Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS3198
2007-07-27 09:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

DAS KRAMER'S JULY 20 MTG WITH ELYSEE RUSSIA ADVISOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS ZL XT FR 
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VZCZCXRO4022
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #3198/01 2080913
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270913Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9174
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0830
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5919
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003198 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS ZL XT FR
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER'S JULY 20 MTG WITH ELYSEE RUSSIA ADVISOR

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003198

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS ZL XT FR
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER'S JULY 20 MTG WITH ELYSEE RUSSIA ADVISOR

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 20 meeting, Damien Loras, the
Presidency's diplomatic advisor for the Americas, Russia,
Central Asia, and non-EU Europe, including the Balkans, told
DAS Kramer that France would recognize Kosovo's independence
at the conclusion of renewed negotiations. Loras stated that
a credible process was necessary in order to garner more EU
unity. Kramer explained U.S. concerns about Russian actions
on Abkhazia and defense issues, suggesting that quiet high
level diplomacy was imperative. Loras agreed and expressed
the GOF hope that a resolution to the current CFE crisis
could be found before Russian suspension took effect. Both
interlocutors suggested that a proposed G-7 meeting at the
Political Director level could effectively demonstrate to the
Russians that their actions were not without consequences.
END SUMMARY

KOSOVO
--------------


2. (C) Loras noted that, despite current failure to obtain a
UNSCR on Kosovo, the process had been vital to showing EU
partners that the Quint had made a serious effort to engage
Russia. More EU unity had been the result. Loras commented
that although France did not expect much from new
negotiations between the parties, the process itself was
again key to obtaining more EU support for the UDI that would
follow. "We (the GOF) are committed to recognizing Kosovo's
independence after negotiations," Loras stated.


3. (C) Sarkozy had a positive conversation with Putin about a
UNSCR a week before the resolution went into blue, Loras told
us. Putin seemed to agree that as long as the proposed UNSCR
did not implicitly recognize Kosovar independence, there was
no need for Russia to insist that the resolution exclude the
possibility. Despite this conversation, FM Lavrov and
others, however, had refused to compromise. Indeed, Russia's

intentions had become clearer as negotiations over the UNSCR
continued. Loras wondered whether a single-sentence
resolution on 1244 might have been preferable -- a Russian
veto could have therefore implicitly ended the mission.


4. (C) Loras and Kramer agreed that the U.S., together with
the Quint, needed to make the Kosovars understand that
patience would bring its rewards. For its part, Loras said,
Serbia needed to be convinced that its future in the
Euro-Atlantic community would ultimately be affected by the
way it conducts itself. Kramer noted that the Kosovo process
should be finalized before a new Russian president was
elected; otherwise we risked putting the new President in a
difficult position as well as beginning the relationship on a
very sour note.

RUSSIA AND ABKHAZIA
--------------


5. (C) The U.S. believes Russia's threat to recognize
Abkhazia's independence is credible, Kramer explained.
Increased Russian rhetoric, moreover, had put Moscow's
credibility on the line and made it more difficult for the
Russians to withdraw their threat. Loras agreed with
Kramer's assertion that quiet, high-level diplomacy was
needed now in order to discourage Russia from following a
dangerous path. Kramer suggested raising several issues
related to Russia's possible unilateral recognition of
Abkhazia: the success of the Sochi Olympics; the stability of
the North Caucasus; and the credibility of Russia's future
role in the Abkhaz peace process.


RUSSIA AND DEFENSE ISSUES
--------------


6. (C) Kramer explained that the U.S. would continue to move
forward with Poland and the Czech Republic on missile defense
installations, while simultaneously pursuing with the
Russians ideas on the Gabala radar site in Azerbaijan and the
Armavir site in southern Russia; these were not mutually
exclusive options. Russian DFM Kislyak would be in
Washington the end of the month for discussions on this
issue. Kramer told Loras that Russia did not share the U.S.
threat assessment of Iran and could not accept that Russia
was only an incidental player in our efforts to confront a
potential Iranian threat. Loras agreed with Kramer's

PARIS 00003198 002 OF 002


analysis of Russia's psyche, but noted that the Russians had
been constructive on Iran issues, particularly at the G8 and
the UNSC. He suggested that Russia's analysis of the Iranian
threat was not yet clear.


7. (C) France hoped that some progress could be made on CFE
before the Russian suspension went into effect in December,
Loras told Kramer. The Russians, he said, had proposed that
some movement towards the adoption of the adapted CFE Treaty
could stop the impending suspension. Loras questioned
whether some of the Baltic states could sign, but not ratify
the treaty, as a sign of constructive engagement to Russia.
Kramer insisted that any movement from the U.S. and Europe
had to come in concert with a Russian step in the right
direction. We planned to discuss CFE with Kislyak as well,
and we hoped to have a better sense of any Russian
flexibility on CFE and its willingness to fulfill its
Istanbul commitments. (COMMENT: It was clear that Loras was
looking to appease Russia in some way, but he avoided
questioning the substance of the Istanbul commitments and the
need for Russia to implement them. He stressed, instead, the
need for creative solutions.)

RUSSIA AND THE UK
--------------


8. (C) The GOF had publicly supported the UK on its recent
diplomatic row with Russia, Loras said, but was disappointed
that the British did not appear to have a strategy.
Fortunately, he said, the Russian response thus far had been
proportional. Both agreed, however, that the deeper issue
was more serious and called into question whether it was
possible to have common values with Putin's administration.

A G-7 MEETING ?
--------------


9. (C) Loras expressed his support for a proposed G-7 meeting
at the Political Director level that would exclude Russia.
Kramer agreed that Russia had to understand that there were
consequences to its actions and that such a meeting would
send an appropriate signal. Loras surmised that the other
G-7 would attend if invited.


10. (U) This cable has been cleared with DAS Kramer.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON