U/S BURNS DISCUSSES KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, GEORGIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 004439

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO AZ FR SR GG RU BM IN IR
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS DISCUSSES KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, GEORGIA,
BURMA, INDIA AND IRAN WITH FRENCH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR
ARAUD


Classified By: A/DCM Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. In an October 30 working dinner with MFA
Political Director Gerard Araud, U/S Burns urged the European
community to respect the "firm" deadline of December 10 to
conclude final status negotiations on Kosovo and pushed for a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia. Araud hoped that
any UDI could be delayed for just a few weeks (until
mid-January) so as not to foreclose the possibility of an
OSCE mission mandate extension, and to give the Europeans
more time to prepare their response. The GOF opposes MAP for
Georgia, but supports creating a special program with
incentives for Georgia that would not refer to "membership."
That said, Sarkozy would have to eventually pronounce on the
Georgia MAP question. Burns and Araud also discussed
possible new members in connection with NATO's April 2008
Bucharest summit, with Araud articulating GOF understanding
of Greece's position on Macedonian membership. On
Afghanistan, both agreed on the benefits of giving an
appropriately expanded mandate to the UN High Representative
to better integrate civilian and military efforts. The
French agreed to provide a draft job description. Araud
countered U/S Burns' call for greater West European
engagement in southern and eastern Afghanistan by citing the
purported need need for an overall strategy, including
conditions for eventual withdrawal of foreign forces. U/S
Burns expressed appreciation for FM Kouchner's recent visit
to Asia and helpful statements on Burma. Araud said Kouchner
would want to discuss Burma with the Secretary, possibly in
Istanbul. On India, the French acknowledged that a U.S.
agreement with India on nuclear cooperation was needed for
them to move forward on their own agreement, and Araud
suggested unblocking the issue for the GOI by having a
joint-signing ceremony of "Agreements of Cooperation" and
"Letters of Intent" with France, Russia and the U.S. In a
brief one-on-one discussion of Iran, Araud expressed
pessimism about an Iranian willingness to negotiate or
suspend enrichment, and was negative about El-Baradei. He
said he expected the EU would wait until Dec. 19 before
coming up with fairly weak sanctions -- and possibly none at
all if a new UNSCR is not adopted. End Summary.

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WHEN TO RECOGNIZE AN INDEPENDENT KOSOVO?
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2. (C) Araud began the discussion by noting that the GOF
believed a negotiated settlement on Kosovo's final status was
very unlikely; it was therefore important to plan how to
manage a probable UDI and its aftermath. The question was
not "whether" to recognize Kosovo, but "when." U/S Burns
emphasized that for the USG the December 10 deadline was
firm. The U.S. would not agree to any further extensions of
negotiations. Araud supported this position, but stated the
French preference that any UDI and subsequent recognition of
Kosovo not take place until mid-January. This would assist
the effort to obtain a renewal of the OSCE mission mandate by
December 31 (for which there was a greater chance of
obtaining Russian approval if there was no prior UDI). If
the Russians refuse to renew the OSCE mission, the burden
will fall upon the EU to fill the gap and further delay the
implementation of the ESDP mission they are planning.
Furthermore, the December 13-14 European Council could better
prepare a text for a declaration by the 27 members (a neutral
text similar to that done for Montenegro) if there was no
complicating UDI immediately after the December 10 deadline.


3. (C) U/S Burns expressed concern that a delay of UDI and
a recognition of Kosovo could lead to public unrest or
encourage those who favor further negotiations. He noted
that Kosovo's unresolved status is a problem for the U.S. as
well as Europe. Araud acknowledged these concerns, but said
that a delay until mid-January would help the Europeans to
achieve a "critical mass" of 18-20 countries that would be
able to recognize Kosovo's independence immediately; the
"delay" they are requesting is one of only a few weeks (until
January 10-15). He added that Thaci was promising other
European leaders that, if elected as Kosovo's next Prime
Minister, he could agree to delay a UDI until mid-March,
something many Europeans wanted to hear. Araud raised
concerns about the possible Serbian reaction to a UDI, noting
that Kostunica has been less and less willing to help reach a
solution (and in fact was linking Kosovo to the current
situation in the Republika Serbska). A strong Serbian
backlash could lead to the expulsion of ambassadors of
countries that recognize Kosovo initially and a stirring up
of conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo. Therefore, it is
imperative to work out the chronology of a UDI and
recognition as soon as possible, and in the view of the GOF,

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a "minimum decent interval" between the end of the
negotiating process and the UDI and recognition of Kosovo is
their preferred solution. Araud also said the international
community sould send a signal to Serbia about what its future
wil be after Kosovo is resolved. Carla Del Ponte's recent
statements did not help. U/S Burns noted how important it
was for Serbia to apprehend and bring to justice Mladic and
Karadzic.


4. (C) On Bosnia, U/S Burns informed Araud about the recent
A/S Fried telephone call to support the High Representative.
The USG believes that long-term, Bosnia will have to engage
in constitutional reform to normalize their institutions to
succeed in joining NATO or the EU. Araud agreed and said
that it was important to send positive signals on a European
future to both the Bosnians and Serbs, although their
current, revanchist approach was more shaped by the past than
constructively focused on their European future.

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DIVERGENCE ON GEORGIA MAP
-------------- --


5. (C) U/S Burns stated to Araud that the USG strongly
supports giving Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at
Bucharest in April. However, for tactical reasons, he said
that a firm decision on this issue was not needed until after
Kosovo was decided this December. That said, every country
has a right to choose its alliances and if NATO turns down
Georgia's application, it would be tantamount to allowing
Russia to make membership decisions for the alliance. Araud
agreed that this is a decision for NATO to make, but the
Russian obsession about encirclement is real, something we
had to contend with. There is also a real danger of a harsh
Russian reaction, possibly even military action against
Georgia, putting the credibility of the alliance at stake.
Araud also criticized "inflammatory" Georgian actions that
have led to increased tensions with Russia. The GOF is
prepared to offer a "significant package" to Georgia, but
does not want it to be called the MAP (or have any word
associated with "membership"). He suggested simply calling
it the "Georgia Action Plan" and said the alliance could
include a declaration of concern about Georgian security.
This is the plan the French and Germans are currently working
on.


6. (C) U/S Burns quickly noted that Russia had been given 16
years to integrate more fully into the Alliance, but had
chosen partnership instead, and had since done nothing in the
NATO-Russia Council and had pulled out of most military
missions. In his view, the Russians wouldn't dare to react
militarily against Georgia, knowing how damaging such a move
would be to its standing. A "Georgia Action Plan" (GAP)
would not work; NATO needs to make a decision on its own
without Russian interference. Philippe Carre, Director of
Strategic Affairs at the MFA, noted that the GOF recognizes
Georgia's aspirations and takes them seriously. The French
consider MAP to be a promise of full membership and the
alliance should not accept a country as a member just to
spite Russia. The French have concerns about Saakashvili's
government and corruption in Georgian politics. U/S Burns
responded that Saakashvili had matured in office and that
NATO had never used corruption as a bar for membership for
other countries. Closing the discussion, Araud noted that
the French position was not cast in stone: MAP for Georgia
would eventually go to Sarkozy for a decision, a decision
that could not be pre-judged.

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BUCHAREST SUMMIT AND NEW MEMBERS
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7. (C) Araud stated that the GOF supports Croatia becoming a
full member of NATO at the April 2-4 summit in Bucharest.
The French do not consider Albania and Macedonia ready to
join the alliance yet, but if the USG insists on including
them as well, the GOF will not resist. U/S Burns said that
the USG didn't have a firm position yet. Ambassador Nuland
would be visiting all three candidate countries November 7-9
and NATO could debate membership in January/February 2008.
He added that the greatest difficulty was being posed by
Greece, which is threatening to veto membership for Macedonia
over the name dispute. While we understand the domestic
Greek politics driving that position, we do not agree that
Greece should risk of destabilizing Macedonia over the name
issue. The United Nations Matthew Nimitz is continuing
efforts on this issue. Araud agreed that this was a real
problem, but said that the GOF was unwilling to put any
pressure on Greece on this issue; Greece is also a member of

PARIS 00004439 003 OF 004


the EU and France will align itself in solidarity with Athens.

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FUTURE STRATEGY AND CAPABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
-------------- --


8. (C) U/S Burns stated that the international structure to
provide assistance in Afghanistan was not working well. The
USG supports the appointment of a more senior civilian
coordinator with an appropriately expanded mandate to focus
on economics, narcotics control, rebuilding of infrastructure
and uniting civilian and military efforts. He hoped that
France and the UK could agree on a job description and person
to fill it in in December. Araud agreed and suggested
nominating Paddy Ashdown as someone with requisite civilian
and military experience. He noted that the GOF does not/not
think the representative should also wear an EU hat.


9. (C) Burns then raised the problems stemming from lack of
military commitments in the east and south of Afghanistan.
Araud responded that the GOF recently decided to send a new
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) to work with
the Dutch in Uruzgan. However, President Sarkozy had not
made any military decisions for 2009 and beyond, and noted
that the GOF is currently undertaking a comprehensive defense
and security review. He said the French are against staying
"indefinitely" in Afghanistan and the Europeans want a
clearer vision of the benchmarks that will trigger a drawdown
of NATO forces. The problem for many in Europe is public
opinion; Europeans don't understand why they should have
forces in Afghanistan; the difficulty is compounded in
countries where parliament has a say in troop deployments.
U/S Burns responded that in our view, the U.S. and NATO
forces will be in Afghanistan for the long-term.
Unfortunately, the lack of burdensharing (particularly by
west European countries) is causing resentment in those
countries whose troops are shouldering the greatest burden.
Until the Afghan government has the capacity to defend
itself, it is in the interest of all NATO countries to make a
sufficiently strong military effort to support it. That was
the decision agreed to in 2003 and the USG is prepared to
discuss future strategy in Afghanistan in greater detail if
that will assist the French to move troops into the east and
south in greater numbers. A strategy discussion of the kind
the French were calling for could be linked to the
appointment and mandate enlargement of the new UN rep.

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SUPPORTING BURMA
--------------


10. (C) U/S Burns expressed appreciation for FM Kouchner's
statements on Burma and his presence in the region. He added
that it was important for UN Special Representative Gambari
to return to Burma soon, and that the UN needed to be more
forceful about whom he would see (and not leave these
decisions to the Burmese generals). Araud agreed and added
that the last EU GAERC meeting had agreed on no new
investment in the country. He clarified that Kouchner's
recent call for "financial incentives" for Burma referred to
a proposed foundation to support the opposition in Burma and
not/not financial incentives for the Burmese generals. Araud
noted that FM Kouchner will want to discuss Burma at the next
opportunity, possibly at Istanbul.

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INDIA: NUCLEAR COOPERATION AT STANDSTILL
--------------


11. (C) Araud informed U/S Burns that a proposed
French-Indian agreement on nuclear cooperation was on hold
until the U.S. agreement could be signed by India and
ratified by the U.S. Congress. The GOF would like to quickly
sign an "Agreement of Cooperation," which alone would not
have commercial implications. Burns expressed hope that the
Indian government would find a way to move forward as soon as
possible. The USG hopes that India would move forward on
agreements with the U.S. before moving forward with
agreements with third countries if they remained blocked on
an agreement with the U.S. Araud, saying he fully
understood, suggested that perhaps the Indian government
could consider signing cooperation agreements and letters of
intent at the same time with the three interested countries
(U.S., Russia and France). This might dilute domestic
opposition and allow the process to move forward. He added
that the GOF would like to see progress on this issue before
President Sarkozy's visit to India at the end of January,

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IRAN: GOF PESSIMISM
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12. (C) In a brief one-on-one discussion of Iran, Araud
expressed pessimism about an Iranian willingness to negotiate
or suspend enrichment, and was negative about El-Baradei. He
said he expected the EU would wait until Dec. 19 before
coming up with fairly weak sanctions -- and possibly none at
all if a new UNSCR is not adopted.


13. (U) This message was reviewed and cleared by U/S Burns.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA