Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS1587
2007-04-19 15:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

COTE D'IVOIRE: FRENCH REMAIN WARY, INTEND TO

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS IV FR 
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VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #1587/01 1091532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191532Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6626
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3728
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1213
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001587 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IV FR
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FRENCH REMAIN WARY, INTEND TO
REMAIN ENGAGED

REF: A. ABIDJAN 347

B. PARIS 1067

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt,
1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001587

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IV FR
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FRENCH REMAIN WARY, INTEND TO
REMAIN ENGAGED

REF: A. ABIDJAN 347

B. PARIS 1067

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt,
1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA Cote d'Ivoire desk officer Charlotte
Montel said on April 18 that outward signs in Cote d'Ivoire
remained positive but that France remained wary that the
situation could take a turn for the worse. The GOF was not
convinced of President Gbagbo's good intentions over the long
term and questioned the motives behind PM Soro's decision to
work alongside Gbagbo. While France was thankful that the
Ouagadougou Accord provided a framework for a drawdown of
Operation Licorne, Montel said that France would remain
engaged in Cote d'Ivoire -- "don't think we are cutting and
running." Montel denied that Minister-Delegate Girardin's
absence at the April 13 IWG meeting in Abidjan -- monthly
meetings where she had been a driving force -- indicated
flagging French engagement. Gbagbo also had a stake in
preserving a French commercial presence, even as he cheered
at the departure of French troops. Montel stressed the need
for the international community to work together to ensure a
smooth transition. She commented that the political class in
Paris, on the eve of presidential elections, was relieved
that Cote d'Ivoire had not turned into a campaign issue, and
that France, post-Chirac, would not likely be faced with an
immediate new crisis there. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Charlotte Montel, MFA desk officer for Cote
d'Ivoire, on April 18 provided a review of events since the
Ouagadougou Accord. She said that, to everyone's pleasant
surprise, events were unfolding positively, citing Force
Nouvelle leader Guillaume Soro's decision to become Prime
Minister, the termination of the Zone of Confidence, and
other measures indicative of an end to the long civil war and
partition of the country. Having been among those most
interested in resolving Cote d'Ivoire's problems as well as a
direct participant in many recent pivotal events (the
November 2004 bombing incident, for example),France was in
no position to offer much public criticism of developments


since Ouagadougou, Montel observed. "At least on the
surface, Gbagbo's done a lot that we've wanted him to do, or
hoped he would do."

"TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE?"


3. (C) Still, she said, French wariness remained high. "It
has almost been too good to be true," Montel commented.
French concern centered on Gbagbo's real intentions and
whether or not he was committed to democratic reform, she
said. He had proven to be an adept survivor and skillful
manipulator of events and perceptions, generally in ways that
enhanced his own power and the likelihood that he would
retain it. She wondered as well how Gbagbo had enticed Soro
to work with him and about the possible promises and deals
they had arranged for their mutual benefit. Montel said that
there was much that did not add up but that it was hard to
criticize the unity they presented to the public.

FRANCE TO REMAIN ENGAGED


4. (C) Montel emphasized that France would remain engaged
in Cote d'Ivoire and that post-Ouagadougou indications (in
some cases generated by French officials, e.g., reftels) that
France would seek a quick exit had unfortunately sent the
wrong signals. Montel said that one had to bear in mind that
for several generations, Cote d'Ivoire had been one of
France's colonial jewels in Africa, and continued to serve as
a major, if not the major, hub of France's African presence
after decolonization. Many Quai diplomats had worked on or
served in Cote d'Ivoire during their careers. There was a
strong institutional attachment to it running through the
MFA, and there were many French businesses, institutions, and
private citizens with longstanding ties as well. "Don't
think we are cutting and running," she stressed. The
Ouagadougou Accord provided a framework for a drawdown of
Operation Licorne, but the French would continue all
commitments to UNOCI and undertake to fulfill Licorne's other
missions.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO WORK TOGETHER


5. (C) In that regard, Montel said that the international
community needed to stay focused and work together. The
end-game in Cote d'Ivoire, if indeed that phase had begun,

needed to be coordinated carefully so that UNOCI, Licorne,
the elections process, the Special Representative's office,
and other international players remained in synch and
continued to function effectively as events warranted.
Tensions had perhaps dropped but that did not mean that the
several elements of the international community operating in
Cote d'Ivoire could all relax or become inattentive and
distracted by other problems.


6. (C) Montel said that the absence of Brigitte Girardin
(Minister-Delegate for Cooperation, Development, and
Francophonie) at the April 13 International Working Group
meeting should not be viewed as a lessening of French
interest either in Cote d'Ivoire or in the IWG. Montel
explained that Girardin did not attend the meeting because of
the French presidential election campaign (first round of
voting on April 22) and because Girardin, according to
Montel, "had gotten tired of being one of the few, if not the
only, minister-level representative at what was supposed to
be a ministerial-level forum." Girardin decided that she
could afford to skip the April 13 meeting.

FRENCH POLITICS


7. (C) Montel confided that Girardin had in effect become
the MFA's point person for all of sub-Saharan Africa.
Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy was neither experienced nor
interested much in Africa, save for the occasional high
visibility issue (e.g., Sudan/Darfur) or something that
touched on health care (he is a physician) or child soldiers
(one of his special interests). Girardin's oversight over
cooperation and development allowed her to take on the Africa
portfolio rather smoothly. Montel noted that Girardin was a
close personal ally of President Chirac and had few ties with
leading presidential contender Sarkozy, meaning that it was
not likely she would obtain a high position in a Sarkozy
government. Montel said that Girardin had been concerned
that Cote d'Ivoire not explode into a crisis during these
final months and weeks of the campaign, both to spare Chirac
during his last days in office and to avoid the new
government's having to deal with a crisis upon entering
office. In that sense, all concerned were glad that Cote
d'Ivoire had been relatively quiet since Ouagadougou.


8. (C) Gbagbo too would benefit from the change in
leadership in France, Montel noted. The new team would
arrive not having experienced first-hand the drama of the
past few years, would encounter a happy and confident Gbagbo
seen as having successfully steered his country through a
difficult period, and might assume that the Cote d'Ivoire
problem had thankfully and largely been "solved" prior to the
new team's coming on board. "We will try to educate the new
team on Cote d'Ivoire's many problems but there's only so
much we can do without making the new team start viewing us
as ineffective pessimists," Montel said.

FRENCH PRESENCE IN COTE D'IVOIRE


9. (C) Montel noted Gbagbo's campaign to woo French
businesses and individuals who fled in 2004 to return to Cote
d'Ivoire. "He may not want Licorne, but he sure wants our
companies," Montel observed. She said that about 10,000
French left Cote d'Ivoire in 2004, out of about 18-20,000
then present. Those who left were either small
single-proprietor business people or individuals working for
large corporations obliged to protect their personnel. Those
who remained were either Franco-Ivoirians or French expats
who had lived in Cote d'Ivoire for many years and who were,
along with their families and businesses, well integrated
into Ivoirian society. Montel said there were no signs that
the small-business community was interested in returning but
she expected that those working for large corporations would
return once big business decided that conditions permitted a
resumption of operations.


10. (C) COMMENT: Montel took care to repeat on several
occasions three points during her comprehensive briefing: 1)
that uncertainty remains concerning Gbagbo's (and Soro's)
long-term intentions; 2) that France welcomes the
opportunities afforded by the Ouagadougou Accord, which
includes possible drawdowns, but that it intends to remain
engaged, to honor all of its commitments, and to consider
carefully any changes in its present posture; and 3) that the
international community needs to work together and remain in
synch as it contemplates tying up loose ends if Cote d'Ivoire
is indeed now entering the concluding phase of its civil war.

END COMMENT.



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