CHAD: AMBASSADOR NIGRO'S DECEMBER 10 MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004682

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR EUN PINS CD CT FR
SUBJECT: CHAD: AMBASSADOR NIGRO'S DECEMBER 10 MEETINGS
WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS

REF: A. PARIS 4661

B. N'DJAMENA 944

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Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French MOD and MFA officials expressed
both concern and optimism over force generation issues
related to the EU's planned mission for Chad and the Central
African Republic (C.A.R.) during December 10 meetings with
U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro. The lack of helicopters
remains the key missing ingredient. The French acknowledged
the difficulty in determing the reason for the recent renewed
fighting in eastern Chad, but agreed that it was not helping
convince potential EU participants to contribute to the EU
mission. MFA DAS-equivalent Christine Fages predicted that
Chad President Deby would eventually reconcile with Zaghawa
rebel elements and that he could come to support elections as
the best way to remain in power. Ambassador Nigro expressed
USG support for French efforts in Chad and pledged to work
closely with French elements in Chad. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro on December 10
held separate meetings at the French Defense and Foreign
Ministries (at the MOD: Colonel Emmanuel Maurin and Elodie
Riche of the Strategic Affairs Delegation; at the MFA:
DAS-equivalent for West Africa Christine Fages, her deputy
Benoit Decamps, and Chad desk officer Loic Mizon). The main
topic at both meetings was the problems France and the EU
have had in obtaining commitments from EU members that would
allow formation and deployment of the EU force in Chad and
the CAR.


3. (C) At the MOD, Riche expressed concern about obtaining
the most important missing element, the 20 helicopters deemed
vital to the mission. She said that "this will be a big
week," noting the December 10-11 GAERC meeting and,
especially the December 14 European Council meeting (heads of
state/government),where this matter, if not resolved by
then, could be taken up at the highest level.


4. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Fages, in contrast, acknowledged
difficulties in the force generation process but expressed
optimism that a solution would be forthcoming. The MOD and
MFA officials agreed that it would be a grave error for the
Chad operation to be cancelled for want of 20 helicopters.
The EU would suffer serious credibility problems if it failed
to carry out a mission that it had voted to undertake and
which was essential for the UN's companion mission, MINURCAT.
This fact alone encouraged Ambassador Nigro's interlocutors
to believe that a solution would be found. The French
reminded that the issue was not finding 20 helicopters but
determining who would pay for them. (NOTE: The French gave
no indication that France would finance the helicopters if no
other EU partner offered to do so. END NOTE.) Repeating
what the French Presidency told Ambassador Nigro last week
(ref A),the French indicated that they would focus their
lobbying efforts on the UK and Germany. Maurin and Riche at
the MOD said that they understood that President Sarkozy had
set a limit on French participation in the mission -- no more
than 2,000 French troops or, alternatively, no more than 50
percent of the mission. Maurin said that he did not think
that Sarkozy would change these figures.


5. (C) On the renewed fighting in eastern Chad, the French
acknowledged that it was hard to determine the reasons for
the rebels' choosing to fight now. There were several
potential reasons, including an assessment by the rebels that
it was best to strike now before EUFOR and UNAMID deploy,
which would hamper their ability to fight. The fighting
might also represent Sudan's decision to mark the end of its
support for the rebels, encouraging them to make one last
attempt. The French said that the recent battles had been
quite fierce, and costly for rebel forces, especially among
the non-Zaghawa forces; it appeared that opposing Zaghawa
forces were not fighting each other as much as other ethnic
groups were doing.


6. (C) The French said that it appeared that Deby's forces
had prevailed in this latest round of fighting, to the point
where Deby could leave Chad and attend the EU-Africa Summit
in Lisbon this past weekend. On December 12, in fact, Deby
was in Paris, transitting between Lisbon and N'Djamena.
(NOTE: The French officials did not elaborate on what he
might do in Paris. END NOTE.) His willingness to leave Chad

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during a crisis, especially given his penchant for leading
his men into battle, demonstrated confidence that this latest
rebel offensive had been contained.


7. (C) In any case, the fighting was doing much to build
skepticism in Europe about participating in the Chad/C.A.R.
mission, and this was no doubt one of its purposes, the
French stated. They regretted also that the "Arche de Zoe"
child smuggling case had occurred at the worst possible time
and that it and the renewed fighting had drawn attention to
Chad in the most negative way, which must have affected the
thinking of potential EU contributors to the operation.
Fages said, however, that it was fortunate that the fighting
was taking place now, before EUFOR and MINURCAT were on the
ground. If elements of the missions had been in place when
the fighting began, EU and UN partners might be calling for
an evactuation or a complete end to the missions. She hoped
that this offensive was a last gasp one and that the rebels
would be exhausted by the time EUFOR and MINURCAT were ready
to deploy.


8. (C) On Chad politics more generally, Fages expressed the
belief that Deby would reconcile with elements of the Zaghawa
clan that were on the rebel side. She predicted as well that
Deby would eventually agree to accept a democratic process
based on free and fair elections as the best means for
remaining in power. She said that as he aged and as going
into battle pesonally became more difficult, Deby would
understand that perpetual warfare was not in his interest and
that an electoral process was his best recourse.


9. (C) At both the MOD and MFA (and at the Presidency
during his ref A meeting),Ambassador Nigro expressed
appreciation for French leadership concerning Chad. He noted
the importance the U.S. placed on Chad and its key role in
the larger set of regional problems, including Darfur. He
said that the USG specifically supported France's efforts to
mount a peacekeeping operation in Chad and the C.A.R. and
that the U.S. was exploring ways it could support EUFOR and
MINURCAT, either politically, in the case of EUFOR, or
through other possible forms of contribution, in the case of
MINURCAT. Ambassador Nigro expressed his keen interest in
working with French elements in Chad, which his French
interlocutors welcomed.


10. (U) Ambassador Nigro did not have a chance to clear
this message before leaving Paris on December 10.


11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON