Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS4683
2007-12-11 10:28:00
SECRET
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

USD/P EDELMAN AND COUNSELOR COHEN DISCUSS

Tags:  PREL PARM MARR MCAP AF IR RU PK GG FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004683 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR MCAP AF IR RU PK GG FR
SUBJECT: USD/P EDELMAN AND COUNSELOR COHEN DISCUSS
AFGHANISTAN, ESDP, AND ARMS EXPORTS TO CHINA WITH SENIOR
FRENCH OFFICIALS

REF: PARIS 4677

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004683

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR MCAP AF IR RU PK GG FR
SUBJECT: USD/P EDELMAN AND COUNSELOR COHEN DISCUSS
AFGHANISTAN, ESDP, AND ARMS EXPORTS TO CHINA WITH SENIOR
FRENCH OFFICIALS

REF: PARIS 4677

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P)
Eric Edelman and State Department Counselor (C) Eliot Cohen
discussed the U.S. desire to develop a three- to five-year
strategic vision for the Alliance in Afghanistan with senior
French officials on December 5 in Paris. The French were
enthusiastic about the proposal, and also welcomed news that
the U.S. is supporting Paddy Ashdown for the enhanced senior
UN civilian position in Kabul. Senior MFA and Defense
officials parried suggestions for further French commitment
of forces in Afghanistan, noting that decisions on any
increased French military engagement were for President
Sarkozy to take, and stressing the need for further
elaboration of a strategic framework. The Presidency and the
MFA noted French interest in securing U.S. public support for
strengthening European defense (ESDP) in connection with
France's renewed commitment to NATO; they hoped the issue
could be discussed in early 2008. USD/P Edelman noted U.S.
concerns with regard to any French consideration of pushing
for a lifting of the EU's China arms embargo, citing U.S.
security concerns in East Asia and U.S. legal obligations to
defend Taiwan. French officials agreed to keep U.S. informed
if there of any further evolution in French thinking. (Note:
USD/P and C also discussed Iran and the NIE, reported
reftel). END SUMMARY

MEETING PARTICIPATION
--------------


2. (SBU) USD/P Eric Edelman and State Department Counselor
Eliot Cohen met with French officials in Paris on December 5
at the Presidency (Francois Richier, Strategic Affairs
Counselor, and Colonel Antoine Noguier of the General Staff);
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Philippe Carre, A/S
equivalent for Strategic Affairs; Philippe Errera, Counselor

to the Minister for Strategic Affairs; Nicolas Niemtchinow,
DAS-equivalent for Strategic Affairs; and Martin Briens, DAS
equivalent for Disarmament),and the Ministry of Defense
(Michel Miraillet, U/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs).
Counselor Cohen met separately with Francis Delon,
Secretary-General of the Prime Minister's General Secretariat

SIPDIS
of National Security (SGDN).

AFGHANISTAN: STRATEGIC VISION; FRENCH ENGAGEMENT
-------------- --------------


3. (S) Edelman and Cohen expressed the U.S. desire to
develop a three- to five-year strategic vision for the
Alliance in Afghanistan. In order to keep allies engaged on
the ground, Edelman said, we need to begin to define our
goals and the contribution each country makes to our overall
strategy. The U.S. hopes for this effort to come together by
the Bucharest Summit. French officials expressed enthusiasm
for the initiative, noting the GOF view that a strategic
discussion on Afghanistan has long been lacking. Miraillet
and Carre stressed that formulating and communicating our
vision for Afghanistan is a critical piece in convincing
public opinion in troop contributing capitals.


4. (S) Cohen briefed on his recent visit to Ottawa, noting
the high degree of concern in the Canadian government about
parliament's renewal of their force's mandate in Afghanistan.
With a panel set to make a report in January, followed by
February debate in parliament, NATO support will be critical
factor. A major NATO nation stepping forward to work
together and alongside the Canadians, Cohen advocated, could
powerfully influence the debate in the right direction.


5. (S) Richier noted that France had already gone to great
lengths to keep the Dutch involved by contributing an OMLT,
and confirmed that France was still considering the
possibility of a PRT. Carre affirmed that France could not
have a "leopard-skin" approach to its involvement in
Afghanistan, resulting from efforts to assist other
governments convincing their publics to accept a lengthier
presence. French troops, Carre argued, should be deployed in
a strategic fashion. This will require more internal GOF
consideration, likely tied to elaboration of the overall

PARIS 00004683 002 OF 002


strategy -- which will likely not be concluded in time to
help the Canadians. Carre, observing that there needs to be
a way to get the main "stakholders" together, on the model of
Kosovo or Bosnia. He suggested an early Quad meeting for
further discussion.


6. (S) Miraillet stated that President Sarkozy would make any
decision on increased French engagement in Afghanistan, and
that no one knew how far he would be willing to go. He
stated that the French chiefs of staff are considering
Afghanistan as a training opportunity for French troops, but
advised against jumping to conclusions. Miraillet said
France feels a great deal of pressure on Afghanistan, both
from the U.S.directly, but also because France is one of the
few NATO countries with significant capabilities. He
highlighted the Ministry's "awful" budget situation and the
pending conclusions of France's defense white paper, which
will be completed in March. He also added that EUFOR in Chad
is "a nightmare" for France, presumably due to the low levels
of commitment from other EU member-states.

UN CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN
--------------


7. (S) Edelman and Cohen argued that a "super-civilian" UN
presence in Afghanistan could boost the international effort
to assist the country's development and provide
troop-contributing countries with an interlocutor whose
agenda matched our own. Cohen emphasized that the U.S. was
in no way looking to replace President Karzai, but instead
design a senior position that could consult with the allies
and create a forum for strategic discussions. Cohen noted
that the U.S. was supporting Paddy Ashdown. Carre said the
French also supported Ashdown but were unsure if the British
themselves approved of his selection.

ESDP
--------------


8. (S) Richier and Carre stressed to Edelman and Cohen that
strong U.S. public support for increased European defense
capabilities through ESDP was critical to France in order for
the French to move forward on their "renewed commitment to
NATO." Carre said that while the issue was not urgent, he
hoped discussions could move ahead early in the new year.
The French want to ensure that there are no misgivings on the
U.S. side before moving forward. Edelman and Cohen said they
looked forward to learning from the French what precisely
they had in mind with regard to increased European defense
capabilities.

ARMS EXPORTS TO CHINA
--------------


9. (S) Noting Sarkozy's reference to the EU's China Arms
embargo as "anachronistic," Edelman requested that the French
consult with the U.S. before taking any initiatives within
the EU. He noted abiding regional security concerns,
including with regard to China's huge ballistic missile
build-up across the straits from Taiwan, and recalled U.S.
obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to defend the
island. Responding to Carre's argument that a 1989-vintage
embargo based is not the way to control China, Edelman warned
against actions that might lead China to misinterpret the
international community's resolve regarding Taiwan,
especially in the sensitive period ahead. Carre affirmed
that he understood U.S. concerns, but noted the growing need
for China's cooperation on international issues including
Iran, and the need to "fix" the embargo at some point in the
future.


10. (SBU) USD/P Eric Edelman and State Department Counselor
Cohen have cleared this message.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON