SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.: FRENCH PUSHING HARD ON ALL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004271

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017
TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR SU CT CD FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.: FRENCH PUSHING HARD ON ALL
FRONTS


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Romain Serman, an AF advisor at the French
presidency, told us on October 16 that President Sarkozy
remains personally engaged on Darfur-related issues and is
pushing for rapid progress on UNAMID and, especially,
MINURCAT. Force generation and financial issues regarding
MINURCAT are slowly being resolved, and the French hope for
deployment to begin in November with the full military
complement in place by mid-January 2008. The French are
concerned, however, that too many of the combat troops will
be French. Sarkozy is reported not happy with South Africa
President Mbeki's change of heart on September 24, which did
not allow the MINURCAT UNSC resolution to be adopted by
heads-of-state at the September 25 Security Council meeting.
Mbeki, UK PM Gordon Brown, and Sarkozy are to meet this
weekend, when Mbeki and Brown will be in Paris to attend the
championship match of the Rugby World Cup. Serman reported
that the French are becoming completely fed up with Darfur
rebel leader Abdulwahid el-Nur's refusal to participate in
the October 27 peace talks in Sirte, Libya, and are looking
for ways to "punish" him, including cancellation of his
present French visa, which is valid until December 28. END
SUMMARY.

MINURCAT/UNAMID


2. (C) In a wide-ranging meeting on October 16 (other
elements of which we will report separately),French
Presidency AF advisor Romain Serman provided an update on
Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.). He
first noted that President Sarkozy remained highly engaged in
the region's issues, always prompting his staff "to keep
moving and to move faster,' with a good but not overbearing
attention to details -- "what's happening with the
helicopters we talked about yesterday?" Serman said that
France succeeded in accelerating EU action on MINURCAT, the
EU-UN operation for Chad and C.A.R. France had hoped that
the EU would take action by October 23; the October 15 EU
decision was most welcome. France would like to keep
deployment of MINURCAT and UNAMID roughly in parallel, so
that the level of activity along the various borders mounts
in step.


3. (C) Serman said that force generation and funding issues
were slowly getting resolved. He said that MINURCAT's
commander, Irish General Nash, had arrived in Paris this week
and was beginning to function at MINURCAT's HQ near central
Paris. The French were pleased that EU "neutrals" such as
Ireland and Sweden were offering military personnel for
MINURCAT.


4. (C) One problem, however, was that troop contributors
were tending to offer support and rear-area units and not
combat troops. Serman said that a larger percentage of
MINURCAT's combat troops looked to be French. As they would
be the most visible elements of MINURCAT, these French troop
would give the impression that MINURCAT was a "French"
operation, something the GOF did not want. However, Serman
indicated that the French could accept this if it meant
allowing the operation to go forward.


5. (C) Serman said that, if everything fell into place as
planned, MINURCAT units could begin to deploy in November.
French military planners have said that full deployment of
the military component of the operation could be accomplished
by mid-January 2008. Deploying the Chadian police/gendarmes
would take place differently -- the UN planned to train the
800 Chadians in batches of 200 a month, with the first group
to deploy in December and then periodically thereafter, with
the full complement in place by March 2008.

MBEKI BALKS ON MINURCAT RESOLUTION


6. (C) Serman said that the French, including President
Sarkozy, were not very happy with South Africa President
Mbeki's change of heart on September 24 concerning the
MINURCAT UNSC resolution. The French had always hoped that
the resolution would be adopted by the UNSC, sitting in
heads-of-state format, on September 25, which would have sent
a strong and clear message about the international
community's commitment to Chad and C.A.R. within the context
of the Darfur cluster of problems. Instead, according to
Serman, Mbeki wavered, saying that he could not vote publicly
for the installation of a "white" military force in Africa,
even though Chad President Deby and C.A.R. President Bozize
had indicated that they would accept, and even would welcome,

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such a force. Mbeki's change of position meant that the
resolution had to be adopted by the UNSC at ambassador-level
on the morning of September 25, rather than by heads-of-state
later that day, robbing it of much of its force. Serman said
that the French had not expressed their displeasure to Mbeki
-- "he knows we're not happy about this, and we didn't need
to tell him." Serman noted that Sarkozy, Mbeki, and UK PM
Gordon Brown would meet together this weekend, when Mbeki and
Brown will be in Paris to attend the final match of the Rugby
World Cup, with South Africa and England contesting the grand
prize.

ABDULWAHID EL-NUR


7. (C) In contrast to the PKO military angle, political
aspects related to Sudan and its neighbors were not going
well at all, Serman remarked, noting the escalation of
North-South violence, the risks to the CPA, and the prospect
that the October 27 peace talks in Sirte, Libya, would amount
to little because of the boycott of rebel leaders such as
Abdulwahid el-Nur. Serman said that the French government
was reaching the limits of its patience with him, and that
even Sarkozy had said that "if he doesn't cooperate, he must
be punished." Serman had little faith in Abdulwahid,
branding him an opportunist more interested in preserving his
self-anointed position as "leader" of the Darfur rebels
rather than in doing anything constructive for his people or
in terms of Sudan's and Darfur's many problems. In Serman's
view, Abdulwahid had become an opportunist, seeking money and
the patronage of NGOs. Not only was he personally not
cooperating but he was using his influence to prohibit
members of his Fur ethnic group in Darfur from sending
representatives to Libya. Serman said that only the Zaghawa
in Darfur seemed to be preparing to attend the Sirte talks.
Serman regretted that Abdulwahid was now wasting yet another
opportunity to play a positive role.


8. (C) Serman noted (with a tone of regret) that the GOF
had recently extended Abdulwahid's visa, allowing him to
remain legally in France until December 28. Serman confided
that the French were looking for ways to cancel his visa, but
he admitted that there were certain legal problems stemming
from the fact that the visa had just been extended. His idea
was that Jan Eliasson would declare, on the eve of the
October 27 Sirte talks, that certain individuals (among them
Abdulwahid) were not cooperating and were impeding the
political dialogue. On this basis, the UNSC could, perhaps
in the form of a Presidential Statement, condemn Abdulwahid
and the other recalcitrants, which could strengthen any
action the French might take to cancel his visa. Serman
acknowledged that Abdulwahid was very crafty, as were his NGO
supporters in France, and that being able to expel him in the
short term might not be easy. "But December 28 is a long
ways off, and he can do a lot of harm between then and now,"
Serman mused.

COMMENT


9. (C) Serman gave the impression that Sarkozy himself has
ensured that momentum within the GOF to get MINURCAT and
UNAMID up and running has continued these past few weeks.
Developments have been less than ideal (e.g., the
disproportionately large number of French combat troops) but
the French appear ready to accept them and to keep moving
forward. We sense that French concern now is less focused on
the two PKOs, which seem to be proceeding apace, but rather
on the worsening state of the other issues in play -- the
North-South/CPA problem and the increasingly fragile October
27 peace talks in Libya. END COMMENT.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


Stapleton