SE NATSIOS DISCUSSES SUDAN, CHAD C.A.R. WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 003942

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PREF EAID UNGA MARR SU CD CT FR
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS DISCUSSES SUDAN, CHAD C.A.R. WITH
FRENCH OFFICIALS (SEPTEMBER 15)

REF: STATE 128495

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios
discussed Darfur and related issues with French officials on
September 15. Both sides agreed that Abdulwahid el-Nur's
continued failure to participate in peace talks, including
the October 27 meeting in Libya, posed serious problems, and
discussed ways of encouraging his participation, which
included funding structured in such a way to ensure his
attendance but to limit his ability to use the funding to buy
arms. The French supported SE Natsios's idea to include
other Fur leaders at the upcoming Darfur talks in Libya.
Both sides agreed that Libya was not the ideal site for the
October 27 talks and that there had to be adequate assurances
that the international community would be allowed a
sufficient presence at the meeting.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The French said that the
September 21 Darfur meeting on the margins of the UNGA would
likely feature a broader group of attendees than had the June
25 Paris meeting. The two sides agreed on the need for a
strong UN Special Envoy (currently Jan Eliasson) and that the
position should perhaps be converted to a full-time job.
Issues pertaining to South Sudan, while not directly a part
of the Darfur issue, could not be ignored because of their
repercussions in Darfur. Both sides agreed that China was
playing an increasingly positive role, which should be
broadened to include North-South issues and the CPA. The
French agreed that it might be better to limit Egypt's
participation in UNAMID (this following an Egyptian offer of
3,000 troops) as an enhanced "Arab" presence might not sit
well with Darfurians. On the EU-led mission for Chad and
C.A.R., the French noted differences with the U.S. on funding
Chadian gendarmes who would participate in the mission; the
U.S. said it would do what it could to encourage Europeans to
contribute troops, especially Sweden (which the French said
could be offered command of the EU force if it decided to
participate and contribute a good share of the necessary
personnel).


3. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The U.S. side raised the issue
of the imminent departure of AEC Chairman Vraalsen and the
need to find a good replacement for him. The French said
they would study the issue, agreeing on the need for an
effective AEC to oversee the CPA. They shared the U.S.
perception that the AEC was operating under undue
constraints. As a final point, both sides agreed on the need
to bolster the cease-fire mechanism in Darfur and possibly
establish a cease-fire monitoring mechanism, perhaps to be
incorporated into UNAMID, in an effort to improve the
existing cease-fire system, which was continuing to break
down. END SUMMARY.


4. (C) Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios, accompanied
by USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa Kate Almquist,
Embassy Pol Chief Rosenblatt, and Embassy notetaker, met with
French officials at the MFA on September 15 to discuss Darfur
and related issues. Eric Chevallier (Crisis and Conflict
Advisor to FM Bernard Kouchner),Jean de Gliniasty (MFA AF
A/S-equivalent),Sylvie Bermann (MFA IO A/S-equivalent),
Helene Le Gal (MFA AF DAS-equivalent),Charlotte Montel (an
MFA AF advisor to FM Kouchner),and Frederic Bouvier (MFA
Sudan Desk Officer) comprised the French delegation.

Abdulwahid el-Nur
--------------

5. (C) After opening pleasantries, during which Chevallier
regretted FM Kouchner's absence because of his demanding
travel schedule, SE Natsios noted Abdulwahid el-Nur's
continuing refusal to participate in peace talks, notably the
meeting in Libya scheduled for October 27. Yet, SE Natsios
noted, Abdulwahid never offered a coherent plan of us own or
rationale for his refusal to cooperate. SE Natsios remarked
that Abdulwahid's communications system seemed good and that
he maintained close contact with his associates.
Abdulwahid's failure to participate could scuttle the talks.


6. (C) Crisis and Conflict Advisor Chevallier said that the
GOF met with Abdulwahid frequently. He noted (and SE Natsios
agreed) that Abdulwahid continued to enjoy strong popular
support among Darfurians, particularly among members of the
Fur ethnic group (70 percent approval). AF A/S Gliniasty
noting Abdulwahid's love of "pomp and circumstance,"

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suspected that he needed money and that if he received
funding, he might attend the Libya talks. Providing support
to him would be difficult for France, Gliniasty commented,
referring to GOF budget constraints. AF DAS Le Gal referred
to information suggesting that Abdulwahid wanted money to buy
arms, with SE Natsios noting the risk that Abdulwahid could
take money but still not attend the Libya talks. Chevallier
offered the possibility of paying him in installments, or
making the money available only if Abdulwahid attended the
talks. He said that Abdulwahid needed the money to show his
status and to pay for his travel and communications needs.
In any case, whatever funding he received must not be used to
buy arms. SE Natsios and the French agreed that Abdulwahid
was adept at finding excuses for his lack of cooperation,
complaining on the one hand of being excluded and not
consulted, but then refusing entreaties to participate. SE
Natsios noted this his apparent "Messiah complex" had led him
into intractable positions that he could not change without
losing standing among his supporters.


7. (C) Chevallier said that Abdulwahid's demand of
"security before peace" was not realistic. Gliniasty said
the French had repeatedly asked Abdulwahid for a list of
requirements which, if met, would allow his participation.
He had offered a paper that Gliniasty said was worthless. He
has been asked to provide a second paper, but Gliniasty did
not expect it to be much better. He noted Abdulwahid's
tendency to change his markers, at one point insisting on "a
certain degree of cease-fire," which then became "a complete
cease-fire." Gliniasty said the French had suggested that
Abdulwahid come up with a reasonable plan the French could
support so that his attendance at the Libya talks could be
announced by September 21 (the date of the Darfur Ministerial
meeting to take place on the margins of the UNGA). Gliniasty
was not optimistic that Abdulwahid would do so.


8. (C) Chevallier commented that, despite all of
Abdulwahid's baggage, he remained a key element of the Darfur
problem, with no alternatives to him in clear view. SE
Natsios did not completely share this view, noting that there
were other potential credible representatives, based on his
recent visit to one large IDP camp. Much of the problem
rested with the Fur, who comprised about 70 percent of those
in the camps. When asked who they viewed as their leader,
responses tended to break on ethnic lines, with Abdulwahid
enjoying about 65 percent of the vote, in SE Natsios's rough
estimation.


9. (C) But so too did Ahmad Ibrahim Diraige, who had gained
prominence some 25 years previously but who still conducted
conference calls with Fur leaders. SE Natsios noted the Fur
tendency to follow a leader, whereas among the Zaghawa,
everyone viewed himself as a leader. Diraige was not a
likely substitute for Abdulwahid, but his presence worried
Abdulwahid. It would be useful if Diraige and others could
at least be heard in the camps. AA Almquist noted Khartoum's
firm control over the media throughout northern Sudan, which
has also been an issue for disseminating information about
the DPA. Chevallier noted that the UN could broadcast in the
DRC and that this had worked well. Gliniasty said that
access to the media could be an agenda item for the September
21 meeting, with Chevallier adding that he favored SE
Natsios's idea to broaden Fur representation at the talks in
Libya to include a range of leaders representing the IDPs.

Libya Meeting
--------------

10. (C) SE Natsios said that UN Special Envoy for Darfur
Jan Eliasson was not pleased with Sudan's neighbors and the
options for holding the GOS-rebel peace talks. AU Chairman
Konare had insisted on Libya. Chevallier said that Konare,
Sudan President Bashir, and Libya President Qadhafi had made
the deal, with the AU then pressuring the UN to accept it.
Chevallier regretted that concerned parties such as France
and the U.S. had not had a voice in selecting the site for
the talks. Gliniasty agreed and said that the selection
typified Konare's and Qadhafi's tendencies to try to exclude
the West and UN from Africa. Le Gal said that there appeared
to be limits on attendance by observers (U.S., EU, Asia,
other Africans); SE Natsios said there must be some assurance
of Western participation. AA Almquist stressed the
importance of key powers within the international community
attending the talks, which had been necessary during the
cease-fire meetings in N'djamena in order to even convince
the rebels to participate. A Western presence could also
allow leverage and recourse to a balancing mechanism between

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the GOS and rebels.

September 21 Darfur Follow-On Conference
--------------

11. (C) When asked about the structure of the September 21
Darfur meeting on the margins of the UNGA, Chevallier
acknowledged that participation had expanded considerably
beyond the June 25 Darfur conference in Paris that the French
had hosted. Attendees now were likely to include, in
addition to those present in Paris, Chad, Eritrea, Saudi
Arabia, G-8 countries, and others. Chevallier said the
French wanted the September 21 meeting to replicate the June
25 meeting in terms of attendees, but that Konare had
rejected this.


12. (C) Concerning the UN and Darfur, Chevallier said that
the UN Special Envoy's position needed to be a full-time
commitment. This would help keep the AU from taking over the
Darfur account. The French had raised this with current UN
SE Eliasson. IO A/S Bermann commented on difficulties the AU
had been presenting and expressed concerns about Konare. SE
Natsios raised Qadhafi as a source of concern. It was hard
to determine Qadhafi's ultimate goal and Darfur's part in it.
His manipulations were consistent with his notions of
pan-Africanism but how Darfur specifically played into that
was not clear. Chevallier said that all of these concerns
underlined the need for the UN SE to be a full-time presence.
SE Natsios expressed general agreement with Chevallier's
point, commenting that Eliasson had other duties in Sweden.
If the UN SE position remained part-time, the SE would have
to be a strong one. A weak part-timer would not do.
Chevallier agreed, saying that he was not proposing a drastic
change but that the position had to be more effective. Sudan
Desk Officer Bouvier observed that Qadhafi would take
advantage of a weak UN SE, especially if the October 27 talks
took place in Sirte, access to which would be difficult.
Both sides again regretted Libya's and Qadhafi's role in the
talks but noted that it would be quite unlikely for UNSYG Ban
to change his position on Libya's hosting the talks after
having made his announcement.

South Sudan
--------------

13. (C) Chevallier asked about the Government of South
Sudan's role in Darfur. SE Natsios responded that the GOSS
was not always helpful and tended to carry out Eritrea,s
foreign policy with respect to Darfur. Chevallier said the
French had spoken with GOSS Vice-President Riek Machar, whom
he described as "tense" during his recent visit to Paris to
meet with Abdulwahid. Gliniasty said that it was perhaps
fortunate that nothing so far had come of GOSS efforts to
reach out to Abdulwahid since these efforts were only focused
on getting him to talks in Juba, not necessarily to UN/AU
talks in Libya. Gliniasty urged caution and said that the
SPLM's position had become ambiguous. SE Natsios referred to
the recent North-South confrontation at Abyei, which, if the
situation worsened, could put the CPA at risk. This issue
should not be a part of the Darfur talks but one could not
ignore matters pertaining to the South in the Darfur context.
A failure to implement the CPA would not bode well for
implementing a Darfur peace agreement.

China
--------------

14. (C) SE Natsios commented on China's increasingly
helpful role, which had so far been restricted to Darfur. It
would be useful to involve China in the CPA. Chinese Special
Representative for Darfur, Liu Guijin, had noted that GOSS
President Salva Kiir had gone to China in July and reportedly
surprised PRC officials by saying that "all of Sudan's oil is
in the South," a point not lost on PRC President Hu. The PRC
position was thus evolving, SE Natsios believed, and China
was becoming increasingly worried about the possibility of a
North-South separation in 2011, which could affect its
various commercial arrangements.

Egypt and Darfur
--------------

15. (C) Gliniasty asked SE Natsios's views on Egyptian
involvement in Darfur, describing the recent statement to the
French by Egypt's Ambassador that Egypt was ready to
contribute 3,000 troops to UNAMID, but that the UN had
indicated that it did not want/need Egyptian troops.
Instead, there seemed to be a need for helicopters. SE
Natsios replied that he could understand the UN's reluctance,
based on the likelihood that Darfurians would resent the

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presence of "Arab" elements among the peacekeepers perceived
to be favorable to the GOS. There was general agreement that
consideration of an Egyptian role in Darfur should take this
factor into account.

EU Operation in Chad and C.A.R.
--------------

16. (C) Chevallier said that on September 14, the French
had circulated a new draft UNSC Resolution to SC members,
which, he said, took into account U.S. concerns about the
previous draft, largely over the issue of funding Chadian
gendarmes who would take part in the mission. SE Natsios
expressed U.S. support for the operation, and remarked that
he had done so publicly after consultations in Germany. Such
an operation would send a strong signal to Bashir.
Chevallier noted the operation's deterrent role with respect
to the Sudan side of the borders.


17. (C) Chevallier said that the main obstacle concerned
funding the Chadian gendarmes, with the U.S. preferring that
funding come from voluntary contributions rather than
assessments. For the French, however, finding resources
would be difficult, even though the U.S. had indicated that
it would make a strong voluntary contribution. The European
Commission had told the French it could provide money for
training and recruiting the gendarmes but not for equipment
or salaries. Chevallier said that he hoped this issue could
be resolved early in the week of September 17, with a
solution in place before the September 21 Darfur meeting in
New York. We noted that USG experts in Washington were aware
of U.S.-France differences on this issue and were working
hard to resolve the matter.


18. (C) As for the operation itself, Chevallier said that
Qadhafi was not causing problems because Chad President Deby
supported it. The mission enjoyed EU political support.
However, work would have to be done to secure troop
commitments. Chevallier said France would provide over half
the troops ("we don't want the mission to be TOO French") and
was canvassing other Europeans for contributions. He said
that the U.S. could play a useful role in encouraging
Europeans to provide troops. Austria was reluctant but he
believed that the Netherlands, Poland, Norway, and especially
Sweden could be persuaded. He stressed Sweden's key role.
The UK and Germany were unlikely contributors because of
their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. SE Natsios said
that the U.S. would do what it could to encourage troop
contributions and that he would try to discuss the matter
with Carl Bildt. Chevallier confided that France was
considering offering Sweden command of the force if it came
aboard and offered troops.

Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC)
--------------

19. (C) SE Natsios raised the AEC, its oversight of the
CPA, and the imminent departure (December 1) of Chairman Tom
Vraalsen, and he and AA Almquist discussed the problems
Vraalsen and the AEC had been having (which Vraalsen
discussed with DepSec Negroponte on September 5 (reftel)).
There was a need to ensure that a competent replacement for
Vraalsen succeeded him. AA Almquist noted the likelihood
that Norway would seek to offer a replacement, and discussed
complications posed to the AEC's operations by the National
Congress Party (NCP),which had to agree (along with the
SPLM) to anything the AEC proposed. Le Gal said the French
had the impression that Vraalsen was effectively rendered
unable to speak his mind. AA Almquist agreed that the AEC
had become very constrained, making it difficult to oversee
the CPA, but that the AEC mechanism still, at least, brought
people to the table. The demise of the AEC could have
unforeseeable effects on the CPA, North-South issues, and
even the Libya talks. AA Almquist noted Kenya's interest in
South Sudan but that Kenya tended to defer to Khartoum
because of IGAD-related issues.


20. (C) Gliniasty asked how France could help. AA Almquist
said the two most important issues for the international
members were finding a replacement for Vraalsen and improving
AEC procedures in order to ensure the AEC's independence.
France was not a member of the AEC, but the EU had observer
status and so France's input would be important in that
regard. Chevallier said the French would study the issue.
Bouvier thought that if the Darfur peace process worked, it
could serve as a model for reinvigorating the CPA. AA
Almquist said that Italy was considering a high-level
meeting, perhaps at ministerial level, in Rome to review

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implementation of the CPA. She said that reinvigorating the
CPA process could also serve to help address all of Sudan's
problems. AA Almquist predicted that the U.S. would raise
the issue of CPA implementation on September 21, although the
issues surrounding the AEC would most likely be discussed in
a smaller side meeting. Bouvier said the French planned to
put these issues on their own agenda for the meeting.

Darfur Cease-Fire
--------------

21. (C) Gliniasty said that as a final point he wanted to
raise the failure of the cease-fire in Darfur, which the
French had discussed with Konare, who had asserted that the
cease-fire was good but needed to be improved. However, in
Gliniasty's view, the cease-fire was breaking down, with
chaos ensuing. If the political talks yielded results, one
of them should be on the cease-fire, and any provisions on an
improved cease-fire should be implemented quickly. Konare
had said that what was needed was an information network to
allow the center to know what was happening and who was
responsible. Gliniasty said the French were considering
proposing the establishment of a cease-fire monitoring
mechanism to monitor and to respond to violations, and would
raise this for discussion at the September 21 meeting.
Bouvier said that a good mechanism would allow better
understanding of events on the ground. SE Natsios pointed
out a recent incident where it appeared that Khalil Ibrahim's
forces had killed 40 police, in part to prove that he still
played a role and that the cease-fire commission had little
authority. Bouvier said that UNAMID could incorporate
cease-fire monitoring issues within its area of
responsibility.

COMMENT
--------------

22. (C) The discussion with the French was productive and
positive, with both sides expressing general agreement on all
issues and offering constructive suggestions on ways to move
forward. The only significant point of divergence concerned
the Chad/C.A.R. UNSC resolution and the issue of funding the
Chadian gendarmes. The French were willing to discuss all
issues and were eager for USG views as we approach the
September 21 meeting, which the French will have a strong
hand in running, although it will be formally sponsored by
the UN and AU. Along with several other indications we have
received since the arrival of the Sarkozy government, this
meeting demonstrated a very positive attitude on the part of
the French to work with the USG on issues of shared concern.
END COMMENT.


23. (U) SE Natsios has cleared this message.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
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