SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.: UPDATE ON FRENCH VIEWS TOWARDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004183

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO SU CT CD FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/CHAD/C.A.R.: UPDATE ON FRENCH VIEWS TOWARDS
UNAMID AND MINURCAT

REF: A. STATE 136068 (NOTAL)


B. PARIS 4084 (NOTAL)

C. USEU TODAY (OCTOBER 4)

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: France now agrees to carry out joint
demarches with the U.S. and the UK regarding contributions to
the UNAMID mission for Darfur (refs A and B),but only/only
with respect to non-EU potential donors. The French will
demarche EU members separately, taking into account the need
for contributions to MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African
Republic. The French have extended Darfur rebel leader
Abdulwahid el-Nur's visa through the end of the year but are
becoming increasingly exasperated with his refusal to
compromise on any issue, even after several meetings with
Foreign Minister Kouchner. DAS-equivalent Christine Fages
told us on October 4 that progress on MINURCAT was proceeding
steadily within the EU, although she was not able to say when
it would deploy and did not offer many details. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) We met separately on October 4 with MFA AF
DAS-equivalents Helene Le Gal and Christine Fages. Le Gal is
responsible for East and Central Africa, which includes
Sudan, and Fages is responsible for West Africa, which
includes Chad and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.),
consistent with long-standing MFA practice. Le Gal and Fages
provided updates on their respective sectors.

UNAMID/SUDAN
--------------

3. (C) Le Gal said that France had modified its position
with respect to the U.S. request (ref A) that the U.S., UK,
and France jointly demarche a number of countries to seek
contributions for the UNAMID mission in Sudan. We had
previously reported (ref B) that the French had declined to
join in this effort, preferring separate demarches in
consideration of the priority France has placed on building
the MINURCAT mission in Chad/C.A.R. Le Gal said on October
4, however, that France now agreed to carry out the joint
demarche with the U.S. and UK, but only with respect to the
non-EU countries listed in ref A. She said that French
Embassies in the non-EU countries had been instructed to work
with U.S. and UK counterparts to make the joint demarche on
host governments. She said that it was possible that some
French Embassies had already contacted U.S. and UK Embassies
in the countries involved and had begun the process.


4. (C) Le Gal said that France would work with EU potential
donors separately, as part of the GOF's efforts to obtain
contributions not only for UNAMID but also for the MINURCAT
mission in Chad and C.A.R. She indicated that France's
leadership role in MINURCAT and its needs required a
balancing between it and UNAMID in terms of French treatment
with EU partners.


5. (C) Le Gal said that the French were becoming
increasingly frustrated with Darfur rebel leader Abdulwahid
el-Nur's refusal to cooperate or to show any willingness to
compromise on any issue. "If anything, he's getting worse,"
Le Gal observed. She said that Abdulwahid had meet several
times in recent weeks directly with Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner, with the latter trying without success to obtain
Abdulwahid's agreement to attend the upcoming Libya peace
talks, among other things. Le Gal reported that Abdulwahid
continued to view himself as the key to resolving the Darfur
crisis and, as such, expected everyone else to bow to his
will.


6. (C) Le Gal said that there was some regret on the French
side for having allowed Abdulwahid to come to France about a
year ago. The purpose then was simply to allow him to
consult with the French. Now, he has ensconced himself well
in Paris and has become "a bit of a darling" for NGOs
interested in Darfur, notably the "Urgence Darfour"

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organization, which has adopted him as Darfur's true leader
and which injected itself into French domestic politics when
it held well-publicized Darfur-related rallies during the
French presidential campaign this past spring. All of this
had contributed to Abdulwahid's considerable ego, Le Gal
commented, and exacerbated his more negative tendencies. Le
Gal said that Abdulwahid seemed now to think that he was not
only the sole leader capable of resolving the Darfur crisis
but also the only person who could deal with all of Sudan's
many other problems. She said he was kidding himself if he
thought that he could assume power in Khartoum -- "the 'Arab'
Sudanese will never let that happen." John Garang might have
been able to do so, but not Abdulwahid, Le Gal noted.


7. (C) When asked about Abdulwahid's residency status in
France and to what degree France viewed this as leverage over
him, Le Gal said that his visa was being renewed on a
three-month basis and that it had just been renewed for a
period extending to the end of 2007. She said that there had
been discussion about whether to renew it but that the GOF
concluded that it might be better to have him in France,
where the French could exercise some control over him and
continue to urge him to be more accommodating, rather than
have him leave France for "who knows where to do who knows
what." Le Gal indicated that the French were willing to put
up with him despite his increasingly erratic ways.

MINURCAT/CHAD/C.A.R.
--------------

8. (C) Our initial introductory courtesy call on October 4
with newly-arrived DAS-equivalent for West Africa Christine
Fages provided an opportunity for an update on MINURCAT.
Exhibiting a very brisk and to-the-point manner, Fages said
that the process of establishing MINURCAT was going well.
She declined to go into much detail but said that EU partners
were fully on board politically and that she expected the EU
to adopt an "action commune" in short order, a requirement
before the EU could engage in an activity such as MINURCAT.
The "action commune" would allow for more detailed planning
and the development of a CONOPS, along with more technical
EU-required aspects of the operation. Force generation
("always complex") was the other immediate concern. Fages
said that several countries had committed troops and support
services, although she declined to specify the countries or
what they had agreed to provide. (See ref C for details
derived from EU sources.)


9. (C) Fages confirmed press reports (e.g., Paris daily Le
Monde, October 4) stating that MINURCAT's general HQ would be
located at Mont Valerien, near Paris. (Le Monde also
reported that Irish General Patrick Nash would likely head
the operation from Mont Valerien, with French General
Jean-Philippe Ganascia commanding in theater.)


10. (C) Throughout the discussion, Fages (whose previous
assignment had been at France's mission to NATO),praised the
"excellent cooperation and support" the U.S. had provided
concerning MINURCAT. She brushed over earlier differences on
the funding of the Chadian gendarmes who are to participate
in the operation and said that money would eventually be
found to fund their activities. Fage said that the Chadian
gendarmes were one of the key elements of MINURCAT, for
without them, Chad President Deby would have never accepted
MINURCAT. Fages said that Deby was thinking ahead -- after
the mission he would have a cadre of relatively well-trained
and well-equipped gendarmes that would be a valuable asset.


11. (C) Fages said that the French had had no problems with
C.A.R. regarding MINURCAT, and observed that C.A.R. President
Bozize undoubtedly welcomed an international presence in
northeastern C.A.R., given his problems in the northwestern
part of his country.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

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