CODEL WEXLER'S JULY 2 MEETING WITH FM KOUCHNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002890

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR H - PLEASE PASS TO CONGRESSMAN WEXLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO UNO UNMIK YI RS IR IS LE
PTER
SUBJECT: CODEL WEXLER'S JULY 2 MEETING WITH FM KOUCHNER
FOCUSES ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS, LEBANON AND
HIZBALLAH, KOSOVO, AND TURKEY/EU

REF: PARIS 2787

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 2 meeting with Congressman
Wexler, FM Kouchner said that the current disarray in the
Palestinian Authority presented an historic opportunity for
an initiative on the peace process, but he described Israeli
"inertia" -- mainly PM Olmert's weakness -- as the main
obstacle. The key would be to find a practical way forward
with Israeli support, perhaps through Barak. Kouchner viewed
Syria rather than Hizballah as the primary bad actor in
Lebanon and argued against designating Hizballah a terrorist
organization in order to have an interlocutor. He defended
his own initiative for a Lebanon national reconciliation
conference in France while acknowledging that Hizballah and
other Shia representatives would probably boycott it in the
end. Kouchner restated French determination to recognize
Kosovo's independence while noting the difficulty of
obtaining a common EU approach to this "European problem."
Kouchner expressed open disagreement with Sarkozy's exclusion
of eventual Turkish EU membership and urged the USG to be
frank with Sarkozy about the dangers of Turkish alienation,
but he also defended the EU's need to determine its borders
in order to become a more cohesive political entity. (Septel
reports Wexler's meeting with Sarkozy Diplomatic Advisor
Jean-David Levitte.) END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Congressman Wexler (D-FL),accompanied by the
Ambassador, met July 2 with FM Bernard Kouchner to discuss
Darfur, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Lebanon (with a
particular focus on Hezbollah),Kosovo, and Turkey/EU.
Kouchner was joined by cabinet advisor Alice Guitton,
Americas Director (AS-equivalent) Daniel Parfait, Americas
desk officer Sameh Safty, and Deputy Spokesperson Brieuc
Pont. (Minister-Delegate for European Affairs Jean-Pierre
Jouyet was originally scheduled to attend the meeting, but he
departed with President Sarkozy for Strasbourg.)

U.S.-French Relations
--------------


3. (C) Wexler assured Kouchner of Washington's strong
interest in the Sarkozy government and expressed the hope
that change in tone would also be productive in terms of
results. Kouchner responded that time would tell, while
noting that the U.S. and France were already cooperating
closely on Darfur, Lebanon, and the Middle East.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
--------------


4. (C) Kouchner stressed the importance of restarting the
peace process, while criticizing the "inertia" of the
Israelis, notwithstanding the Israeli decision to distribute
tax monies to Mahmoud Abbas. He blamed Olmert for focusing
only on domestic politics; according to Abu Mazen, Olmert was
insisting that all contacts with the Palestinians go through
him, as a way of buttressing his authority. Wexler
encouraged France to work with the U.S. to restart the
process, saying that leadership by the U.S., with France by
its side, could make a real difference given Olmert's
inability to do much on his own. Kouchner did not disagree,
but stressed the need to find a practical way forward, saying
little would be possible without Israeli support. He hoped
that Ehud Barak could play a positive role. He expressed his
intention to publish an article in the U.S. and French press
on what he called an "historic opportunity" -- at a time when
the Palestinians were weak and Palestinian terrorists in
Lebanon were under siege.


5. (C) Wexler queried whether France was potentially
interested in an international summit with the participation
of the U.S., European and Arab countries that might serve as
a vehicle for a concerted push toward a final settlement,
suggesting that more European pressure on the USG might
produce higher-profile U.S. engagement. He noted the
less-than-positive result of Saudi mediation of the national
unity government (NUG),which was not supported by the United
States. Kouchner was dubious that the USG would be prepared
to engage in this manner, but suggested he might be
interested in hosting a conference in Paris to get the ball

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rolling. He said it was time for a new initiative, one that
went beyond the release of prisoners and would appeal to
Israelis and Palestinians alike fed up with war. The
Fatah-Hamas split offered a perfect opportunity.

Hizballah/Iran
--------------


6. (C) Noting reports that a Hizballah operative was being
held in Iraq, Wexler stated that Iran was clearly stirring
the pot there and cited the detention as proof of the
connection between Iran and Hizballah. He asked whether the
incident would change European attitudes toward listing
Hizballah as a terrorist organization. Kouchner rejected
putting Hizballah on the terrorism list, since doing so was a
"trap." He noted the catch-22 of not being able to talk to
those with whom one needed to negotiate; political access was
essential. Moreover, he argued, Syria, not Hizballah, was
responsible for the recent violence in the Palestinian camps,
and dialogue among all the communities was the only possible
means for avoiding a civil war in Lebanon. Hizballah
represented the Shia part of the Lebanese community.


7. (C) Kouchner reviewed his proposal for a national
reconciliation dialogue on French soil, stating that the idea
was to get all sides to begin talking to each other about
their views toward each other and the future of Lebanon.
There would be no documents, since recently the attempt in
Lausanne to produce even an extremely weak statement had
failed. Dialogue was not a "magic solution," but it was
important "not to refuse to talk to the main protagonists
even if one condemned their actions." It was not a powerful
step, but the only one at their disposal for the time being.


8. (C) Kouchner insisted that the proposal did not represent
a change in French policy: France supported the March 14
movement and the Siniora government, and intended to continue
working closely together with the USG. He concluded that his
expectations were low that representatives from all
communities would be willing to attend in the end. Wexler
asked if that meant Hizballah. Kouchner said he suspected
Hizballah would not come in the end, and that other Shia
representatives would refuse as well, although he said later
that the conference still had a 50-50 chance of taking place.
Claiming that all parties had been on board until the recent
assassination of the parliamentarian Walid Eido, he announced
that he would call PM Siniora later that morning to obtain an
update.

Kosovo
--------------


9. (C) Saying he had been briefed by EUR A/S Fried on the
Kosovo situation (reftel),Wexler asked about next steps.
Kouchner responded that this was a European and not a U.S.
problem, while assuring Wexler that France supported the
Ahtisaari plan (even if he had moved too quickly) and
independence for Kosovo. It was important to avoid a Russian
veto and to achieve EU unity on a strategy -- both of which
were proving problematic. Recognizing Kosovo following a
Russian veto would undermine the UN system. It was useful to
extend talks until the end of the year in order to bolster
the election chances of the democratic parties in Serbia. In
the end, however, independence would be inevitable, as stated
by President Sarkozy. Guitton noted the imminent circulation
of a new draft UNSC Resolution designed to ensure a continued
international presence. Kouchner reiterated that it would be
necessary "to play theater" for another six months, at the
end of which a determination would need to be made on the
feasibility of yet another resolution (although he seemed to
doubt it would be possible). He stressed the importance of
language stressing "the future" of Kosovo and not using the
word "independence." He hoped the other EU member states
would accept this solution.


10. (C) Wexler asked how this strategy furthered the chances
of democrats in Serbia. Kouchner did not have a good answer
(and appeared to concede that he did not fully understand
Serbian thinking on this issue),but said he would travel to
the region July 12 and 13 to try to massage them. He said
the Serbs needed others to make the final decision so that
they could move on and turn their attention to joining the

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EU. He complained that EU-Serbian relations had been frozen
too long over Serbian failure to turn over war criminals to
the ICTY. Now that SAA negotiations had resumed, it would be
possible to offer more political incentives. He concluded
again that this was a European problem.

Turkey
--------------


11. (C) Asked about Turkey, Kouchner made clear that he did
not agree with Sarkozy's policy of excluding Turkey from EU
membership. He claimed he was trying to convince Sarkozy to
change his position, noting that future memberships would be
subject to popular referendum in any case and that the
accession negotiations would take at least 15 years. That
said, he noted that Sarkozy had agreed that 30 of 35 chapters
could be opened up in Turkey's ongoing accession negotiations
with the EU. Wexler asked if there was anything the USG
should do. Kouchner responded that the USG should be frank
in making its own views known, by arguing the danger inherent
in allowing Turkey to drift toward extremism, its secular
tradition, and its good relations with Israel. He argued
indirectly that the USG should also pressure Turkey on
reforms and on recognizing the Armenian genocide.


12. (C) Kouchner nonetheless argued that Sarkozy was right
in calling for an EU brainstorming session by the end of the
year that would focus on European frontiers and identity and
deal with the questions of Ukraine, Turkey, and the
Mediterranean Union. Wexler noted the potential negative
implications of putting an early end to many countries'
membership aspirations. Kouchner said he understood, but he
defended Europe's long-term goal of becoming a cohesive
political entity; the EU at 27 was already proving difficult,
and the EU was losing energy. He said it was also necessary
for the EU to deal with unwanted immigration in a context of
high unemployment. While the game was not over for Turkey,
Sarkozy was determined.

Darfur
--------------


13. (C) Kouchner judged that the June 25 ministerial meeting
on Darfur had been constructive, but he admitted that the
Sudanese had already veered from an initial statement in
support of the conference's decisions to one more sharply
critical.


14. (U) Representative Wexler did not have an opportunity to
clear this message.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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