DAS KRAMER'S JULY 20 PARIS QUAD MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 003202

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL PGOV EU XH ZL FR
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER'S JULY 20 PARIS QUAD MEETING


Classified By: POL M/C JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: DAS Kramer met with his "Quad" (UK, France,
Germany) counterparts on July 20 in Paris. (Their last
meeting had been in London, April 2007.) Discussions
included support for reform in Ukraine and key areas for
further policy engagement there. Ukraine, all agreed, was
generally moving in a good direction. Kramer outlined a
proposed expansion of U.S. sanctions against Belarus to put
pressure on the regime to release all political prisoners,
but added we did not expect the EU to follow suit due to the
political sensitivity of the issue and the recent revocation
of GSP. The Germans questioned whether Minsk was prepared to
take a step forward at a time when Lukashenko thought he had
already made positive steps that deserved to be rewarded.
Kramer insisted that the Quad should note that the release of
all political prisoners was the line in the sand. All
participants agreed on the need for more transparency from
Moldova on their Transnistria discussions with Moscow.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: France provided a summary of FM
Kouchner's recent visit to Belgrade and Pristina. FM
Kouchner had asked the parties to engage constructively
during upcoming negotiations. France noted that EU
discussions on the subject would be difficult, adding that it
was a priority to convince the Spanish and the Swedes that a
UDI might be necessary in the face of Russia's desire to
maintain the status quo. Kramer told the Quad that the U.S.
was concerned about possible Russian recognition of
Abkhazia's independence. It was important to engage the
Russians now with quiet, high-level diplomacy: they had to
understand the implications of their actions. A longer
discussion on Russia ensued, with Quad participants
pessimistic about a change in Russian attitudes over the next
two years. EU and U.S. unity, everyone agreed, was vital in
dealing with Russia. END SUMMARY


3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
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DAS David Kramer
Poloff John Espinoza

UK
--
Anthony Smith
Nicole Willey

GERMANY
--------------
Hans-Deiter Lucas
Christina Beinhoff

FRANCE
--------------
Jacques Faure
Aurelia Bouchez

--------------
UKRAINE
--------------


4. (C) The Quad shared similar views on the current political
situation in Ukraine, and underlined seven key areas for
continued policy engagement, noting a need to support Ukraine
generally while staying out of internal political
disagreements. Policy areas included: (1) urging quick
formation of a new government; (2) energy security, including
reform of the sector; (3) respect for human rights; (4) WTO
accession; (5) raising NATO awareness; (6) elevating EU
awareness and reform in line with EU standards; and (7)
constitutional reform.


5. (C) Overall, the Quad agreed that Ukraine was moving in a
positive direction, albeit with fits and starts, and seemed
to have (more or less) internal political consensus on the
need to move towards the EU. Awareness of EU institutions
was lacking in public circles, Faure told the others, blaming
a lack of activity by the local EU office. Others agreed but
warned that an aggressive campaign could backfire or lead to
unrealistic expectations. Expectations of Ukraine's
political class about the EU and access to EU markets was
finally becoming more realistic. The EU had to be careful
with its approach. NATO membership, everyone agreed, was
more controversial, therefore more visible. Ukraine was not
ready for membership, but the Quad noted that the Alliance
should continue engagement.


PARIS 00003202 002 OF 004



6. (C) France's Bouchez expressed concern that Russia may see
Western involvement in Ukraine as antagonizing. Issues such
as the Black Sea Initiative and NATO membership could put
Russia, which always sees itself competing with the West in a
zero-sum game, on the offensive. She suggested that the EU
in particular should be careful not to get into areas where
Russia might put pressure on Ukraine to "choose" between
partners. Kramer and Smith both agreed that Russia made
everything a zero-sum competition, while insisting that -- on
serious issues -- this should only guide strategy, and not
decisions.

MOLDOVA
--------------


7. (C) Quad participants all agreed on the need for further
transparency on Moldovan discussions with Moscow on
Transnistria. Moldovan President Voronin continues to assure
Quad countries that no decisions will be made outside of the
5-plus-2 format, but his interest in basing his legacy on
solving the Transnistria problem is a concern. Bouchez said
that the EU needed to work harder with Moldova on reforms; it
was unclear if political will was the impediment, or lack of
capacity to absorb concrete reforms. Perhaps EU tools did
not fit the Moldovan model. Lucas insisted that the U.S. and
EU should continue to deplore a lack of transparency, without
being too concerned: Voronin would not take a unilateral
step. Kramer surmised that without Russian interest in a
solution to the Transnistria issue, any forward movement was
unlikely. He was dubious that the 5-plus-2 format would
resume any time soon.

BELARUS
--------------


8. (C) Kramer outlined USG intentions to impose additional
U.S. sanctions against Belarus, including significantly
expanding the visa ban list and likely freezing assets
ofstate-owned companies that we believe are principal funders
of Lukashenko's regime. The goal, Kramer explained, was to
increase pressure on Minsk for the release of six remaining
political prisoners (three had been released). Kramer added
that the U.S. was prepared to withdraw the sanctions
proposal, and ease current sanctions, if Minsk responded
positively prior to implementation of the additional measures
(most likely within the next two months). These latest moves
by the U.S. were not irreversible, but we felt forced to take
them after telling the Belarussian regime we would do so in
April unless they changed their behavior. Change in
behavior, Kramer emphasized, was what we sought, and
tightening the noose was the best way to try to do that.
Kramer made clear, however, that the U.S. understood EU
sentiment on the issue, and would not push the EU to adopt
similar sanctions in light of the recent decision to revoke
GSP. He also stressed the importance of maintaining a firm
position unless Lukashenko did the right thing.


9. (C) Lucas noted that Belarus had recently demonstrated
some positive movement, including an agreement for opening an
EU Commissioner's office, allowing the Belarus Helsinki
Commission to remain open, and allowing foreign officials
more latitude in traveling outside of the capital. While
Lucas did not defend Lukashenko, he wondered if the regime
would be open to making more concessions at a time when it
believed it should be rewarded. Kramer interjected that
recently there had been steps in the wrong direction, such as
moves against youth activisits and others. France's Bouchez
noted that the U.S. and EU needed to discuss the transition
from isolation to engagement, while recognizing that the
process would be in stages. She affirmed Kramer's
observation that there was no appetite in the EU for harsher
sanctions, and that any such move could damage EU unity.
Kramer reassured the others that the U.S. was not looking for
regime change but rather regime behavior change.


10. (C) The quad agreed that the developing economic
situation in Belarus could significantly affect its political
future. The economy appeared to be worsening in the face of
higher energy prices. Subsidies for military pensioners and
students would soon be reduced -- a move that clearly
signaled financial trouble for the government. Lucas
highlighted Russia's role as the only possible creditor for
Belarus, thereby solidifying its position with Lukashenko.
He added that as the international community sought change
from Minsk, we had to keep the door open to dialogue and
avoid driving the regime into the arms of Russia. The Quad
endorsed Lucas' comments to keep the door open -- Kramer said
it was open, though not much -- but there was also a
unanimous view that the fear of Russia's relationship with

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Lukashenko would not affect Western demands for a respect of
basic human rights. Kramer added that there still appeared
to be friction between Moscow and Minsk, underlining the fact
that Moscow's choice for CIS SYG had not been supported by
Lukashenko. Our problems with Lukashenko, Kramer noted, were
not driven by his relationship with Moscow but by his
behavior internally.


11. (C) Quad members all insisted that U.S. and EU engagement
with mid-level officials would continue, as well as attempts
to assist in the development of civil society and political
parties (the opposition). The EU plans further discussions
on energy with Belarus, but on a technical level. Kramer
added that a small Department of Energy team may visit
Belarus in August.

KOSOVO
--------------


12. (C) Faure reviewed FM Kouchner's visit to Belgrade and
Pristina, noting that the Minister was warmly greeted in both
cities. Kouchner's message to both Belgrade and Pristina was
that the Ahtisaarhi plan remained a good basis from which to
work, and that the additional 4-6 month period for
negotiations was a positive development that Serbia and
Kosovo should use constructively. PM Kostunica, as expected,
did not welcome anything that hinted at Kosovar independence.
President Tadic and FM Jeremic were less guarded, though not
particularly helpful on a positive way forward. Faure also
stressed that Kouchner had, for the first time, made a
linkage between Kosovo and EU membership -- Serbia could not
hope to join the EU as long as Kosovo's status was undecided
and ethnic conflict still existed. Pristina insisted that
independence was the key issue and not negotiable. KFOR,
Faure reported, characterized the situation as calm but
perceived impatience. It was currently a mild concern, but
they were preparing for any eventual possibility.


13. (C) Herve Boisguiallaume, the French MFA's Kosovo expert,
gave a quick rundown of Quint discussions and noted that the
Quint would be announcing its failure to obtain a UNSCR at
the UN due to Russian threats of a veto. Quint Balkans
directors would be meeting in Vienna on July 25 to discuss
modalities of future negotiations. EU discussions would
begin on July 23; these would be difficult, Bouchez told us.
Convincing the Swedes and the Spanish was the priority.
Kramer noted that it would be better to solve the Kosovo
issue before a new Russian president was elected; otherwise
we risked putting the new President in a very difficult
position, and there was no guarantee that dealing with Russia
on this issue would get any easier with a new leader.

KOSOVO: THE ABKHAZIA LINKAGE
--------------


14. (C) Kramer emphasized the need to dissuade the Russians
from associating the Kosovo case with that of Abkhazia. He
proposed that Quad governments make several points to the
Russians: (1) the stability and security of the South
Caucasus could not be walled off from the North Caucasus, (2)
no one had questioned the territorial integrity of Russia in
1994 when Chechnya rebelled, and (3) the success of the Sochi
Olympics could be in jeopardy if Russia mvoed forward with
recognition of Abkhazia.


15. (C) Bouchez and Lucas expressed concern over the Sochi
Olympics proposal, and focused instead on a need to continue
with confidence-building measures and obtain a successful
renewal of UNOMIG in October. Kramer noted that the
Georgians had been restrained in their behavior, and should
be given appropriate support. The U.S. was looking for a way
to show the Russians that recognition of Abkhazia would be
extremely serious. Putting pressure on Russia by discussing
the 2014 Olympic games might convey the right message. The
U.S., however, remained open to other ideas. Lucas also
questioned the utility of a NATO visit to Tbilisi in the
current timeframe -- wondering if it would only serve to
further irritate Russia.

RUSSIA
--------------


16. (C) During an in-depth discussion of Russia's current
motivations and attitudes, all Quad members shared one key
assessment: Russia was not likely to change its attitude in
the next two years and this was not good. The trends in
Russia and with Russian policy were not encouraging, but Quad
members agreed this didn't mean they could ignore or simply
confront Russia; they needed to engage on key issues as well.

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Lucas underlined the need for patience and further
engagement, noting that the EU had to do a better job of
agreeing on common language and staking out "redlines." He
added that a positive agenda was key in order to show Russia
that we recognized where common ground existed. Lucas
insisted that Russia was trying to play the role of a great
power and it needed to be managed carefully.


17. (C) France highlighted the need to avoid both complacency
and open confrontation. Faure mentioned five areas for
further EU (and in some cases, U.S.) engagement: (1) early
warning system for urgent crises; (2) dialogue on
investments; (3) agreement on overflight fees for Siberia;
(4) framework for WTO/Russia dialogue; and (5) completion of
EU/Russia post-PCA agreement. There was general agreement on
these elements. Quad members unanimously emphasized the need
for U.S./EU unity on the tougher issues.


18. (C) Kramer agreed in general with EU members, and said
that we would try to find common ground with Russia on
missile defense and other strategic issues (Iran and North
Korea),but he also noted the need to push back when
appropriate. He stressed the importance of EU-U.S. unity if
we wanted to have opportunities to influence Russia. Russia
tended to present on many issues a mirror image of the U.S.
and the West, a tendency that exacerbated problems. It was
important that they understood the need to think through
their policies instead of just taking a contrary position, he
said.


19. (C) Meeting participants all expressed solidarity with
the UK on its current diplomatic row with Moscow (Russian
refusal to extradite Lugovoi),pointing out that the matter
went to the core of our common values.


20. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Kramer.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON