COMOROS: FRENCH MFA SEES NO EASY SOLUTION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003363

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS EAID PHUM PINR ASEC CN FR
SUBJECT: COMOROS: FRENCH MFA SEES NO EASY SOLUTION TO
IMPASSE

REF: ANTANANARIVO 779

Classified By: Political-Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA Comoros Desk Officer Stephane Le Brech
said on August 7 that there appeared to be no ready solution
to the current crisis in the Comoros, because of Anjouan
"President" Bacar's intransigence and the improbability of
any military solution to the impasse. Le Brech said that the
GOF had no clear notion of what Bacar wanted, other than to
maintain such power as he had seized. AU and South African
diplomacy had come to naught, and both might soon reduce
their diplomatic efforts. Bacar remained key to any solution
but there were few apparent means to move him in the right
direction. Separately, a member of the Comoran community in
France urged the U.S., France, and others to encourage a
"Western" orientation in the Comoros, to counter what he
perceived as the risk of Arab/Islamic encroachment. END
SUMMARY.

MFA VIEW
--------------


2. (C) Stephane Le Brech, outgoing MFA Comoros Desk
Officer, met with us on August 7. His assessment tracked
with that of Embassy Antananarivo (reftel). There appeared
to be no easy solution to the current impasse, with Anjouan
"President" Bacar refusing to accommodate or work with other
Comoran leaders or interested parties such as the AU and
South Africa. Le Brech said that Bacar was the key to any
solution but his ultimate goals remained obscure, and he
continued to assert that any overtures for political dialogue
as a way to a solution were evidence of conspiracies intended
to undermine his "valid" electoral "victory." In Le Brech's
view, Bacar had no discernible ideology but rather a tendency
to say "no" in response to any proposition that might require
compromise on his part, leaving one to conclude that he was
simply interested in preserving such power as he had seized
through his bogus "election."


3. (C) Le Brech said that France lauded efforts by the AU
and South Africa to bring Bacar to his senses. However, in
Le Brech's view, both the AU and South Africa, now realizing
Bacar's intractable nature, were on the verge of slowing down
their diplomatic efforts out of frustration and a loss of
patience with what was becoming a more and more futile
exercise. Le Brech said that France had done what it could
quietly to promote dialogue between Bacar and the rest of the
Comoran leadership but had met with similar results. No one,
he said, knew what Bacar really wanted and it was therefore
difficult to find a way to move him.


4. (C) Le Brech said that Union President Sambi's call for
a military solution to the problem was completely
unrealistic. No outside parties would want to intervene in
an essentially internal political dispute, particularly
absent large-scale conflict, humanitarian concerns, genocide,
famine, ethnic cleansing, or a clear-and-present emergency
situation that might spur international intervention. "If
California decided to change its status vis-a-vis Washington,
you could hardly expect the EU to help invade California
militarily at Washington's behest," he observed dryly.
Sambi's request for military support and outside intervention
evidenced either a total lack of ideas or monumental naivete
(or both),in Le Brech's view.


5. (C) As to next steps, Le Brech said that much depended
on when and if Bacar showed his real hand. Nothing much
would change, Le Brech said, so long as Bacar kept saying
"no" to everything. There might be hope for progress if he
started to say "yes" once in a while but so far, nothing had
prompted a positive response. "We will just have to wait and
see," Le Brech said, with regret.


6. (C) Asked whether the GOF was concerned about the
possibility that extremist Islamic factions might try to
profit from the situation (see below),Le Brech said that
that did not seem very likely. He said that the problems of
the Comoros were entirely internal and he did not see
evidence that malevolent outside forces were at work there.
He also said that the crisis was not having much effect on
Mayotte, and he noted the resumption of commercial and
personal traffic between Mayotte and the other islands,
suggesting that the islands were in many ways functioning
"normally," despite the political divide between Anjouan and

PARIS 00003363 002 OF 002


the others.


7. (U) NOTE: Le Brech's last day as Comoros Desk Officer
was August 8; he will soon transfer to France's Embassy in
Cotonou. END NOTE.

MEETING WITH COMORAN EXPATRIATE


8. (C) At the request of Comoran expatriate Abdou Saadi, we
met on August 1 to discuss the situation in the Comoros.
Saadi is a long-time resident of France of Comoran origin who
said that he had a civil service job with the Ile-de-France
Regional Council (which includes Paris). Saadi said that he
was deeply troubled by the crisis in the Comoros. He
immediately labeled Bacar as an opportunist without any goals
other than to make Anjouan his personal fiefdom. Saadi said
that the U.S., France, and others had to "keep the pressure
on Bacar," although he agreed that there did not appear much
in the way of effective leverage.


9. (C) Saadi's larger concern involved what he
characterized as the growing influence of the "arabo-islamic"
world in the Comoros. He suggested that the U.S., along with
other Western countries, increase its presence in the Comoros
and maintain a higher public profile, in order to keep
Comorans, especially young ones, "oriented to the West."
Saadi thought that the relative absence of Western influences
and the lack of visible opportunities offered by Westerners
(scholarships to study abroad, educational programs, media
presence, etc.) were allowing Comorans to gravitate toward
the "arabo-islamic" countries. Saadi believed that these
countries would see the Comoros as an opportunity for
expansion and would fill the void that he believed the West
was allowing to develop.


10. (C) As to a longer term political solution, Saadi said
that something had to be done to make simpler and more
rational the system of governance. He provided a coherent
printed document outlining what he saw as a possible solution
-- a system whereby the national parliament would elect a
national president, to replace the cumbersome rotational
system now in place, although each island would still have
its own elected president.


11. (C) Saadi said that he was trying to develop a plan to
increase medical and health care coverage in the Comoros. He
noted the presence of about 250,000 Comorans in France, most
of whom maintained close ties to their families and friends
in the islands. Saadi wanted to develop a system whereby
Comorans in France could make regular financial contributions
to a fund in France. The fund would then operate a private
health care system in the islands, based on the investments
made by Comorans in France, to be available to beneficiaries
designated by those contributing to the fund in France. He
said that his organization ("Caisse d'Assurance Maladie de
l'Union des Comores" or CAMUC) would be interested in working
with French or American companies that might want to help
manage the system. (NOTE: He did not directly solicit USG
involvement but made clear that USG interest in his health
care project, or in his proposed governmental restructuring,
would be most welcome. END NOTE.)


12. (C) COMMENT: Unlike many of our unsolicited visitors
with interests in Africa, Saadi was calm, did not engage in
polemics, displayed a minimum of self-interest, and seemed
sincerely interested in trying to find ways to help the
Comoros. END NOTE).


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA