C.A.R.: FRENCH HOPEFUL BUT NOT CONVINCED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001623

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS CT FR
SUBJECT: C.A.R.: FRENCH HOPEFUL BUT NOT CONVINCED
REGARDING PEACE INITIATIVES

REF: A. BANGUI 61


B. BANGUI 62

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA C.A.R. desk officer Daniel Westerink
on April 28 said that the GOF was encouraged by the recent
peace pact engineered by President Bozize and UFDR leader
Damane but was not convinced that this arrangement would
prove significant because of uncertainty over whether other
UFDR elements would respect it. Westerink provided details
about French military deployments in C.A.R. and of France's
desire to have FOMUC, perhaps at the beginning of 2008,
extend its area of operations eastward, to include Birao,
which would allow the French to withdraw French forces from
Birao and ensconce them at the French base near the Bangui
airport. The GOF, however, faced questions about FOMUC's
future (whether it would continue to be a CEMAC operation or
whether ECCAS might also become involved). Moreover,
Westerink reported EU misgivings about extending FOMUC's area
of responsibility, as this might conflict or overlap with
planning for an international peacekeeping force along the
C.A.R.-Sudan-Chad borders. Westerink made clear that
reducing the French role in backstopping the C.A.R. military
in Birao was a high French priority. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MFA C.A.R. desk officer Daniel Westerink on April 18
offered comments on the recent peace agreement brokered by
President Bozize and UFDR leader Damane (reftels) in Birao
within the Syrte process. Westerink said that the deal
offered hope but that France was reserving judgment in order
to see if the arrangement proved to be real and effective.
He noted that many "arrangements" and "deals" of this type,
large and small, had been concluded in recent years in that
part of Africa and that many had turned out to be
meaningless, with neither side respecting them practically
from the moment they had been signed. This agreement, he
said, might prove to be different, but only time would tell.
Westerink said that an important concern was that UFDR
elements imprisoned in Cotonou would reject Damane's deal
outright, just as they had rejected the Syrte formula on
previous occasions.


3. (C) Westerink commented that Bozize did not help matters
by celebrating, on March 15, the fourth anniversary of his
coming to power. That he came to power by leading an armed
rebellion, and was now celebrating that victory, was not the
kind of signal one should send when confronted by, and at the
same time trying to make peace with, rebel elements seeking
to accomplish the same thing, Westerink observed dryly.

FRENCH FORCES


4. (C) Westerink said that France did not want Birao to
become a permanent, or quasi-permanent, base for French
troops. France would be willing to send troops there to
reinforce the C.A.R. military as needed, but wanted to keep
them stationed near Bangui. (NOTE: According to DAO
sources, reported septel, the French may be willing to remain
in Birao until the rainy season is in full swing late in May,
effectively ending any combat in the region. The French may
leave a forward air controller in the area indefinitely, for
close air support, or until FOMUC or other forces are capable
of securing Birao. DAO septel report will contain more
precise figures on French forces and their disposition. END
NOTE.)

FOMUC


5. (C) One way to facilitate the departure of French forces
from Birao would be to have FOMUC extend its areas of
operation into eastern C.A.R., including Birao. Westerink
said that France was pursuing this possibility and hoped to
achieve FOMUC's acceptance when its mandate would be renewed
at the beginning of 2008. He said it was too late to
accomplish this by the time of the next mandate extension in
June 2007.


6. (C) However, the question of whether FOMUC would remain
a CEMAC operation or become, in whole or part, an ECCAS
operation (CEEAC in French),was a complication, Westerink
noted. While ECCAS, which includes more countries than CEMAC
and which covers a broader geographic area, might present

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advantages, it posed several problems as well. First, it was
less France-oriented. The CEMAC countries were all members
of the franc zone and were well versed in French thinking,
concerns, and ways and means. This was not the case with the
ECCAS countries. Moreover, Rwanda was a member of ECCAS,
and, given the poor state of Rwanda-France relations, could
serve as an obstacle regarding anything France might want to
accomplish with ECCAS regarding C.A.R. Westerink indicated
that the GOF was continuing to think of ways to extend
FOMUC's range, taking into account the possible effects of
CEMAC and/or ECCAS involvement.

EUROPEAN UNION


7. (C) A further issue, Westerink mentioned, was the EU,
which had expressed concern about FOMUC's operating in
eastern C.A.R. Although he did not specify or provide
details about the EU's interest, Westerink indicated that
Brussels may worry that any expansion of FOMUC's area of
operations in eastern C.A.R. could complicate planning for
the deployment of an international peacekeeping force into
the tri-border area of eastern and northeastern C.A.R.,
possibly as a part of a larger peacekeeping plan involving
Chad and Sudan as well as C.A.R.


8. (C) COMMENT: Westerink made clear that relieving France
of the duty of backstopping the C.A.R. military in Birao is a
high French priority. Accomplishing that without leaving
C.A.R. vulnerable at that strategic location is proving to be
difficult and may take many months, if Westerink's scenario
develops as he described it. That said, it appears that the
French are willing to provide assistance to Birao if
circumstances require during the interim. END COMMENT.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

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