GOF: KAKAHK 2009 OSCE BID AND MORE ENGAGEMENT IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002516

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO OSCE ZK EU GM FR
SUBJECT: GOF: KAKAHK 2009 OSCE BID AND MORE ENGAGEMENT IN
CENTRAL ASIA

REF: A. PARIS 2197


B. STATE 80727

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Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The MFA's Central Asia desk officer told us
June 11 that the GOF's relationship with Central Asia was
changing, but not dramatically. The key element: Central
Asia policy would no longer depend on Chirac's personal
relationship with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev. France
was working closely with the EU, and would continue to
support EU Special Representative for the region (and retired
French diplomat) Pierre Morel as he undertook to implement
the soon-to-be adopted EU Central Asia strategy. After 14
years of neither a French Presidential nor Foreign Minister
visit to the region, the its 2008 EU Presidency was an
opportunity for France to show a little more interest. The
GOF has not yet come to a policy decision on Kazakhstan's
2009 OSCE chairmanship bid, notwithstanding former FM
Douste-Blazy's December 2006 EU intervention in apparent
support of the Kazakhs.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Poloff also sought and obtained the
GOF's support in convincing SCO countries to avoid any
negative positioning on U.S. and allied military
installations in Central Asia (ref B). END SUMMARY.

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INCREASED ENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA
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3. (C) MFA Central Asia desk officer, Helene Roos, told
poloff on June 11 that the GOF's relationship with Central
Asia was changing with the new French government, while
cautioning us not to expect a dramatic shift, given that the
region was still "quite far from Paris." Chirac's
relationship with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev had long
defined the GOF's engagement in Central Asia, she said, and
so Chirac's departure naturally meant a shift in perspective.
While the GOF would still likely follow the German "lead" in
the region, it would also be playing a key role in
implementing the EU Central Asia strategy on the ground.


4. (C) France, she explained, will hold the local EU
Presidency in Astana and Ashgabat from July 2007 through
December 2008, and would also hold the local EU Presidency in
Dushanbe and Tashkent from January 2008 through December

2008. (Note: Portugal and Slovenia do not have embassies in
Central Asia, and therefore need a local representative
during their EU presidencies. France will fill this role in
the lead up to its own presidency in July 2008-December 2008.
France's accredited Ambassador to Bishkek is in Astana.)
France, she said, recently passed the message to Central
Asian governments that neither a French President nor a
Foreign Minister had visited the region in 14 years and that
the GOF saw the EU presidency as a possible opportunity to
step up engagement.

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KAZAKHSTAN 2009 OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP BID
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5. (C) Roos informed us that the GOF had taken no formal
position on Kazakhstan's candidacy for the 2009 OSCE
chairmanship. Despite former FM Douste-Blazy's December 2006
EU intervention on the subject, which some Kazakhs
interpreted as a de-facto endorsement of their candidacy,
France continued to carefully study the issue. Some in the
MFA, she said, believed that supporting Kazakhstan's 2009 bid
was particularly important to Russia's support for the OSCE
during a difficult and complicated period (see reftel A).
Others, she insisted, were not convinced of this argument. FM
Kouchner did not yet appear wedded to either position.


6. (C) Roos said that the GOF, like others, had tried to
encourage the Kazakhs to withdraw their candidacy while they
instituted democratic reforms, but that this strategy did not
appear to be productive. She asked if the U.S. had engaged
the Kazakhs on the substance of their proposed chairmanship.
Roos argued that positive engagement with the Kazakhs on

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their substantive program might demonstrate our commitment to
their candidacy in principle-- something that could help us
argue for delay. Roos also stressed that Astana's complete
lack of substantive proposals for its chairmanship provided
additional reasons to ask the Kazakhs to withdraw their 2009
bid and delay until 2011. 2011 was the latest possible date,
she added, as Nazarbayev is not likely to relent unless he
has sufficient confidence that the Kazakhstan chairmanship
would occur before Nazarbayev's reelection campaign in 2012.


7. (C) The Germans, Roos insisted, were the key in obtaining
EU support for a recommendation to Astana that it withdraw
its candidacy for 2009. The GOF, she said, would not want to
risk further EU divisions concerning Central Asia, and was in
a difficult position as long as Germany supported Astana's
bid. She explained that following the renewal of sanctions
against Uzbekistan, many of her contacts (including the
Uzbeks) confirmed that Berlin informed Tashkent that the
renewal was "not our fault" and "against our counsel." Roos
suggested that Paris could probably still be convinced to put
more pressure on the Kazakhs if Berlin showed some movement
in its position. Roos very frankly noted that most GOF
officials did not believe a Kazakh chairmanship was ideal for
the OSCE, but that the organization might face more damage if
only a handful of Western countries opposed the Kazakh bid.
EU unity on the issue, she added, would probably be the only
way France could oppose Kazakh's candidacy.

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HELLO ASHGABAT, WE'RE BACK
--------------


8. (C) Engaging Turkmenistan, Roos told us, was a key element
in France's thinking about Central Asia. Like many U.S.
officials, Roos said she believed that there was a window of
opportunity to engage Ashgabat in constructive dialogue and
promote reform. As the local EU President in Ashgabat for
the next 18 months, the GOF was examining its priorities in
line with the EU strategy, Roos said, and she hoped that
Washington and Paris would increase their cooperation in the
country. Turkmen officials, she added, never failed to point
out that high ranking U.S. diplomats were in Ashgabat "every
month." Roos informed us that Turkmen FM Rashid Meredov
would likely be coming to France in October, followed by
Turkmen President Berdimuhammedov in November 2007. The
French FM may return the visit during France's EU Presidency
(July-December 2008). A Presidential visit by Sarkozy has
not been ruled out, but is not cuurently in the works.

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SCO
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9. (S//NF) Poloff informed Roos that the U.S. would be
encouraging Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members
to avoid any statements or actions during their August 2007
meeting that might complicate the use of military bases in
Central Asia for countries participating in Operation
Enduring Freedom (ref B). Roos noted that she understood the
importance of Manas Air Base and said that the French base in
Dushanbe was also vital to their contributions in
Afghanistan. France, she added, supported our efforts without
any reservations. Roos agreed that unity on the issue was
important and would see if a similar demarche by the GOF
could be delivered.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) Roos seemed to indicate that some new GOF officials
could still be convinced to put additional pressure on
Kazakhstan to withdraw its bid for the 2009 OSCE
chairmanship. Without a change in Berlin's position,
however, Paris does not seem likely to use its political
capital on this particular issue.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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