U/S BURNS' JUNE 13 LUNCH WITH FRENCH FM KOUCHNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002726

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO YI UNMIK UNO LE IR
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' JUNE 13 LUNCH WITH FRENCH FM KOUCHNER


Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG R STAPLETON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) June 13, 2007, 1:00 P.M.


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
Under Secretary Burns
Ambassador Stapleton
Ambassador Frank Wisner, U.S. Special Envoy for Kosovo Final
Status Issues
P Staff Bame
Pol Espinoza (notetaker)

France
Foreign Minister Kouchner
Political Director Araud
A/S-equivalent for non-EU Europe Faure
FM Cabinet Advisor Dumont
FM Cabinet Advisor Errera
Political Director Staff Veyssiere


3. (C) SUMMARY: U/S Burns and French FM Kouchner discussed
Kosovo, Lebanon, Darfur, Iran, and domestic French politics
over lunch on June 13. Burns convinced Kouchner to agree to
the principle of Kosovo independence and the U.S. strategy
for moving forward in the UNSC. Kouchner noted that while he
agreed that Kosovo independence was the only possible
outcome, the Quint should demonstrate first to the world that
it had made every possible effort to find agreement between
the parties and in the UNSC before moving to recognize Kosovo
independence. President Sarkozy, he said, would have the
final say for the GOF on the recognition of an independent
Kosovo. Kouchner agreed with Burns that U.S.-France unity on
Lebanon was the key to past and future success on the ground
and in the UNSC. Burns noted the difference in Hizballah
policies and expressed concern about the effects of inviting
Hizballah to Kouchner's proposed conference in Paris.
Kouchner insisted that Hizballah's presence was necessary for
the credibility of political dialogue, but noted that France
continued to fully support PM Siniora.


4. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Kouchner highlighted his goals for
the Darfur conference: (1) support for the Chad operation and
for the sites where displaced individuals are concentrated,
and (2) support for AMIS troops. While not completely ruling
out further sanctions, he questioned their timelines, while
adding he had warned Khartoum that Europe might follow the
United States if there was no progress. Kouchner did not
believe sanctions would work in Iran and encouraged the USG
to speak with Iran and reach out to the Iranian people.
Burns explained USG policy and suggested that economic
sanctions were a logical extension of U.S. and EU3 political
pressure, though Russian and Chinese stances might require
further sanctions outside the UNSC. On domestic politics,
Kouchner noted Sarkozy's strong mandate, but said that
foreign policy would only see shifts in approach, not policy.
Kouchner flagged as his only key disagreement with Sarkozy
Turkey's European integration. (NOTE: This lunch was held on
June 13, the day following the Kosovo political directors'
quint meeting and a Burns' dinner with PolDir Araud. The
lunch preceded Burns' meeting with Presidential Diplomatic
Advisor Jean-David Levitte. END NOTE) END SUMMARY

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KOSOVO
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5. (C) Kouchner told U/S Burns and Ambassador Wisner that,
absent a UNSCR, we would need to demonstrate to the world
that we had made every conceivable attempt to find an
agreement between the parties and in the UN Security Council
before moving to Quint recognition of an independent Kosovo.
Burns stressed the importance of Quint unity and reviewed
Quint discussions on a strategy to move forward based in
large part on Sarkozy's G-8 proposal: (1) Quint agreement on
Kosovo independence as the final outcome; (2) a push now in
the Security Council for a UNSCR in order to gauge Russia's
reaction; (3) if a Russian veto still remained likely, we
would allow three to six months for dialogue between the
parties and prepare mechanisms for independence without a
UNSCR; and (4) if there is no agreement between the parties
or in the UNSC at that time, the Quint and others would move
to recognize an independent Kosovo. Kouchner agreed in
principle with the proposal, but did not appear to attach as
much importance to a timetable. Somewhat jokingly, Kouchner
referred to his birthday in early November as a possible
deadline for dialogue to end and independence to begin.


6. (C) Political Director Araud nonetheless remained guarded

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about French recognition of Kosovo and feared a European
clash on the issue -- particularly with the Italians and
Spanish. Kouchner was less worried about the Spanish, with
whom he would meet that evening, and he suggested that
Secretary Rice could bring the Italians along with a phone

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call. Araud focused on legal concerns throughout the
conversation and reiterated that a Russian veto would put
Europe in an incredibly difficult legal situation. Wisner
said that the U.S. understood the political difficulties and
would do its best to assist.


7. (C) Wisner explained that the U.S. thought constructive
dialogue between the parties could only take place if both
the Serbs and Kosovars understood that independence was the
final outcome. Serbia, Wisner said, might be more willing to
engage on specific issues of concern if the Quint made clear
that recognition of an independent Kosovo was inevitable.
Burns added that dialogue would be most useful if led by
Ahtisaari. Kouchner countered that Foreign Ministers must be
involved in the process and reiterated his earlier proposal
(from a Quint telephone conference the previous week) that
Quint ministers visit the region together. He explained that
Ahtisaari, for whom he had great admiration, had not been
able to identify the right interlocutors and influential
people in the region with whom to make his case.


8. (C) Kouchner feared violence in the coming weeks against
ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, and insisted that Quint partners
deliver a clear message to Pristina about the sensitivity of
the coming months. Wisner agreed to pass the message to the
Kosovars, but added that he would also be taking a positive
agenda to Pristina, pushing them to move forward quickly on
reforms and other preparations for independence; a lot of
work remained to be accomplished. He agreed to provide
Kouchner and Araud an account of his June 14-17 Kosovo trip.
Kouchner agreed to take a similar message during his upcoming
mission to the region, and added he would be traveling across
Kosovo, not only to Pristina.

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LEBANON
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9. (C) U/S Burns stressed to Kouchner that U.S.-French unity
on Lebanon policy was the cornerstone of any success we had
had on the ground and in the UN Security Council. It was
vital that we preserve that cooperation without surprise
initatives, such as the GOF-proposed conference, and continue
to put pressure on Syria not to reinsert itself into Lebanon.
Kouchner agreed that U.S.-French cooperation was essential
and noted that his proposed conference for Lebanon would only
be a forum for political dialogue; it was not a signal of any
impending policy change. Kouchner added that the invitation
to Hizballah in no way meant that the GOF did not support
Siniora, but was a reaction to the reality of Lebanon.
Siniora and the March 14 movement did not represent the
majority of Lebanese, he said. Kouchner clarified that the
event would be at the sub-cabinet level and added that
Siniora had agreed on June 12 to send a representative to the
conference. "If they don't all come, we won't have it,"
Kouchner noted.


10. (C) Burns acknowledged differences over policy on
Hizballah, and wondered whether Hizballah's participation in
the conference would undermine UNSC efforts to maintain
pressure on it to disarm. Kouchner responded that "inviting
them would not change anything." Hizballah, Kouchner argued,
had to be a part of the political dialogue, or the forum
would lack credibility. Burns suggested, and Kouchner agreed
in principle, that the question of illegal arms and financial
support from Syria to groups other than the LAF had to be a
part of the discussion.


11. (C) Kouchner said he was not overly concerned about a
possible summer offensive by Syria and Hizballah against
Israel, but did not rule out the possibility. He said that
the current problem was Fatah al-Islam, which was responsible
for the incidents inside the Palestinian refugee camps.
Kouchner judged that there was a new unity in Lebanon to back
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Araud added that Hizballah
had nothing to gain from attacking Israel, but that Syria was
a different matter. Lebanese Hizballah and Syria, Araud
insisted, were not the same entity.

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DARFUR
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12. (C) Kouchner characterized Khartoum's signature to the
Hybrid Force agreement as a deliverable from his visit to the

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region, but was somewhat pessimistic about the agreement's
significance. He said that Khartoum had accepted to receive
"experts," which was how the Chinese referred to their troop
contribution -- but Kouchner questioned the practical
implications of Khartoum's language.


13. (C) Burns pushed Kouchner on individual Sudan sanctions,
laying out the U.S. position that sanctions would help to
increase pressure on the regime. Convincing China in the
UNSC was an uphill battle. Kouchner indicated that sanctions
were not the priority for France at the moment, but that he
had warned Khartoum that Europe could follow the USG if there
was no progress.


14. (C) Khartoum, despite having never been invited to the
Paris ministerial, had recently refused to attend, Kouchner
said. "They want our money, but they won't take our soldiers
-- it's not possible." The minister, after expressing his
hope that Secretary Rice would attend, laid out two key
issues he hoped the ministerial would address: (1) support
for the Chad operation and aid for sites where displaced
people were living-- he described the situation as desperate,
and (2) support for the AMIS forces who had not been paid
since January. Kouchner said that UNSYG Ban Ki-moon had
accepted to attend, as well as the Chinese, though he was not
convinced that the FM would really come. He expressed deep
frustration that there would be no Africans present at the
conference.

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IRAN
--------------


15. (C) Kouchner pushed back on Burns' proposal that the USG
and Europe implement sanctions against Iran outside the
framework of the UN Security Council if China and Russia
proved unwilling to cooperate fully, insisting that sanctions
were ineffective and "cannot get what we need." The Minister
counseled that pressure on the regime had to come from inside
the country, and that our strategy had to include talking to
Iran and the Iranian people -- whom he judged to be largely
against the Ayatollahs. Kouchner insisted that while they
might not talk to the USG, they would talk to France.


16. (C) Burns explained that U.S. policy on Iran was clear --
Iran would not become a nuclear military power, and the
United States would not talk to Iran directly until it
suspended enrichment. Use of force, while a last resort,
would not be taken off the table. Solana, Burns said, had
warned the Secretary the previous day that he did not believe
Larijani was prepared to make any concessions. Everyone,
Burns stressed, was now against Iran, and sanctions could
help to couple economic and political pressure on the regime.
Kouchner suggested that the Iran issue would require further
discussion. COMMENT: Araud openly disagreed with Kouchner's
characterization of sanctions and their impact. Kouchner's
comments appeared to be more of a critique of U.S. and EU-3
policy since the crisis began; he offered no operational way
forward. Kouchner's presentation did not track with the
existing French approach on holding Iran firmly to its IAEA
and UNSC commitments. Kouchner's negativism on sanctions
also contrasted with Diplomatic Advisor Levitte's views
(septel). END COMMENT

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DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
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17. (C) Kouchner described the Socialist Party (PS) as near
its end while fighting out an internal battle. A new party
would emerge, but he was not convinced of its ability to
build a strong coalition. He described Segolene Royal as
childish, and mocked her current politicking. Kouchner said
that the Sarkozy administration had a solid mandate for
moving forward on the domestic front, but that he didn't
expect any major new foreign policy changes, only different
approaches. For the moment, he noted, his only major foreign
policy difference with Sarkozy was over Turkey's European
vocation. Kouchner off-handedly commented that he could
imagine resigning from the government if he were to disagree
with Sarkozy on a issue of serious principle.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON