PARIS HOSTS INAUGURAL W. MED RSI CONFERENCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 000319

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT MARC NORMAN, TED ALLEGRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC OTRA PTER FR AG LY IT MT SP
TS, MO, PO

SIPDIS
SUBJECT: PARIS HOSTS INAUGURAL W. MED RSI CONFERENCE

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Stapleton hosted the inaugural
Western Mediterranean Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI)
Conference on December 5-6 in Paris. U.S. Chiefs of Mission
and Embassy representatives from France, Italy, Spain,
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal and Malta gathered as a
first step to develop a regional counterterrorism strategy.
Ambassador for Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton and U.S.
interagency representatives participated. Meeting
participants sought to understand how the North African and
European dimensions of the terrorist threat interact and to
identify possible measures to enhance both inter-USG and
regional cooperation to address the cross-Mediterranean
nature of the problem.


2. (S) Summary continued: Chiefs of Mission made several
recommendations on the way forward, including the need to a)
increase MEPI funding to foster vital economic reforms in
North Africa and boost European assistance to North African
countries in order to improve economic and social conditions
that stimulate illegal (and legal) migration to Europe, b)
develop a core short- and long-term message to the EU on
counterterrorism issues c) develop a better understanding of
the radicalization process, d) put in place a long-term
strategy for an effective assimilation/integration policy out
to 2050, e) get a better understanding of the attitudes of
North African and immigrant populations with respect to the
U.S., f) improve information-sharing among the countries of
the region, g) produce/codify a list of counterterrorism and
RSI best practices and disseminate these to posts, and h)
continue to meet regularly to coordinate an integrated
regional CT approach. End summary.

The Regional Picture
--------------


3. (S) Attendees began the session by briefing on the
distinctive aspects of threats posed by specific groups or to
specific countries.


4. (S) Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC): With
500-800 operatives, the GSPC is a growing regional threat, in
part as a result of the success of the Algerian government in
combating the group in country. Faced with unrelenting
pressure from the GoA, the GSPC has made a strategic shift
from a focus on jihad in Algeria to a more international
approach that emphasizes outreach to other organizations
(including al Qaida),providing training to members of other
groups, and launching attacks outside Algeria. For now, the
GSPC uses Europe mostly for fund-raising and facilitation,
but its September 2006 announcement of an open alliance with
AQ may presage an increased threat there.


5. (S) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG): Ultimate
networkers, the LIFG serves as connective tissue for other
groups and enjoys growing influence within AQ. It benefits

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from dynamic leadership with strong religious credentials.


6. (S) MSJ: The least known of the North African extremist
groups, it appears to be more a movement than an
organization. Following the Casablanca bombings, a strong
Moroccan government crackdown dismantled more than a dozen
cells and has led the group to operate increasingly out of
Spain and to engage in close cooperation with the GSPC.


7. (S) Algeria: The 150,000 dead in the Algerian conflict
has lead to increasing war-weariness on the part of the
population and made GSPC recruitment more difficult. The
GoA,s amnesty process has been successful in bringing many
fighters out the maquis and the government,s closer
monitoring of mosques has also limited extremists,
influence. Countering these positive trends are the
continuing difficult economic and social conditions, which
the government has so far failed to address. Relations
between U.S. and Algerian services are good, especially on
the military side, but poor Algerian absorption capacity and
bureaucratic inertia have complicated our ability to provide
training and other forms of CT assistance.


8. (S) Morocco: Since the Casablanca bombings, some 23 cells
have been disrupted, but concern is growing over the
potential threat of jihadists returning from Iraq, especially
as the GoM does not appear to have a plan to deal with such a
threat. The GoM,s greatest asset is, in many ways, the
king,s position as Commander of the Faithful. The GoM
recognizes the need to address social and economic conditions
and the king is pressing for reforms, particularly with
respect to women,s and children,s rights. The GoM is also
moving to control religious institutions and preaching with a
view to ensuring that a tolerant form of Islam is practiced
in Morocco. Relations with the U.S. are good. The 2004 Free
Trade Agreement has increased investment and noticeably
improved the image of the United States. There are estimates
of up to 3 million Moroccans living outside the country; many
Moroccans can move easily around Europe.


9. (S) Italy: A likely target for AQ because of its role in
Iraq, Afghanistan and (now) Lebanon, Italy may have some 2-3%
of its Muslim population radicalized. Small extremist
communities, mostly in the north, are active, but the GoI
devotes considerable resources to CT and is aggressive about
using new powers to arrest and expel troublemakers. With
North African, Bosnian, Somali, and increasingly Pakistani
communities to contend with, the GoI has done a poor job of
recruiting minorities or developing language capabilities in
its security services. More broadly, the GoI has yet to meet
the challenge posed by the need to integrate people of
different ethnic origins. Cooperation with the USG,
extraordinary under the previous government, remains good,
but the Milan rendition case of abu Omar poses a challenge
and the highly independent and left-leaning judiciary has
shown a tendency to vitiate some CT efforts.


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10. (S) Portugal: Portugal,s small Muslim population has
seen minimal radicalization; the country,s CT challenge is
mostly one of disrupting logistical support networks.
Portugal has cooperated closely with the USG, even on
detainee transfers through the country, although, as is the
case in many countries, negative publicity about "rendition
flights" poses a problem.


11. (S) Tunisia: The country appears on the surface to be
stable and safe, but faces a growing threat. G8 ambassadors
in country have expressed concern that the domestic
environment may be fostering extremism. The GoT has
repressed the terrorist threat within the country itself
(terrorism suspects are closely monitored),but inadequate
border security has meant Tunisian radicals can easily
travel. Some have turned up in Iraq and there is Tunisian
involvement in cells in Europe. Cooperation with the U.S. is
good, but the GoT is more inclined to share with us
information about external threats than it is about internal
developments. Cooperation with its neighbors is adequate
with respect to repatriation, but less than warm.


12. (S) Malta: While there appear to be no terrorist cells
in the country, because of its location, Malta serves as a
transfer point and, in effect as the Southern border of
Europe. The GoM does a good job of monitoring its Freeport,
but has responsibility for air and sea space some 800 times
the size of the country itself, posing an obvious challenge
to its limited resources. Illegal immigration is an enormous
and growing problem equal to some 50% of the country,s
birthrate in 2005. Despite increasing awareness of the
potential for future problems, the Maltese are having trouble
handling the influx.


13. (S) Spain: Some 1,000 Islamist extremists operate out of
Spain, but the country,s long history of confronting
terrorism has meant the GoS is very focused on the threat.
Terrorist activity in Spain appears to be linked with
criminal activity (especially with respect to credit card
fraud, passport theft, and, to some degree, drug
trafficking). Illegal immigration is a worsening problem.
Recruitment (of foreign fighters for Iraq and Afghanistan)
appears to be ongoing. USG/Embassy Madrid has excellent
cooperation with the GOS on a range of CT issues, including
an agreement to share terrorist watch list information
(HSPD-6),which A/S Harty signed during her recent trip to
Madrid and which now serves as a model for other such
agreements. Embassy Madrid often serves as the "interagency"
for the GOS, given poor Spanish internal coordination on CT,
which the GoS is trying to address. Because of the close
ties the Embassy maintains with all of the CT actors in the
GOS, our counterterrorism efforts remain effective.


14. (S) France: The GoF, well aware that France is a target,
does an effective job of monitoring and controlling the
problem. French CT structures are robust and effective and
the operational relationship with the USG is excellent.

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Nonetheless, France is confronted with a burgeoning immigrant
population and is doing a poor job of assimilating it,
despite recent GoF efforts to reach out to communities in
which immigrants predominate. Terrorist recruitment in
prisons and the possible threat of Iraq returnees is a
concern, as is, increasingly, the Pakistan terrorism nexus.

Specific Concerns and ideas to address them
--------------


15. (S) Chiefs of Mission engaged in a wide-ranging
discussion, concluding that the regional challenge we face in
addressing the terrorist threat manifests itself in several
broad categories:

Immigration:
--------------


16. (S) Underlying and contributing to the terrorist problem
is the reality of a massive, often uncontrolled, and growing
immigration flow across the Mediterranean: in Algeria alone,
there were some 150,000 requests for French visas in 2006.
Moreover, there is a growing number of young North Africans
trying to enter Europe clandestinely or by seeking refugee
status. This huge migration poses a major and multi-faceted
challenge. Chiefs of Mission noted that the ongoing
migration is driven by deep-seated economic and social
conditions and is therefore likely to continue for the
foreseeable future absent concerted efforts to address the
conditions in North Africa (and points south) that feed a
desire to relocate. While steps must be taken to enhance
maritime security, we must also devise ways to provide
economic opportunity in host countries that can create
disincentive for relocation. Such an effort must be done in
conjunction with European countries. We must seek European
participation in and contributions to, the Broader Middle
East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) and encourage them
to press North African countries on the need for economic and
social reform. We need more MEPI resources to augment our
own efforts to promote vital economic and education reforms
in North Africa.


17. (S) At the same time, we must find ways of assisting
partner nations on both sides of the Mediterranean to manage
population movements of the size currently underway.
Specifically, we must help them ensure that terrorists do not
take advantage of this movement to travel or to exploit
discontent associated with such dislocation. Unfortunately,
we and the governments in the region appear to have at best
only a limited grasp of the nature of the migration: for
example, camps for immigrants, which are presumably targets
for terrorist subversion, as well as for terrorist transit,
are essentially closed off as neither we nor governments have
established effective monitoring or investigative
capabilities. While some countries (Spain, for example)
capture biometric data on immigrants, most do not and some
lack the capacity to do so or to absorb the technology. We

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need to find ways to address this information gap.


18. (S) Libya in particular appears to be indifferent to the
immigration problem. There may be more non-Libyans than
Libyans living in the country, which serves as a launching
pad for population movement from countries to its south.
Chiefs of Mission noted that we must address Libyan inability
(or unwillingness) to deal with the issue and agreed that
Embassy Tripoli participation in the next RSI would be useful.

Integration/Assimilation
--------------


19. (S) Chiefs of Mission noted that European partners will
be faced with a growing need to develop effective programs to
assimilate and/or integrate new residents of their countries.
This will require a shift in mindset, as many receiving
countries have yet to deal with (or in some cases even
acknowledge) the scope of the problem. It has proven
difficult to integrate even legal migrants; terrorist plots
in recent years have involved wealthy students and spouses of
airplane pilots, for example. The Internet and continuing
links with migrants, "home countries" pose additional and
poorly understood challenges for governments seeking to
grapple with the imperative of integrating new populations.
Chiefs of Mission concluded that we need to raise the profile
of radicalization/immigration issue in the ongoing U.S.-EU
dialogue on terrorism and explore the possibility of
involving the North African leadership in European efforts at
integration.


Radicalization
--------------


20. (S) The phenomenon of radicalization appears to affect
1-3 percent of Muslim populations across the board, with
violent extremists seeking to exploit the discontent of
underprivileged, disadvantaged communities. Chiefs of
Mission determined that we need to develop a better
understanding of the nature of the threat terrain, especially
with regard to radicalization. To this end, we should
commission additional studies on how radicalization takes
place, look closely at de-radicalization efforts around the
world (e.g., in Morocco); and encourage countries to share
successes in countering radicalization. Of particular
concern is prison radicalization, about which little is yet
known; this issue should be made a priority.

Information and Outreach
--------------


21. (S) Chiefs of Mission noted that we often lack a clear
picture of many aspects of the challenges we face in the
region. Over the long term to address this shortfall, we
need to make a serious investment in counterterrorism
expertise, train a cadre of CT experts, and ensure that

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information regarding challenges and best practices is widely
disseminated.


22. (S) More specifically, we need to get a handle on the
nature of the immigration wave. For example, the practice
engaged in by some migrants of destroying identity papers
before arrival at their destination countries not only
assures that they cannot be returned to their countries of
origin but also makes it close to impossible to identify new
arrivals. We need to help partner countries find ways to
monitor migrants and to discern terrorists and criminals that
may be in their midst.


23. (S) We lack as well a good sense of the nature and
thinking of existing Muslim communities in Europe. To
address this shortfall, Chiefs of Mission concluded that we
need to devote additional resources to polling immigrant
communities, as well as local populations in North Africa,
with a view to determining their concerns and attitudes
towards the U.S. and its policies.


24. (S) Chiefs of Mission noted that efforts to engage with
Muslim populations and share information about USG assistance
programs have a significantly positive impact on those
communities, perceptions of the United States. We must do
a better job of getting out such information. Chiefs of
Mission therefore strongly urged additional resources be
devoted to outreach and information efforts. Programs
connecting such communities with U.S. Muslims and other
moderates are vital and need to be better funded.
Non-government organizations are also active on this front
and we need to have to a better understanding of their
activities and how we can leverage them.


25. (S) The recent Algerian amnesty for "repentant"
terrorists provides yet another illustration of the need for
better sharing of information. The lengthy delay (some 10
months) between the actual amnesty and GoA,s provision of
the names of those pardoned is unacceptable; we need to
ensure such lists are quickly provided and disseminated.

Conclusions
--------------


26. (S) Chiefs of Mission propose a strategy that
simultaneously examines and addresses the various stages of
the interrelated immigration, integration, and radicalization
challenges: mass movement, lack of connection to new homes,
efforts by terrorists and radicals to exploit discontent and
dislocation. By viewing the challenge holistically, and
concurrently, we can begin to grapple with what will clearly
be a long-term effort that will require a highly coordinated
and flexible response across the government. Thus, CoMs
propose a continuing series of discussions as part of an
effort to bring to bear all instruments of national power.
In light of these considerations, Chiefs of Mission made the
following specific proposals:

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A. Boost MEPI funding for programs to improve economic and
social conditions in North Africa that stimulate illegal (and
legal) immigration. Encourage European participation in
BMENA and in efforts to enhance economic and social reforms
in North Africa. Focus additional attention on the role of
Libya with respect to immigration and population movement.


B. Develop a core message for our engagement with the EU on
counterterrorism issues, including specific actions we want
host governments to take, and areas where the U.S. is willing
to provide assistance. We should focus on short-term
specific goals, as well as longer term policy objectives.


C. Better map the environment and develop a greater
understanding of the radicalization process through increased
study of the phenomenon, and better sharing of successes in
countering it. Increase the focus on the threat of prison
radicalization. Raise the profile of integration and
radicalization issues in discussions with the EU. Also,
increase polling to better understand local views and how
people acquire information, particularly in North Africa.


D. Put in place a long-term strategy to develop the necessary
groundwork for an effective assimilation/integration policy
out to 2050. Explore the utility and feasibility of
encouraging North African governments to engage with the
Europeans with a view to fostering integration of immigrant
communities. Seek to leverage NGO activities.


E. Develop a better understanding of the attitudes of North
African and immigrant populations with respect to the U.S.
and key terrorism-related issues through more accurate and
detailed polling. The USG needs to exponentially and rapidly
expand successful people-to-people programs that create
lasting favorable impressions of the U.S. and undermine the
attractiveness of extremist ideologies as a key long-term
instrument to counter extremism. One focus of these programs
should be expanding local contacts with U.S. Muslims.


F. Improve information-sharing among the countries of the
region, specifically with regard to lists of persons freed in
amnesties.


G. To devise a more effective strategy to address the
threat, we should produce/codify a list of counterterrorism
and RSI best practices and disseminate these to posts, with a
view to having them updated periodically. Make a long-term
investment in developing CT expertise and a cadre of experts.


H. To maintain the momentum generated by this meeting,
embassies intend to meet regularly to coordinate an
integrated regional CT approach, based on a network of
country teams and developed through face-to-face contact and
video and telephone conferences. Chiefs of Mission agreed to
continue the RSI process in the future and request assistance
from Washington in obtaining and obligating significant

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additional funding necessary to undertake this regional CT
strategy and increase understanding among decision-makers and
budget analysts of the CT challenges in our region.

Meeting Participants
--------------


27. (S) The meeting consisted of USG Ambassadors (and
political and intel staffs) in the field as well as several
Washington agencies. Principals from the field were: Craig
Stapleton, Ambassador to France; Ronald Spogli, Ambassador to
Italy; Eduardo Aguirre, Jr, Ambassador to Spain; Al Hoffman,
Ambassador to Portugal; Robert Ford, Ambassador to Algeria;
Bob Godec, Ambassador to Tunisia; Molly Bordonaro, Ambassador
to Malta; Wayne Bush, DCM to Morocco.


28. (S) Principals from Washington included: Hank Crumpton,
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism; EUR A/S Dan Fried;
NEA DAS Gordon Gray; Ambassador Brian Carlson, R; Nerissa
Cook, Office Director EUR/PGI; Rollie Burans, NCTC; Bruce
Swartz, U.S. DOJ Assistant Attorney General; GEN Mark
Schissler, Joint Staff, Deputy Director for the War on
Terror, MG Robertus C.N. Remkes, US EUCOM Director for
Strategy, Policy, and Assessments; MG David Scott, US SOCOM,
Deputy Director SCO.



29. (U) This cable was drafted by S/CT and cleared by all
participating Chiefs of Mission and Ambassador-at-Large, Hank
Crumpton.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON