Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS2643
2007-06-19 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

YOUR JUNE 24-25 VISIT TO PARIS

Tags:  PREL FR EUN NATO UNO UNMIK YI RS IR IS LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 002643 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR, NEA, AF, AND OES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO UNO UNMIK YI RS IR IS LE
KPAL, SENV, SU, ECON, ETRD
SUBJECT: YOUR JUNE 24-25 VISIT TO PARIS


Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 002643

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR, NEA, AF, AND OES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO UNO UNMIK YI RS IR IS LE
KPAL, SENV, SU, ECON, ETRD
SUBJECT: YOUR JUNE 24-25 VISIT TO PARIS


Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) Madam Secretary:
You will be arriving in a France whose mood is up-beat for
the first time in years. Sarkozy's energy and determination
to meet challenges head-on and break with the past have
lifted national morale. His resounding presidential victory
May 6 -- notwithstanding the French electorate's decision in
the June 17 legislative elections to bolster the Socialist
opposition -- has given Sarkozy a broad-based mandate to
undertake long overdue economic and social reforms. Sarkozy
hopes that his upcoming whirlwind of reform -- on a range of
areas from taxes and labor markets to university admissions
-- will trigger a "shock of confidence" that will lead to
increased national productivity and competitiveness.
Sarkozy's larger goals are to adapt France to globalization
and to renew the country's confidence in itself as an
international actor. To achieve them, he is seeking renewed
economic growth to reduce France's chronically high
unemployment rate (especially for youth) and to win
maneuvering room to address the economic and social
rigidities that have caused France to languish for a
generation. Although it is difficult to predict at this
stage how much popular resistance he will encounter, Sarkozy
is off to a fast start. That same dynamism is also infusing
France's international engagement, magnified still further by
Foreign Minister Kouchner's iconoclastic, trademark activism.


2. (C) We have gotten off to a good start with the new
Sarkozy administration. From the President on down, France's

new leaders are pledging a relationship of mutual confidence
and continuing close coordination on most of the issues that
matter: Lebanon/Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Russia,
Darfur, and counter-terrorism. For our part, Secretary Gates
and U/S Burns have sent a loud and clear message about
France's importance to the U.S., and our proposal for a ship
visit by the nuclear carrier Enterprise has been welcomed by
Defense Minister Morin. Tone will not always translate into
substance: Sarkozy has continued to make the point that
friendship does not mean automatic alignment with the U.S.
France will continue to develop its own positions based on
its own analyses of situations and its understanding of
French interests. We nonetheless believe that the French
will be less inclined than in the recent past to take a
position at variance with ours simply in order to assert
France's difference. (In that regard, they have already
promised a less theological approach to NATO.) We are also
finding it easier to engage practically with the new
government, ranging from easier access to franker exchanges.


3. (C) All that said, France's early initiatives -- on
Lebanon, Syria, Kosovo, and Darfur -- were launched with
insufficient coordination. Sarkozy's and Kouchner's activism
and the strength of their convictions also make them partners
that are not always easy to manage even when they do
coordinate with us. Sarkozy has effectively built up
critical support for a June 21-22 EU Council decision on a
simplified treaty on EU institutional reforms, putting France
back at the center of EU decision-making, shifting the burden
for any failure to others, and potentially enabling the EU to
speak with a louder voice on the international stage. But
his adamant opposition to Turkish EU accession, and his push
for a Mediterranean Union including Turkey as a (poor)
substitute, threaten to antagonize a strategic Ally. Initial
indications were that Sarkozy would allow accession
negotiations to proceed so long as three EU chapters not
related directly to accession were left unopened. There are
signs now, however, that Sarkozy may veto opening a chapter
related to monetary union. The spillover from EU-Turkish
tensions continues to bedevil NATO-EU cooperation and has
prompted the Turks to withdraw blanket overflight clearance
for French ISAF flights.


4. (C) Sarkozy is pushing an impressive domestic economic
reform agenda, but he is no free-trader. He lacks the ties
to France's agricultural sector of his predecessor, but his
rhetoric in defense of French agricultural interests has been
as strong as that of President Chirac. As Finance Minister,
Sarkozy energetically defended the government's bailout of
French industrial giant Alstom before EU competition
authorities. Sarkozy has generally indicated that he sees a
role for the state in promoting national -- or European --

PARIS 00002643 002 OF 004


corporate "champions."


5. (C) FM Kouchner has taken advantage of your visit to
schedule a Darfur ministerial on his signature issue of the
moment. We have an interest in using your bilateral meetings
with Kouchner and President Sarkozy to follow up on U/S
Burns' June 12-13 meetings by taking Sarkozy up on his word
"to help us get out of Iraq"; reviewing the evolving
situation in Lebanon and Kouchner's proposal for a national
dialogue under his personal aegis; planning next steps on
Iran; charting our strategy on Kosovo; and discussing Russia
management. We would expect the French side to raise the
Palestinian crisis and climate change. Your discussions with
Defense Minister Morin can build on Secretary Gates' June 6
meeting to reaffirm that France will stay the course in
Afghanistan and to discuss the need for good NATO-EU
coordination in any Kosovo settlement follow-up.


6. (C) Iraq: It is not too early to engage President
Sarkozy's government on providing more help to Iraq,
suggesting four specific contributions:
-- First, France should commit to maintain its
ambassador/embassy in Iraq for at least the next year. This
battle was in fact already fought and won in the French
bureaucracy earlier this year, but we should get a commitment
against the day when there may be a clamor to reduce France's
diplomatic presence.
-- Second, France should issue a statement in support of
national reconciliation in Iraq within the context of Iraq's
constitutional, elected government. The French recognize the
need for reconciliation in principle, but need to replace
calls for international conferences that might or might not
supplant Iraq's elected government and its constitution with
helpful statements that support Iraqi sovereignty.
-- Third, France should reinforce our message by telling Iran
to match its actions in Iraq to its declared policy. This
would be consistent with France's advocacy of dialogue with
Iran for the purpose of encouraging it to behave more
responsibly in the region.
-- Fourth, France should make an additional, concrete
contribution to assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan. France has
already donated one million euros, but more humanitarian
assistance will help the Jordanians as well as the Iraqis.


7. (C) Lebanon/Syria: France is sending two contradictory
signals to the Lebanese: On the one hand, they say that
French policy has not changed; on the other hand, they alter
that message by saying Sarkozy will not be so tightly allied
with the Hariris. The Lebanese and Syrians are ignoring the
first message and focusing on the second. Sarkozy's offer to
begin a dialogue with Syria, Michel Aoun's visit to Paris
(where he met twice with FM Kouchner),and FM Kouchner's
proposed Lebanese dialogue (with the inclusion of Hizballah)
have all contributed to the perception that France is
drifting away from March 14. The good news is that our
concerns have registered with the French, who have been at
pains recently to assure us of their desire for continued
cooperation, and that FM Kouchner personally canceled
Ambassador Cousseran's scheduled visit to Damascus on June 16
after the assassination of Walid Eido and invited Lebanese PM
Siniora to visit Paris before the end of the month. But
Kouchner currently intends to go ahead with the Paris
conference. We need to impress on them that their hasty
outreach to the Lebanese opposition is demoralizing March 14
and that the murder of Walid Eido is Bashar's way of testing
Sarkozy. If the French blink, Bashar wins.


8. (C) Iran: The French are ready to press for an ambitious
third UNSC sanctions resolution, and we should seek their
help in building international support for it. They also
understand the importance of non-UN sanctions, and will cite
the cuts they've already made in export credits, as well as
the reduction in French banking ties to Iran. We should
encourage them to do more, while respecting their view that
we should be discreet about such measures so as not to
undermine ourselves in the Security Council. They may
express concern about whether Congress will impose sanctions
on European firms doing business with Iran; such sanctions,
they believe, would be disastrous to the unity we have
carefully built.


9. (C) Afghanistan: France has assured us that it will

PARIS 00002643 003 OF 004


maintain its military commitment in Afghanistan. It warns us
that European support for military engagement is fragile, and
posits a need to begin to frame an eventual exit strategy
since "neither side can win." As a gesture of solidarity,
France now plans to increase the number of French
"Operational and Mentoring and Liaison Teams," or OMLTs, from
one to four. Although he has not rejected outright leading a
PRT, Sarkozy prefers a sector-based assistance approach to a
geographic contribution. But he is nonetheless studying the
option, and you can offer further encouragement. More
importantly, your visit provides an opportunity to confront
French and European wobbliness over remaining in Afghanistan
until the job is done.


10. (C) Kosovo: Your meeting with Sarkozy is an opportunity
to obtain his firm commitment to our current Kosovo strategy,
including the GOF's recognition of an independent Kosovo in
the event we cannot secure an acceptable UNSCR in the face of
Russian opposition. Sarkozy believes that everything is
negotiable so long as Kosovo achieves independence in the
end. FM Kouchner believes it is also important that the West
be seen to be making every conceivable attempt to get the
Russians to abstain on a UNSC Resolution providing the legal
basis for recognizing Kosovo's independence and for a NATO/EU
military presence there. If additional negotiations fail to
produce an agreement with the Russians, France would prefer
not to push the draft resolution to a vote, and would be
prepared to join us in recognizing Kosovo's independence at
the appropriate time.


11. (C) Russia: We expect Russia policy under Sarkozy to be
more coordinated with the EU, with less consideration for
Chirac's France/Germany/Russia axis. The French have no
illusions about Russia -- on Kosovo, MD, Iran, or even CFE,
not to mention human rights and democracy -- and its wedge
tactics. The GOF advocates finding a middle road between
"complacency and confrontation." They will want to reward
the Russians if they cooperate on Kosovo, and avoid irking
them further if they do not (for instance when it comes to
NATO/Georgia). They may argue for increased flexibility on
CFE given our firm position on MD, and their sensitivity to
Russia's fear of encirclement. Despite the increased
prominence Sarkozy has given to human rights, he is still
seeking a positive relationship with Putin, albeit with only
limited success. Despite these nuances, he will be open to
your arguments about the need to deal with the Russians with
firmness as necessary.


12. (C) Darfur Conference: Darfur has taken on remarkable
prominence in French public opinion, and Kouchner wants a
deliverable as a demonstration of French leadership. The
Ministerial will bring together the P-5 and other G-8
countries, the UN, and China, in addition to lead (primarily
European) donor partners. African participation may be
limited to Egypt and the Bank of African Development; African
Union Chairperson Konare has endorsed the event but does not
plan on AU participation, because of its non-African venue.
The Ministerial will highlight the need for a coherent
political process on Darfur, address the humanitarian and
security dimensions of the crisis, and emphasize its regional
character -- the spillover into eastern Chad and the Central
African Republic. On June 17 the French military began a
food airlift to Darfur refugees and Chadian IDPs within
Eastern Chad. This may grow into a short-term French and
European military protection effort that would later
transition to UN leadership.


13. (C) Climate Change: Sarkozy signaled during his
election victory speech that climate change was his top
priority, and he called on the U.S. "to take the lead" in the
fight against global warming. The President's proposal for
nationally determined emission reduction targets that would
involve China and India among others and approach to the
issue at the G8 Summit is gradually forcing France and others
to take a more realistic approach. Sarkozy may nonetheless
continue to advocate binding constraints on greenhouse gas
emissions as a necessary ingredient of a post-2012 Kyoto
follow-on agreement in order to defend Europe's CO2 emissions
trading system (ETS). You can impress on Sarkozy the U.S.'s
interest in intensifying collaboration with France in
developing climate-friendly energy technologies and in
sharing approaches to energy efficiency.

PARIS 00002643 004 OF 004




14. (C) Palestinian Crisis: Your French hosts will want to
learn more about the U.S. approach to dealing with the
current Palestinian crisis, and will want to exchange views
on how to stabilize the situation in the Palestinian
Territories. They will be looking for ways to reinforce
Abbas, but may be reticent about publicly endorsing his
emergency cabinet or adopting tough measures against Hamas.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON