A/S FRIED-POLDIR ARAUD ON IRAN, KOSOVO, GEORGIA,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000363

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM EUN NATO UNO UNMIK FR KCFE RS SR
YI, AF, GG, IR, MD
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED-POLDIR ARAUD ON IRAN, KOSOVO, GEORGIA,
MOLDOVA/CFE, NATO MINISTERIAL


Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French Political Director Araud informed EUR
A/S Fried during a January 25 meeting that Russian Security
Council Chairman Ivanov had revealed to him the previous day
while in Paris that he would travel to Tehran February 28 at
the behest of President Putin. Araud said the Russians had
promised repeatedly they would not be making any new
proposals, and suggested they rather intended to caution the
Iranians against overplaying their hand. Urged not to
emulate the Russian example, Araud said there were no plans
for a French mission over the short term, although he
acknowledged that some other EU countries such as Italy, as
well as Chirac himself (as conveyed to A/S Welch by Chirac's
Middle East advisor January 24),continued to perceive a need
to engage Iran on regional issues.


3. (S) SUMMARY CONT'D: Araud agreed with Fried that a UNSC
Resolution on Kosovo should supersede UNSCR 1244, bless an
international presence in Kosovo post-status, and endorse the
substance of Ahtisaari's recommendations on minorities.
Araud said he could agree with the U.S. approach and timing
even though France would have preferred postponing
Ahtisaari's presentation of his recommendations, and argued
for tactics that would give the Serbs the burden for any
future blockages, and give the Russians sufficient cover for
an abstention on the UNSCR. If necessary, Araud indicated
that France could live without an explicit reference to
superseding UNSCR, but that passage of a UNSCR was a sine qua
non for any subsequent ESDP mission as well as EU consensus
on recognizing Kosovo's independence. Worried about the time
required to persuade the Russians to abstain, Araud noted the
Germans did not exclude having Kosovo on the agenda for the
G-8 Summit (Fried cautioned against waiting so long). Araud
called for continuing contact group meetings, possibly at
ministerial level, to demonstrate continuing cooperation with
Russia and prepare the political ground for Kosovo
independence. He said the MFA was brainstorming on further
steps the EU mighttake to encourage Serbia. On an eventual
ESDP mission to Kosovo, he asked the U.S. to consider
participation in a first-ever U.S.-EU operation.


3. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: Both sides agreed it was difficult
to judge at this stage whether Russia would use Kosovo as a
precedent for Abkhazia, but they agreed that the Russians had
recently shown themselves somewhat more cooperative on
Georgia, with Fried adding that there was some evidence to
suggest that the Russians might be reconsidering their
pressure tactics. Citing the Russian-Georgian agreement on
basing, the French side suggested that it was perhaps time
for Allies to "think creatively" and reconsider their
position on the linkage between Russian fulfillment of its
Istanbul commitments and ratification of the adapted CFE
Treaty. Fried countered that France and the EU would do
better to consider the U.S. proposal for an EU multilateral
force in Moldova/Transnistria. On Afghanistan, Araud
indicated that any decision to bolster the French military
presence was probably a decision for France's next president
and assured Fried that the French proposal for an Afghanistan
contact group was aimed at improving strategic/political
coordination rather than creating new institutions. END
SUMMARY.


4. (SBU) Accompanied by the Ambassador, EUR A/S Dan Fried
met January 25 on the margins of the "Paris III" Lebanon
donors' conference with MFA Political Director Gerard Araud
to discuss primarily European issues (Kosovo),but also Iran.
Araud was accompanied by Deputy Political Director Veronique
Bujon-Barre, A/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs Philippe
Carre, DAS-equivalent for CFSP Jean-Louis Falconi,
DAS-equivalent for Russia and the former Soviet Space Aurelia
Bouchez, DAS-equivalent for NATO Nicolas Niemtchinow,
DAS-equivalent for the Balkans Edouard Beslay, and Araud
staffer Gael Veyssiere. Fried was also joined by DCM, PolMC
and POL Deputy (notetaker).

IRAN
--------------


5. (S) Araud began the meeting by informing Fried that
Russian Security Council Chairman Igor Ivanov, visiting Paris
January 24, had told him he, accompanied by DFM Sergei
Kislyak, would be traveling to Tehran February 28 for
consultations with Iranian officials at the behest of
President Putin. Araud described Kislyak as going to great
lengths to reassure the French that the Russians would abide
by P5-plus-1 commitments, telling them several times that

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Russia would be offering no new initiatives and that Russia
remained opposed to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.
He had also promised that Kislyak would debrief his
P5-plus-one counterparts following the visit.


6. (S) Pressed by a clearly skeptical Fried about the
ostensible purpose of the visit, Araud judged that the
Russians intended to warn Iran that it was on a serious
collision course with the U.S. Araud believed the Russians
would urge the Iranians to be cautious and to avoid any
miscalculations; this, he continued, corroborated what U/S
Burns had recently told him, to the effect that Iran seemed
to believe it had the upper hand but was in danger of
overplaying it.


7. (S) Returning to Iran toward the end the meeting, Fried
welcomed the recent EU conclusions on Iran and praised French
Ambassador to the U.S. Levitte for providing a good
operational channel for U.S.-French consultation on sensitive
subjects. Araud said Iran was a difficult issue not only for
the EU, but increasingly in Paris, and noted that the
February 12 EU GAERC would feature a general debate on Iran.
The Italians, he considered, continued to insist that
discussion of Iran should go beyond the nuclear problem.
They -- and the French Presidency (he was careful not to
associate himself with this view) -- perceived a need to
engage the Iranians on regional issues such as Afghanistan,
Iraq, and, in particular, for the French Presidency, Lebanon.


8. (S) Fried expressed the hope that France would not
emulate the Russian example. He noted that Arab countries
were uncomfortable with outreach to Iran and that local
Ambassadors were reporting that the Iranians were showing
signs of nervousness and of feeling isolated. Araud assured
Fried that there would be no mission "in the short term."
(Separately, Chirac's diplomatic advisor for the Middle East,
Dominique Boche, told NEA A/S David Welch January 24 that the
Presidency still believed a "combination of pressure and
openness to dialogue" might work with Iran and that the
Chirac was still considering sending a high-level envoy to
Tehran. He promised, however, that France would consult with
its other partners before actually doing so.)

KOSOVO
--------------


9. (C) Fried told Araud he had taken to heart Araud's points
during their last meeting that a new UNSC Resolution on
Kosovo was both "critical" and "needed to be short."
Commenting that the recent elections had resulted in no
surprises and left Kostunica in the position of king-maker,
he said the U.S. approach remained to support Ahtisaari and
his recommendations and to refrain from referring publicly
and explicitly to independence over the coming weeks,
although any leaks about the U.S. bottom line could
eventually force adjustments. Ahtisaari planned to be in the
region in February and intended to present his proposal at
that time. The U.S. believed a subsequent four-to-six-week
period of intense discussions between Ahtisaari and the
parties made sense before going to the Security Council, and
judged that it was important for Kosovar leader Ceku to be
seen to be engaging Ahtisaari as well.


10. (C) On a UNSC Resolution, Fried noted that the U.S. had
circulated a number of ideas but that only three were
crucial: that a new UNSCR supersede UNSCR 1244; that it bless
an international presence in Kosovo post-status, and that it
endorse the substance of Ahtisaari's recommendations on
treatment of minorities and other related issues. A UNSCR
need not/not explicitly affirm Kosovar independence, which
would also help avoid a direct confrontation with Russia.
Fried assured Araud that the U.S. shared the French view that
a UNSCR was essential to the process and said he preferred
not to consider fall-backs at this time. The odds of passing
a resolution, he continued, hinged on EU-U.S. unity; even if
not all EU member states (Greece, for example) approved the
UNSCR, building a critical mass of support would be essential
to overcome Russian stalling. Fried said he expected Kosovo
to declare its independence immediately following passage of
the resolution, and the U.S. likely to recognize Kosovo
immediately thereafter. He assured Araud that the U.S. would
remain in KFOR.


11. (C) Araud expressed general agreement with the U.S.
approach, including the timing, even if France would have
preferred postponing Ahtisaari's presentation of his
recommendations. He said it was essential that the Serbs be

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perceived as responsible for any blocages that followed; this
was also desirable from the point of view of avoiding a
Russian veto. Araud indicated that Ivanov had reiterated
standard Russian talking points about mutually agreed
solutions in his consultations of the previous day, while
acknowledging that the Serbs had accepted independence for
Montenegro, and argued for more time. On a UNSCR, Araud said
it would be a "miracle" if it included the three elements
identified by Fried, suggesting that it might be necessary to
drop the explicit reference to superseding UNSCR 1444 and to
argue after the fact that any new UNSCR automatically
superseded what preceded it. But having a UNSCR was
absolutely essential, Araud argued, if not for France, then
for the EU. Failure to pass a resolution would be a disaster
for the EU: Spain had already indicated that it would not
recognize Kosovo without one, a position likely shared by
Romania and Hungary; moreover, a resolution was a key
precondition for deployment of an EU ESDP mission.


12. (C) For all those reasons, Araud argued, it would be
necessary to do the utmost to obtain a Russian abstention.
Fried responded that FM Lavrov had promised the Secretary
about a year ago that Russia would not veto. This was not a
guarantee, he quickly added, but suggested that it was still
possible to persuade Russia to abstain. Araud suggested that
it working the Russians would take time and wondered when
would be the right moment to move to a vote, and whether this
would involve calling their bluff. He said the Germans
believed Kosovo could end up on the agenda for the G-8 summit
in June. Fried cautioned against waiting this long, adding
that raising the stakes might in the end prove necessary, but
we should seek earlier resolution. It also ran the risk of
undermining the G-8 as an institution.


13. (C) On Serbia, Araud doubted that the EU would take a
decision at its February 12 GAERC on next steps, but
suggested that decisions would be needed in March. The MFA
was brainstorming on the Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA) and considering what might be done in the
face of a continuing lack of cooperation on ICTY. He said
there was a clean division within the EU between the UK and
the Netherlands on one hand, and Hungary and unspecified
other member states on the other. Fried responded that the
U.S. supported EU outreach to Serbia so that Serbia should
think about a future in the EU rather than the past as
represented by Kosovo.

CONTACT GROUP AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL?
--------------


14. (C) Araud said it would be important to maintain the
Contact Group as a way of demonstrating that close
coordination with Russia was continuing. He proposed, at the
end of February, a possible Contact Group meeting at
political director or even ministerial level, noting that it
might appear to some as "paradoxical" that "dramatic"
decisions would be taken at any other level. Fried responded
that the Secretary would be raising Kosovo soon with FM
Lavrov and that he would keep this proposal in mind. He said
it would be necessary to find the right combination of
pushing and embracing Russia for them to justify an
abstention, and then to act quickly thereafter.

U.S.-EU ESDP MiSSION?
--------------


15. (C) Returning to a possible ESDP mission to Kosovo,
Araud expressed the hope the U.S. would consider
participating, saying that this would be the first time the
U.S. and EU cooperated in an operation. Fried did not rule
out the possibility, noting that the U.S. would have
something to contribute and that this would demonstrate
U.S.-European unity. But issues of NATO equities would have
to be considered carefully. Carre said that France would
await an indication of USG interest before pursuing the idea
any further, at which time further bilateral exchanges would
no doubt prove necessary in order to get the details right.

GEORGIA
--------------


16. (C) Bujon-Barre asked for Fried's assessment as to
whether Kosovo would impinge negatively on the April renewal
of the UNOMIG mandate for Georgia. Fried responded that he
would have responded in the affirmative a week earlier, but
that the Russians had shown a more cooperative side during a
recent meeting of the Friends Group in Berlin, by showing

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interest in CBMs for Abkhazia. This trend was further
reinforced during recent U.S.-Russian discussions in Moscow
on Nagorno-Karabakh. That said, it was essential to be firm
with Russia against Kosovo trade-offs; the Secretary, he
said, had made clear to the Russians that unilateral Russian
recognition of Abkhazia would constitute a major problem,
including in U.S.-Russian relations. Fried said he felt
somewhat encouraged by a recent article in the Russian
newspaper Kommersant which judged that Russian pressure
tactics on Georgia had failed, which suggested that the
Russians were perhaps preparing to reconsider some aspects of
their policies. He hoped this was the case, and that they
would be less tempted now to try to hold Georgia hostage.

CFE AND MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA
--------------


17. (C) Carre worried that the Allied position on the link
between Russian fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments and
ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty was reaching its
limits and was not sustainable over the longer term. Now
that the Russians and Georgians had reached an agreement on
basing, it was hard to justify the Allied position on the
basis of a few stockpiles of munitions in Transnistria.
There was a risk of killing the adapted Treaty, which argued
for seeking a way to decouple the Istanbul commitments from
CFE. It was now time for creative thinking; mentioning the
issue once a year at the OSCE ministerial was insufficient.


18. (C) Fried asked rhetorically why Allies felt a need to
respond to Russian refusal to fulfill its commitments. What
was wrong with asking Russia to do what it had committed to
do? Fried cited the recent U.S. suggestion that the EU
consider a multilateral mission to Transnistria (that would
include Russians) as a more appropriate example of creative
thinking, adding that it could be tailored in such a way as
to proceed in parallel with further steps toward a political
settlement. This, he suggested, made more sense than backing
away from existing commitments.


19. (C) Carre agreed that the Russian position on stockpiles
was ridiculous, but continued to argue that the basing
agreement with Georgia should make it possible to solve other
issues in a reasonable way. He did not wish to give credence
to the view that Allies were prepared to abandon the adapted
CFE treaty or were linking it to a complete solution of
Russia's "post-colonial" baggage. Carre also worried that an
EU mission to Transnistria could put the EU "between" Russia
and the Moldovans and create problems. Fried responded that
any solution would no doubt involve a package arrangement,
but should not be one of surrender.

NATO INFORMAL MINISTERIAL ON AFGHANISTAN/KOSOVO
-------------- --


20. (C) Carre recalled French satisfaction with the Riga
summit and reminded Fried that France had done what it could.
He asked Fried for confirmation that the January 26
ministerial was aimed at renewing NATO's purpose and general
commitment and was not intended to provoke dramatic new
commitments. Fried assured him that this was the case,
adding that it should be seen in the context of a series of
meetings on Afghanistan aimed at demonstrating the need for a
comprehensive approach to Afghanistan that included civilian
as well as military elements and for bolstering Afghanistan
in anticipation of a spring Taliban offensive. That said, we
sought and needed required forces, more resources, and an end
to caveats on this issue. Fried asked if it was correct that
France might be prepared to provide significant additional
military resources to Afghanistan. Araud responded that such
a decision would probably have to be taken by the next
president.


21. (C) Carre assured Fried that the French proposal for a
contact group on Afghanistan was aimed at enhancing political
coordination and guidance rather than creating a new
institution, with Araud adding that the French saw a need for
more political/strategic dialogue among key players. Fried
assured them that the U.S. had considered the French proposal
in that same spirit in looking at ways to broaden cooperation
beyond the purely military aspect.


22. (C) Carre announced that, contrary to indications
earlier in the week, FM Douste-Blazy would now participate in
the morning session of the Ministerial; he would depart
before lunch in order to return to Paris for Abbe Pierre's
funeral. (Note: Douste-Blazy originally indicated that he

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would attend the entire ministerial. Subsequently, Embassy
was told January 23 that, for domestic political reasons
related to the ongoing presidential campaigns and prior to
Abbe Pierre's passing, Douste-Blazy would not be able to
attend the Ministerial.)

SUDAN
--------------


23. (C) Araud, noting ongoing debate in the U.S. Congress on
Sudan, asked to be informed in advance of any evolution in
U.S. policy, given the repercussions this could have for
French interests in Chad and the C.A.R.


24. (U) A/S Fried cleared this message.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON