Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS3213
2007-07-30 09:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH VIEWS ON EU FORCE IN EASTERN CHAD

Tags:  MOPS MASS PBTS KPKO PREL PREF EUN CT CD FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9203
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1318
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 003213 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: MOPS MASS PBTS KPKO PREL PREF EUN CT CD FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON EU FORCE IN EASTERN CHAD

REF: STATE 103146

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 003213

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: MOPS MASS PBTS KPKO PREL PREF EUN CT CD FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON EU FORCE IN EASTERN CHAD

REF: STATE 103146

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA DAS-equivalent Helene Le Gal on July
26 said that France sought the deployment in eastern Chad of
an EU peacekeeping force (2,000-2,500 troops) early in
November. Prior to that, France would seek a UN Security
Council Resolution authorizing the EU to undertake the
mission; the UNSCR was indispensable for the EU to establish
the operation in conformity with EU legal requirements. The
purpose of the EU mission would be to provide security to the
refugee and IDP camps in eastern Chad, but not to provide
border security. The UN, the French conceive, would agree to
provide police/gendarme capability in parallel to the EU
mission and agree to assume formal control of the overall
operation one year after its deployment. Le Gal said that,
for the moment, France did not contemplate a direct U.S. role
in this project, but she said that any USG political
statements in support would be welcome, and that at some
later stage the U.S. could play a role in prodding potential
European troop contributors. Le Gal said that a small part
of the EU force could also deploy in the C.A.R. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Helene Le Gal, MFA DAS-equivalent for East and
Central Africa, met with us on July 26 to discuss reftel
demarche, and offered clear responses to its main points.

OVERALL GAME PLAN


3. (C) Le Gal said that France was working towards an early
November deployment of an EU peacekeeping mission in eastern
Chad, whose function would be to provide security for refugee
and IDP camps; it would not be charged with securing the
Chad-Sudan border. The force would be composed of
2,000-2,500 troops, with France providing the majority of the
forces. However, France and its EU partners would need a UN

Security Council Resolution authorizing the EU to deploy the
mission. She said that the UNSCR did not need to be specific
and could consist of a general authorization. The resolution
could also contain a provision stating that the UN would
mount a civilian police mission in eastern Chad in
conjunction with the EU mission. As a third component, the
UNSCR would also stipulate that the UN would assume control
of the EU mission within one year after its deployment. The
EU mission itself would have an initial six-month mandate,
with an option to extend it for six more months, after which
the UN would assume control.


4. (C) The UNSCR would allow the EU to create and structure
the operation, in accordance with EU practices and
procedures. Le Gal noted that the decisions taken at the
July 23 meeting were only preparatory; an "action commune"
decision was required, and this could only happen with the
UNSCR in place. She noted Germany's reluctance to endorse
the plan, and the fact that it had taken high-level
engagement to prevent Germany from trying to block the
mission at the July 23 EU session.


5. (C) Le Gal said that France hoped the EU decision could
take place circa September 10, which would require adoption
of a Security Council resolution beforehand. EU approval
would authorize funding for such preliminary activities as
fact-finding, military planning, development of a CONOPS, and
other steps necessary before deployment could begin. French
military planners were already at work on a provisional
CONOPS, which should ensure accelerated EU action.

FORCES


6. (C) MILITARY: Le Gal said that the French would provide
at least half of the 2,000-2,500 personnel and was therefore
seeking roughly 1,000 troops from other EU members. She
believed Poland, Spain, and Sweden had committed about 150
troops each, and Romania was considering participation.
Non-EU states such as NATO-members Turkey and Norway were
also possible contributors, although she said that EU members
had to constitute the first deployment force. The UK and
Germany refused to contribute and Denmark (which had opted
out of ESDP) could not participate. Portugal had so far been
mute, but Le Gal said that Lisbon, as the current EU
president, would feel compelled to make at least a token
troop contribution.


7. (C) Le Gal said that French forces already deployed in
Chad as part of Operation Epervier would not participate in
the new mission. Operation Epervier, she said, was primarily
aerial in nature and did not include ground specialists, so
France would need to deploy infantry troops for the EU

PARIS 00003213 002 OF 003


mission. Operations Epervier, however, would provide
logistical and transportation support, especially when the
new operation's forces began arriving in Chad.


8. (C) The Rules of Engagement for the new mission would be
standard EU ROE ("comparable to but perhaps a bit less robust
than NATO's," Le Gal noted),similar to the ROE that applied
to the EU mission deployed in the DRC. The UNSC
authorization would not determine the mandate, CONOPS, or ROE
of the EU mission, but it would specify the UN's own role,
which Le Gal said would be primarily civilian in nature,
specifically the CIVPOL component.


9. (C) CIVPOL: The part of the mission to be under UN
control would involve 1,000 UN civpol, Le Gal anticipated.
These would include the absorption under UN command and the
UN salary structure of 800 Chadian gendarmes, some of whom
were currently part of UNHCR efforts to provide refugee camp
security. Le Gal said that francophone African countries had
to be the primary source of personnel; Jordanian civpol, for
example, were not viable candidates. France would contribute
a few civpol, who would likely play a liaison role with Chad.

CHAD'S VIEWS


10. (C) Le Gal said that Deby remained unconvinced and was
wary of the French plan, especially with respect to what he
believed could result in a large-scale UN presence in eastern
Chad. Deby feared that the EU and UN operation could become
a launching pad for a possible "invasion" of Darfur from
Chad, thus embroiling Chad in a subsequent conflict with
Sudan not of Chad's own making. Le Gal stressed the need to
convince him that the EU operation, followed by the UN
mission, would be good for Chad, and to emphasize that
neither mission would be huge in scale. She added that the
EU operation would not address political reconciliation in
Chad, commenting that the EU already had an established
process led by EU Commissioner Louis Michel.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC


11. (C) Le Gal said that the French plan included the
deployment of a small contingent of EU forces into
northeastern C.A.R. In contrast to Chad President Deby,
C.A.R. President Bozize actively wanted an EU or UN
deployment. Le Gal said that EU Foreign Policy Chief Solana
had phoned C.A.R. President Bozize on July 25 and received an
enthusiastic response. Le Gal said that FOMUC forces, where
were deployed in and around Bangui on a specific mandate,
would not be involved in the EU operation, though there was a
good case for placing FOMUC liaison officers within the EU
operation. French forces presently in C.A.R., specifically
in Birao, could be rehatted for the new EU mission, she
remarked, although the matter had not yet been settled.

AFRICAN UNION


12. (C) Le Gal said that France was not seeking an active
AU role in the new mission in Chad -- the AU's approval, in
the form of a Peace and Security Council declaration, would
suffice, along the lines the AU had granted to the EU for its
operation in the DRC. She noted that FM Kouchner was
currently in Addis Ababa and would discuss the matter with AU
Chairman Konare. The EU would likely offer the AU a liaison
officer slot at the mission's headquarters. When the EU
dispatched forces to the DRC, it had made a similar offer,
but the AU had declined. Le Gal said that France was
reluctant to seek involvement with Africa's subregional
groupings, especially CEN-SAD, which Libya dominated.

HUMANITARIAN/RECONSTRUCTION


13. (C) Le Gal noted that appeals would be made to the
usual UN agencies for humanitarian support for refugees and
IDPs in eastern Chad. She acknowledged that there was
competition with Darfur for donor resources, with Chad's
needs less well addressed. Le Gal indicated that it was
premature to consider longer term reconstruction issues.

U.S. ROLE


14. (C) At several points we asked whether France wanted or
expected the U.S. to play an active role in this project.
Underscoring that the Chadian operation would be an EU
mission, Le Gal saw no need for direct U.S. involvement.
However, she invited the U.S. to renew the discussion early
in September, particularly with an eye to U.S. help in
encouraging participation by Europeans and other potential
troop contributors and in terms of focusing the UN. France
was grateful for U.S. humanitarian assistance in Chad and

PARIS 00003213 003 OF 003


would welcome public statements in support of the EU's
operation.

DARFUR


15. (C) Le Gal believed the EU force would have a salutary
impact on Darfur. The border area in Chad would no longer be
a No-Man's Land, and the refugee camps and IDP population
would prove less fertile ground for militia recruitment.
Darfur rebel factions would draw the message, she hoped, that
they needed to participate in a political process.

COMMENT


16. (C) Le Gal provided succinct and incisive responses to
the issues raised reftel and, at least in general terms,
presented a coherent vision of what the French want to
accomplish. However, rapid agreement among partners and
equally rapid action in the UNSC and in Brussels will be
necessary for the French to keep to their timetable,
complicated by the inevitable worldwide summer slowdown -- Le
Gal herself leaves shortly for three weeks of holiday. She
nonetheless expressed firm French commitment to this plan and
is likely to remain a candid interlocutor during its
development and implementation. END COMMENT.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA