Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS1154
2007-03-23 16:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
TALIBAN EXCHANGE: FRANCE AGREES SERIOUS;
VZCZCXYZ0031 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHFR #1154 0821611 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 231611Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5915 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1955 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1698 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 0268 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0175 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0385 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0695 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0470
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001154
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREF PTER PREL AF IT NATO FR EUN
SUBJECT: TALIBAN EXCHANGE: FRANCE AGREES SERIOUS;
NON-COMMITTAL ON NEXT STEPS
REF: STATE 36204
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001154
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREF PTER PREL AF IT NATO FR EUN
SUBJECT: TALIBAN EXCHANGE: FRANCE AGREES SERIOUS;
NON-COMMITTAL ON NEXT STEPS
REF: STATE 36204
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
1. (C) POL Deputy delivered reftel demarche March 23 to
DAS-equivalent for Security Affairs Pierre Thenard and desk
officer Francois Revardeaux, highlighting (also to dispel
some press rumors that have circulated) failed U.S. attempts
to dissuade the Italians and Afghans from proceeding with
such an exchange, the negative precedent such an exchange set
in future hostage-taking situations, and the damaging impact
on Western security interests and troops on the ground. He
noted that the U.S. had protested to the Italians and the
Afghans and was asking France and other friends and allies to
do likewise, given that French interests were also involved.
2. (C) Thenard listened carefully to the presentation and
indicated that he would "pass up the line" to the foreign
minister's staff the depth of U.S. concern. He agreed that
the Italo-Afghan deal, in going far beyond ransom payments,
had added a new, "political" dimension to hostage taking. At
the same time, he half apologized for the Italians in
claiming that, unlike the "more stoic" USG, European
governments were much more susceptible to the pressures of
public opinion in dealing hostage-taking. He repeated that
he would nonetheless inform his superiors of U.S. concerns.
3. (C) POL Deputy reiterated his hope that the GOF would not
only register our preoccupation, but also take action itself
in approaching the Italian and Afghani governments to protest
their actions. Thenard suggested that this might have
already occurred, at least with Italy and on an informal
basis, while making clear that France would not likely take a
public position on the issue. POL Deputy repeated that the
U.S. fully expected France would take up the matter in
diplomatic channels only.
4. (C) Comment: The GOF seems intent on handling this issue
in "informal" channels, and made a point of specifying before
the meeting that it would be treated as an "exchange of
views" rather than as a formal demarche. Similarly, while
Thenard said "he would not be surprised" if the issue had
already been raised with the Italians (he did not mention the
Afghans),he stopped short of stating explicitly that this
had been the case. We suspect that the GOF, if it says
anything at all to the Italians, will want to do so quietly
and on its own terms without U.S. knowledge since Italy is a
fellow EU member state. That our interlocutor did not
mention the Afghans at all suggests that France is not
interested in approaching them bilaterally; it would remain
to be seen whether France would consider a multilateral
demarche by NATO/ISAF. End comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREF PTER PREL AF IT NATO FR EUN
SUBJECT: TALIBAN EXCHANGE: FRANCE AGREES SERIOUS;
NON-COMMITTAL ON NEXT STEPS
REF: STATE 36204
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
1. (C) POL Deputy delivered reftel demarche March 23 to
DAS-equivalent for Security Affairs Pierre Thenard and desk
officer Francois Revardeaux, highlighting (also to dispel
some press rumors that have circulated) failed U.S. attempts
to dissuade the Italians and Afghans from proceeding with
such an exchange, the negative precedent such an exchange set
in future hostage-taking situations, and the damaging impact
on Western security interests and troops on the ground. He
noted that the U.S. had protested to the Italians and the
Afghans and was asking France and other friends and allies to
do likewise, given that French interests were also involved.
2. (C) Thenard listened carefully to the presentation and
indicated that he would "pass up the line" to the foreign
minister's staff the depth of U.S. concern. He agreed that
the Italo-Afghan deal, in going far beyond ransom payments,
had added a new, "political" dimension to hostage taking. At
the same time, he half apologized for the Italians in
claiming that, unlike the "more stoic" USG, European
governments were much more susceptible to the pressures of
public opinion in dealing hostage-taking. He repeated that
he would nonetheless inform his superiors of U.S. concerns.
3. (C) POL Deputy reiterated his hope that the GOF would not
only register our preoccupation, but also take action itself
in approaching the Italian and Afghani governments to protest
their actions. Thenard suggested that this might have
already occurred, at least with Italy and on an informal
basis, while making clear that France would not likely take a
public position on the issue. POL Deputy repeated that the
U.S. fully expected France would take up the matter in
diplomatic channels only.
4. (C) Comment: The GOF seems intent on handling this issue
in "informal" channels, and made a point of specifying before
the meeting that it would be treated as an "exchange of
views" rather than as a formal demarche. Similarly, while
Thenard said "he would not be surprised" if the issue had
already been raised with the Italians (he did not mention the
Afghans),he stopped short of stating explicitly that this
had been the case. We suspect that the GOF, if it says
anything at all to the Italians, will want to do so quietly
and on its own terms without U.S. knowledge since Italy is a
fellow EU member state. That our interlocutor did not
mention the Afghans at all suggests that France is not
interested in approaching them bilaterally; it would remain
to be seen whether France would consider a multilateral
demarche by NATO/ISAF. End comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON