USD/P EDELMAN DISCUSSES IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 003964

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP FR RU SR IZ IR AF
SUBJECT: USD/P EDELMAN DISCUSSES IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE
DEFENSE, CFE AND KOSOVO WITH GOF


Classified By: Andrew Younng, Acting Political Counselor, for reasons 1
.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) Please see paragraphs 4 and 7 for requested
Washington follow-up actions.


2. (C) SUMMARY: On September 18, USD/P Eric Edelman and
State Department Counselor Eliot Cohen met with French
Political Director Gerard Araud to discuss Iran, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Missile Defense, CFE and Kosovo. The GOF is
working to convince its European neighbors to toughen
sanctions on Iran and may consider taking national
measures as well. The idea of a French PRT in Afghanistan
is still under consideration, but caught up in an
"interagency squabble" and the French would appreciate
receiving USG experts to discuss PRT possibilities to break
the logjam. On Iraq, the GOF is actively looking for
proposals to assist in the reconstruction of the country,
but is hampered by the security situation. The GOF
believes that the NATO allies need to agree on what they
want to say on MD at Bucharest and requested that some USG
experts present MD to the French white paper defense
commission which is currently reviewing France's security
and defense priorities. The GOF welcomes U.S. proposals to
break the impasse on CFE, but believes that the Russians
have already made the decision to suspend participation in
the treaty; however, there should be a price to pay for
withdrawal. On Kosovo, other European allies are coming
around to accepting that there may be no alternative to
supervised independence of Kosovo absent a UNSCR; some are
hoping that a UDI could be delayed until after Russian
presidential elections in March 2008. END SUMMARY.

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TOUGHENING FRENCH STANCE ON IRAN
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3. (C) USD/P Edelman expressed appreciation for the recent
tough statements by French President Nicholas Sarkozy and
FM Bernard Kouchner that warned of the dangers of a nuclear
Iran. Araud responded that Sarkozy considers the problem
of Iran to be "THE major foreign policy crisis of our
time." The GOF wants to move ahead on toughening sanctions
in the Security Council, even if they would be limited in
value by the lack of commitment by the Russians and
Chinese. They believe that financial sanctions
(demonstrated by the U.S. Treasury) to have been the most
effective sanctions so far and are working to get the other
EU members on board. Germany, whose medium- and smaller
enterprises feel the painful effects of financial sanctions
more than the large multinational companies based in other
countries, is the most difficult ally to convince (although
Araud noted that Merkel had agreed in principle to the idea
at the most recent Franco-German summit). The GOF is
proposing a letter to go to other EU colleagues to request
that this subject be addressed within the EU, perhaps as
soon as the next GAERC meeting. At the same time, the
French are not excluding the possibility of taking
additional national measures to increase the pressure on
Iran.

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FRENCH PRT IN AFGHANISTAN CAUGHT IN INTERAGENCY SQUABBLE
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4. (C) USD/P Edelman proposed that the GOF consider
leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in
Afghanistan, possibly in the Nimruz province which abuts the
Iranian border. This could help stem the flow of weapons
and materials from Iran that the Taliban and other rebels
are trying to use against the Alliance in the south. Araud
responded that the possibility of a PRT has been under
consideration
within the GOF, but the idea is currently caught up in an
"interagency squabble" in which the President and the MFA
support deployment, but the French MOD is resistant to it.
ACTION REQUEST: Araud suggested that it would be helpful
to have USG experts come to France to discuss what types of
activities a French PRT could engage in and reinforce the
ideas for political-civil cooperation in Afghanistan.

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DEFEAT IN IRAQ IS A DEFEAT FOR THE WEST
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5. (C) USD/P Edelman expressed appreciation for FM
Kouchner's recent visit to Iraq. Araud responded that
President

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Sarkozy believes that a defeat for the coalition forces in
Iraq
would be a defeat for the West. The GOF is planning to open
a
Consulate in Erbil and is actively looking for ideas to
assist in Iraq; the problem with many proposals is the
uncertain security situation. For example, to send police
trainers, judges or others to Iraq, it is necessary to have
a sufficiently secure environment for them to be able to
conduct their mission. There is a strong French political
will to act and they are hoping FM Koucher will return to
Iraq soon and have some deliverables that he can announce.
Edelman suggested that the French consider assisting in the
re-engagement of the UN in Iraq, perhaps by providing
military personnel that could act as advisors and assist
with the question of UN security. Araud returned that
sending military personnel is a "red line" for the GOF, but
he conceded that military advisors in a U.N. role may be seen
differently
than sending combat troops.

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WORKING WITH RUSSIA ON MISSILE DEFENSE
-------------- --------------


6. (C) USD/P Edelman emphasized to Araud that the USG was
trying hard to counter Russian concerns that current
missile defense planning is really meant to be the first
step in a global system that could be used in a "first
strike" against Russia. He stated that the USG is not
developing new warheads or new platforms (although Russia
is) and that U.S warheads and platforms are aging;
the Russian theory does not take these factors into
account. Furthermore, we have given the GOR evidence of
Iranian capabilities, but they refuse to believe that our
concern is about the Iranian threat and not Russia. Araud
said that in his recent trip to Moscow, the core of the
Russian arguments that he heard is: 1) that the U.S. wants
global (AEGIS cruisers) capabilities; 2) the U.S. routinely
says that, "the USG currently does not intend to develop
further MD capabilities" which they interpret to mean that
the USG is keeping its options open to change its mind in
the future; and 3) the refusal to halt discussions with
Poland and the Czech Republic is clear evidence of U.S.
plans to build an MD system regardless of Russian
concerns.

7) (C) On next steps forward, Araud stated that it is
important for the Allies to agree on what they want to say
about MD at the NATO summit in Bucharest. One political
reality is that there is "not one single euro" to pay for a
NATO MD component (and he added that MD is not a priority
of the current internal French defense review). However,
he added that the GOF does not want to be difficult and
they do want to know what the USG is hoping to receive at
Bucharest. Edelman responded that the current USG MD
proposal is a benefit for the Alliance, but NATO must
be ready to fill in the gaps for short- and medium range
missiles (something even the Russians acknowledge is a
threat). ACTION REQUEST: Araud informed Edelman that it
would be very helpful for a MD team to come from the USG to
brief the Defense White Paper Commission, which is
conducting a review of France's defense and security
priorities, on what the MD system will do and why it is
important.

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CFE: BREAKING THE TREATY TO SHOW RUSSIAN STRENGTH
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Araud welcomed the U.S. proposals to break the
impasse and move forward on CFE and Istanbul commitments,
which show that we are trying to save the CFE treaty and
respond to Russian concerns. Unfortunately, his sense is
that the Russians are "looking for something cheap to smash
up" to demonstrate that they are back as a strong world
power. For the GOF, the test of Russian intentions will be
if they show willingness to seek a compromise on some of
the major issues, such as flank limits. The flank limits
were already modified twice in the 1990's, so they could be
adapted again, but if Russia refuses to negotiate on this
issue (which is important to many allies) then it will show
that the GOR does not want to save the treaty. Edelman
agreed and remarked that thus far, Russia seemd more
determined to wrest one-sided concessions from the Allies
rather than trying to meet us halfway. Russia is also
trying to justify suspending their participation in the CFE
treaty on the legal argument that if the treaty allows for

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withdrawal from its provisions, that would also "imply"
that the treaty authorizes a suspension. The upcoming
October meetings between Rice and Gates and their Russian
counterparts would hopefully be an opportunity to obtain
greater Russian engagement on this issue. Araud agreed
fully and stated firmly that the Russians must be aware
that they cannot simply withdraw from a major arms control
treaty without paying a price.

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MANAGING KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Araud remarked that negotiations on Kosovo were
"going nowhere" and that there was no disposition on the
part of Russia (and thus Belgrade) to be constructive. The
allies must now prepare the "choreography" of how to manage
a likely unilateral declaration of independence (UDI).
Araud added that Thaci was traveling around Europe
presenting himself as the next natural leader of Kosovo and
that he was promising that he could delay any UDI until
March (ie, after the Russian presidential elections). This
is exactly what many European leaders want to hear; he
hoped that this would not cause any transatlantic rift and
expressed his worry that Thaci was raising expectations too
high among the European allies. Edelman responded that we
believe that France, the UK and Germany should continue
their leadership in this process and do all they can to
guarantee European unity. KFOR will also have to position
itself to deter any rash actions after December 10 (on the
part of either Kosovo's Serbian or Albanian populations),
and the E.U. will also need to discourage any attempt by
the Republiska Srbska to follow suit and attempt to secede
from Bosnia & Herzegovina.


10. (C) Araud praised the actions of the European
negotiator Ambassador Ischinger and said that his efforts to
visit the European capitals and explain the negotiation
process was very effective in convincing allies that
everything possible was being attempted. Cyprus, for
domestic political reasons of its own, will not be able to
recognize an independent Kosovo, but the GOF hopes that the
Cypriots will agree not to oppose other EU members from
sending help to an independent Kosovo (such as police,
trainers, etc). He added that allies will need to accept
the already "defacto partition" of the north and there
should not be a fight to unify Kosovo. He added that
European political opinion was still divided on the
question of Kosovo, as many Europeans associate the Kosovar
Albanians with organized crime and see the Serbs as
traumatized victims. Any violence towards Serbs living in
Kosovo would be a disaster for European governments. He
also advocated a "PR campaign" for the Kosovars to show
that they will respect their Serbian minority population
and national heritage sites.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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