GENERAL OBERING'S MARCH 16 MISSILE DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001115

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: MARR MNUC PARM FR
SUBJECT: GENERAL OBERING'S MARCH 16 MISSILE DEFENSE
DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS (CORRECTED COPY)

REF: PARIS 1111

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1
.4 B/D

(U) CORRECTED COPY, this message replaces reftel.


1. (C) Summary: MOD and MFA officials welcomed briefings by
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director LT. General Obering on
March 16. The MOD was primarily in a listening mode, raising
only a few key questions. General Obering stressed that: 1)
the Iranian ICBM, IRBM, SRBM threat is real, growing and may
be non-deterable; 2) the European site will defend against
longer-range threats and can compliment NATO's Missile
Defense efforts; 3) the Missile Defense System has completed
numerous flight tests, which proves that the missile defense
system works; and, 4) the U.S. has and will continue to
engage with Russia. We will continue to be transparent with
NATO and Russia, Obering emphasized. MFA Director for
Strategic Affairs Philippe Carre agreed with U.S. assessments
of the threat from Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere, and
expressed support for the right of the United States to
defend itself with MD. Carre was noncommittal, however, on
General Obering's offer for the U.S. to work with French
experts and industry. He said France needed time to study
our MD program more closely, adding that regardless of who
wins the French Presidential elections, the new French
administration likely would seek a review of France's
security policies. U.S. presentations on MD could be
factored into the review.


2. (C) Carre saw a need for the U.S. and Europe to manage
carefully public diplomacy on MD, given clear Russian and
Chinese misperceptions about the U.S. MD program, especially
if the U.S. were seriously considering deployment of a radar
site in the Caucasus - a move Carre thought was unwise as it
would only aggravate the Russians. Separately, Carre observed
that the Chinese had told the French they believed that the
U.S. MD program was directed at China.


3. (C) In a reference to France's own nuclear defense policy,
Carre noted France thought MD could only complement, and not
be a substitute for, deterrence. Carre's most serious
objections centered on the eventual linkage between the U.S.
MD program with ongoing MD discussions at NATO. France
recognized that ultimately NATO would develop an MD program,
but for now advised the U.S. not to focus publicly on the
linkage between the two programs to avoid public splits among
Allies. End Summary.


MFA WORRIED ABOUT DIVISIONS AT NATO
--------------


4. (C) MFA Director for Strategic Affairs Philippe Carre
welcomed General Obering by observing that France has been
"thinking deeply" about missile defense and therefore had
appreciated U/S Edelman's offer in the fall of 2006 to brief
on the U.S. approach. Carre was accompanied by his deputy
Francois Richier, MFA desk officer for missile defense Arnaud
Mentre, and Navy Commander de Coriolis, representing the
office of the military advisor to the President at the Elysee.


5. (C) Following General Obering's thorough presentation on
the Iranian missile threat, which he suggested may be
non-deterable, as well as on the effectiveness of the U.S.
missile defense program, Carre said France would have no
public comments on the U.S. MD program, which it viewed as a
bilateral effort with the Czech Republic and Poland. France,
he added, did not believe that missile defense would become a
substitute for deterrence, but could understand its use as a
complement to deterrence. In any case, France accepted
missile defense as a reality, in part because MD is not
adequately covered by nonproliferation treaties, such as the
NPT.


6. (C) Carre voiced concerns pertaining to Russia, China, and
the linkage between the U.S.'s and NATO's MD programs.
Volunteering that the Russians would always find ways to be
difficult, and agreeing with General Obering that the
Russians had been amply briefed, Carre nonetheless cautioned
that it would be important to properly manage Russian
objections and misperceptions, especially if the U.S
envisioned placing a radar site in the Caucasus region, which

France believes Russia would find unacceptable. General
Obering clarified this last point by noting that an
additional site could be placed closer to the Iranian threat.
Obering also added that the U.S. has and will be transparent
with NATO and Russia.


7. (C) In terms of NATO's own MD program, Carre noted that
much work had been done at tactical levels, but no final
decisions had been taken on a program at Brussels. France
was satisfied with the current state of debate at NATO, he
added. In response to Carre's questions, General Obering
explained that the U.S. MD program had been designed to be
compatible with NATO's own system. A linkage between the two
programs was possible, he added. Carre said that NATO would
ultimately develop its own MD program, but he advised General
Obering against highlighting the likely linkages between the
two programs so as better to avoid the creation of divisions
among NATO allies. (Note: In a subsequent meeting with the
MFA desk officer following MD, he noted that given that
NATO's program has not yet reached the same levels of
development as that of the U.S., less public debate on NATO's
program at this time would help to calm Russian objections to
NATO activities on its borders. End note.)


8. (C) Turning to China, Carre informed General Obering that
the Chinese had conveyed to France their belief that the U.S.
MD program was directed at China. General Obering stated
that the U.S. program was not aimed at China but was intended
for the defense of the U.S., while providing a security
umbrella for most of its allies in Europe.

No Immediate Reaction to Cooperation Offer
--------------


9. (C) Carre had no immediate response to General Obering's
offer to work with France on MD. General Obering said the
U.S. valued French official and industry expertise in
companies such as Thales and EADS. The U.S. also would be
interested in the use of the French test site in Bordeaux.

MOD Thinking on U.S. Missile Defense
--------------


10. (C) Following introductory remarks by the MOD Deputy
Director for Strategic Affairs Admiral Saint Salvy, Robert
Ranquet, Engineer-General and advisor to Saint Salvy,
welcomed General Obering's presentation, but offered that
France "was not ready to engage in such a program," as it
prefers to contain threats through nuclear deterrence.
Additionally, he emphasized that France accepts the U.S.
right to develop its MD program. Also present at the meeting
from the French side were Major General of the Marines
Jean-Paul Faugre, Air Force Brigadier General Hendel Hugues,
and Col. Denis Milliot, head of the North American desk at
the MOD.


11. (C) Ranquet indicated the MOD was "puzzled about MD,"
because its preliminary assessment was that the Missile
Defense System was designed to counter a long-range threat,
but "would have limited impact to destroy shorter-range
missiles aimed at Paris or London." Second, he said the MOD
would welcome more information on how missile defense would
relate to NATO's program, as it was not clear whether the
U.S. viewed its MD program as a part of or a substitute for
NATO's own MD program. He then wondered whether the Russians
would be even less willing to accept a missile defense system
that was part of NATO, given their suspicious attitudes
toward the Alliance.


13. (C) Expanding on his presentation, General Obering
offered that MD would indeed protect Europe as well as the
U.S. and at Ranquet's request, promised more technical
discussions in the future, adding that he would be briefing
the NAC and NRC on April 19 on just this question. In terms
of MD's place in NATO, Obering explained that the U.S. had
invested $100 billion in MD since 1983 "and it would not be
fruitful for NATO to duplicate these expenses." He added
that there would nonetheless exist useful synergies with NATO
and MD's command and control would be streamlined with NATO
systems.


14. (C) Lastly, Ranquet said that while the MOD did not
understand Russia's aggressive response to the prospect of
missile defense and found Russia's means of communicating its

displeasure "unacceptable," but there clearly is a lack of
understanding -- both in Russia and among European publics.
He urged more diplomatic exchanges to counter
misapprehensions and applauded Obering's trip as a good
start.


15. (U) This message was cleared by General Obering's office.






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