the UNSC.
We asked whether there was any countervailing pressure
domestically to temper French determination to move ahead as
quickly as Richier argued. He responded that there is no
real domestic pressure on the GOF regarding Iran. The French
public was mostly too distracted by immediate events.
(Comment: Richier referred to the weeklong and highly
controversial visit by Libyan leader Qadhafi, which was going
on at the time of this meeting. End comment) He noted some
questions raised about why President Sarkozy would "go along
with the U.S." if either side knew better what the actual
state of Iranian nuclear program was. Richier agreed,
however, with our assessment that the French media,s
prevailing editorial line on Iran agreed that Iran,s nuclear
program remained a source of valid international concern and
supported further UNSC sanctions absent Iranian agreement to
international demands.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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