FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE IRAQ COALITION

S E C R E T PARIS 001659

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PM/RSAT AND NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/25/2017
TAGS: PREL IZ MARR MAS MOPS PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE IRAQ COALITION

REF: STATE 54925

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Embassy Paris has regularly engaged the GoF on
possibilities for French participation in the Iraq coalition,
but has made little headway given President Chirac's
original, adamant opposition to the war. Although the French
have generally tried since then to avoid provoking the U.S.,
and to indicate that they understand the dangers of a
precipitate U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, in fact they have done
little more than pay lip service to the idea that French
interests are also at stake.


2. (S) If anything, the French have grown more reticent about
Iraq in the final days of Chirac's presidency: The French
have taken off the table their long-standing offer to train
Iraqi security forces in France; they have canceled plans to
open a regional embassy office in Irbil; and they came fairly
close to reducing or eliminating their diplomatic presence in
Baghdad (an effort that was abandoned only after the French
Ambassador in Baghdad strenuously objected to having been cut
out of the policy discussion in Paris). A change in French
policy is not in prospect before Chirac leaves the Elysee in
mid-May.


3. (S) Although Chirac's departure may open the door to an
eventual reconsideration of France's position, the likelihood
of change remains limited in the short-term. We will
therefore need to think strategically about when and how to
engage on Iraq with France's new president, framing our
requests in a manner consonant with French political
realities. It would, for example, likely prove futile -- and
counterproductive -- to welcome a new French government with
a request to put French boots on the ground in Iraq. The
overwhelming majority of the French public believes that
Chirac's opposition to the Iraq war has been vindicated by
subsequent events, a view that has also been endorsed by the
two remaining presidential candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy and
Segolene Royal. Neither candidate, if elected, would derive
any political benefit from reversing that position. To the
contrary, Royal would likely face a revolt within her own
party, and Sarkozy (who is already under fire from the left
for being too pro-American),would risk confirming himself as
Washington's toady.


3. (S) A more realistic set of goals might include persuading
the French to be more supportive of Iraq within an EU
context, including by intensifying their civilian
capacity-building efforts. We could help lay the groundwork
by assisting the GOI to do a better job of screening
potential civil service candidates before sending them
overseas (France's Inter-Ministerial Coordinator for Iraq
Reconstruction, Jean-Pierre Guinhut, recently complained to
us that a batch of Iraqi civil servants sent for training in
France included a "60-year-old sheikh who spoke no language
other than Arabic, and even that badly"). We might also
encourage the French to offer further humanitarian assistance
to Iraqi refugees. In time, and particularly as progress is
made on national reconciliation and the transfer of security
control to the Iraqis (which may help reverse the French
perception that Iraq is not yet fully sovereign),we might
persuade the French to renew their offer of training for the
Iraqi security services or possibly to engage more
substantially with the NATO training mission in Iraq. Post
will provide further analysis of the possibilities for French
engagement once we move past the presidential election and
the new government takes office.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

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