Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS4069
2007-09-27 15:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN FRANCE-ANGOLA RELATIONS

Tags:  PREL AO FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9971
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHFR #4069/01 2701547
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271547Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0495
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004069 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017
TAGS: PREL AO FR
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN FRANCE-ANGOLA RELATIONS

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004069

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017
TAGS: PREL AO FR
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN FRANCE-ANGOLA RELATIONS

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA Angola desk officer Carole Blestel
told us on September 26 that Angola was apparently seeking to
improve relations with France, citing the meeting between
Presidents Dos Santos and Sarkozy on September 24 in New
York. She said that Angola had initiated the meeting and
that the Angolans no longer seemed to want to use the
long-running investigation of the Falcone Affair (a complex
allegedly illicit arms trading case dating from the
Mitterrand era) as a reason for distancing Angola from
France. Blestel said that the MFA was planning for Sarkozy
to travel to Angola in 2008, with a lower-level delegation
likely to go to Angola before then to set the stage for the
presidential visit. Legal proceedings against 42 defendants
(including ex-Interior Minister Charles Pasqua and former AF
Presidential Advisor Jean-Christophe Mitterrand (son of the
former president) in connection with the Falcone Affair may
begin in 2008. Blestel asked whether the U.S. would send
election observers to Angola for the 2008 legislative and
2009 presidential elections, and whether the U.S. still
intended to open a presence post in Cabinda. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) We met with MFA Angola desk officer Carole Blestel
on September 26 to discuss the significance of the September
24 meeting between French President Sarkozy and Angolan
President Dos Santos on the margins of the UNGA. Blestel
said that the meeting was a friendly one and she confirmed
Sarkozy's statements after the meeting that the two sides
intended to improve relations. She said that Dos Santos
invited Sarkozy to visit Angola during the early part of 2008
and that Sarkozy, in principle, accepted the invitation. The
MFA would begin planning the visit in conjunction with
Angolan counterparts. As Sarkozy stated to the press, a
lower-level delegation, likely led by Jean-Marie Bockel
(State Secretary for Cooperation and Francophonie) would make
an advance visit, probably before the end of 2007.

The Falcone Affair and Its Repercussions
--------------

3. (C) Blestel said this turn toward improved relations
might finally mark an end to the unfortunate and lengthy

period of poor relations caused by the Falcone Affair, the
still-murky case dating from the Mitterrand years involving
arms sales to Angola, engineered by Pierre Joseph Falcone and
many others. In April 2007, a French judge investigating the
case sent it forward to the Paris Correctional Tribunal,
clearing the way for further legal proceedings against 42
defendants, including former Interior Minister Charles Pasqua
and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, a son of the former president
and AF-advisor at the Presidency during much of his father's
term of office. Blestel, adopting a "let the chips fall
where they may" attitude, said she hoped the trial would
begin as scheduled in 2008 and that it would reach some
conclusion within a reasonable time, although she
acknowledged the tendency of such cases to drag on forever.
She doubted whether Falcone, a fugitive whose whereabouts
were unknown, would actually appear in court.


4. (C) The Falcone Affair, which also came to be called
"Angolagate," involved transgressions on a number of levels,
Blestel explained, including kickbacks, money-laundering,
bribes, a failure to properly document arms sales, tax
evasion and fraud, and similar illegalities. The 42
defendants were accused of having carried out a mix of these
activities. Many, including JC Mitterrand, had already been
in and out of court (and jail, in several cases, including
Mitterrand's) a number of times over the years in connection
with the case.


5. (C) The Falcone Affair damaged relations because it cast
Angola, the buyer of the arms, in a negative light and as a
necessary participant in or accessory to illegal activities.
Blestel said that Angola's decision to chill relations was
essentially a result of embarrassment and a loss of face once
its role in the affair was revealed. Moreover, the Angolans
always believed that the French Government must have been
aware of, if not directly involved in, the affair, especially
given the roles of figures such as Pasqua and JC Mitterrand,
and were angry that the GOF, in their view, denied
involvement. Blestel believed, which she hoped the trial
would confirm, that there was never any involvement on the
part of the GOF and that any of the defendants who may have
been officials during the affair had been acting in their
individual capacities, although they certainly might have
been guilty of abuse of office.

6 (C) When asked why the change in Angola's position,
Blestel said that it appeared the Angolans were beginning to
understand that their reluctance to deal with France had long
ago become unproductive and that there was much to gain by
improving relations. She also believed that the Angolans

PARIS 00004069 002 OF 002


were starting to understand that the GOF was not involved in
the affair and that the trial of the 42 defendants was in
itself a positive sign that France was serious about going
after those whose activities had proved damaging to both
Angola's and France's broader interests. The Angolans took
advantage of the UNGA to reach out to Sarkozy, and his
willingness to move forward rather than dwell on the past
matched Angolan hopes, Blestel explained.

Subdued French Posture in Angola
--------------

7. (C) Blestel said that France in recent years had
maintained a low profile in Angola. If relations improved,
she expected that one area of interest would be restarting
French economic and development assistance. An additional
unfortunate result of the Falcone Affairs was Angola's
decision not to repay certain debts owed to France for
loan-based assistance the French had provided before.
Blestel said that the debt issue would have to be resolved
(either through repayment, forgiveness, or restructuring)
before France could provide new assistance. She said that
despite the French Embassy's low profile in Luanda, it was
sufficiently staffed to allow for a rapid expansion in
activities should relations indeed move forward.

U.S and Angola
--------------

8. (C) Blestel asked whether the U.S. planned on sending
elections observers to Angola to monitor the legislative
elections in 2008 and 2009. She also asked for information
about the opening of a small presence post in Cabinda. (We
have e-mailed AF/S for information on these two inquiries,
and a reply by e-mail would be sufficient to allow us to
respond to her.) Blestel said that the Alliance Francaise
educational/cultural organization maintained an office in
Cabinda, noting that Cabinda was home to a fair number of
francophone Angolans and residents from neighboring
francophone countries.




Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


Stapleton