DOD USDP EDELMAN AND FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001063

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL FR NATO PARM AF IZ IR MOPS MNUC KCFE
MARR
SUBJECT: DOD USDP EDELMAN AND FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR
ARAUD DISCUSS MISSILE DEFENSE, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, IRAN


Classified By: AMB Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: During a March 15 meeting with USDP Edelman,
MFA Political Director Araud accepted fully the U.S. right to
deploy MD in the Czech Republic and Poland while noting the
need for careful Russia management. Agreeing with Edelman
that this was more a problem of politics than physics, Araud
expressed concern that the U.S. might be considering
deployment of an MD element to Georgia and asked whether the
U.S. also had plans to push for Georgian participation in
NATO's MAP process in connection with the 2008 summit. Araud
responded to Edelman's description of PRT successes in
Afghanistan with a request for documentation and analysis of
PRTs that might serve to produce a more favorable GOF
attitude following the upcoming presidential elections,
reiterated familiar concerns about the need to keep France
and other NATO governments informed in advance of ISAF
operations, and said France would raise as a matter of
Alliance principle Turkey's denial of blanket authorization
for ISAF-related overflights at NATO if France and Turkey did
not reach an understanding soon. In response to Edelman's
briefing on the surge in Iraq, Araud agreed that Iran was
reassessing its operations in Iraq in response to the recent
operations against the IRGC(QF) in Iraq and the dispatch of a
second carrier battle group to the Gulf. However, he saw no
moderating of Iran's "obsession" with enrichment and said the
Iranian's were using Russia's current refusal to deliver fuel
as another argument for an indigenous capability. END
SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) DOD Under Secretary for Policy Eric Edelman and
Ambassador Stapleton met March 15 with MFA Political Director
Gerard Araud to discuss missile defense, Afghanistan, and the
situation in Iraq. Araud was joined by Policy Planning
A/S-equivalent Pierre Levy, IO PDAS-equivalent Marc
Giacomini, Strategic Affairs A/S-equivalent Philippe Carre,
Advisor to FM Douste-Blazy for Strategic Affairs and North
America Francois-Xavier Carrel-Billard, Nonproliferation
Affairs DAS-equivalent Philippe Errera, Strategic Affairs
office desk officer for missile defense issues Arnaud Mentre,
NATO desk officer for Afghanistan Xavier Chatel, and Special
Assistant to the Political Director Gael Veyssiere. POL/MC,
LtGen John Sattler of J-5, Military Assistant COL Tracy
Warren, LTC Nate Lucas of OSD, LTC Chad Lemond of DATT, and
POL Deputy (notetaker) accompanied Edelman.

MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


3. (S) Ambassador Edelman briefed on U.S. deployment plans,
explaining U.S. sites were optimal to intercept missiles from
North Korea but that the Czech and Polish sites were needed
to defend fielded forces and European allies against an
eventual Iranian threat. He reviewed U.S. efforts at
transparency within NATO and with Russia, including in the
NATO-Russia Council, and pointed out the contradiction
between Russian opposition to a U.S. site defending against
Iran and Russia's own claims that it needed to abrogate the
INF Treaty for the same reason, among others. Finally,
noting Russian statements that they would prefer a U.S. site
in the UK even if technically such a site would theoretically
enable interception of a Russian missile, he concluded that
the Russian problem appeared to be one of politics, not
physics.


4. (C) Araud responded that the U.S. had a right to defend
itself, that Poland and the Czech Republic were friends and
allies who had the right to agree to missile sites, and that
the Russian complaints and implicit threats were
unacceptable. He agreed that the Russian reaction was
political in essence, and, recounting Putin's ravings during
the most recent meeting of Foreign and Defense ministers in
Moscow, cited traditional Russian fears of encirclement close
to their "geopolitical borders" and their rekindled imperial
ambitions. The Poles and Russians attached a similar
importance to a U.S. presence -- if for opposite reasons.
But Russian reactions still needed to be taken into account,
since they had consequences for Europe. He said France's
position of calling for more dialogue reflected its status as
a concerned observer; while the Germans had perhaps
overreacted to the U.S. announcement, the situation created
was also uncomfortable for France. Edelman acknowledged the
concern and stressed the continuing importance the U.S.

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attached to cooperation with Russia on Iran, Kosovo, and
other issues.


5. (C) Carre asked whether Russia had accused the U.S. of
violating NATO commitments on stationing and infrastructure
on the territories of new members. Edelman responded that
the Russians had not yet raised the issue in any of his
conversations, adding that any deployment would involve
neither substantial forces nor bases.


6. (S) Edelman pointed out that the likelihood that any
potential Iranian missile would invariably cross Russian
territory, with the possibility of significant debris, might
yet persuade Russia to take a more cooperative approach.
Araud responded that concerns about debris, and the
possibility that a missile might be intercepted over German
territory, might help explain the stronger German reaction.

BUT WHAT ABOUT GEORGIA?
--------------


7. (S) Araud asked if, as has been reported, the U.S. was
thinking of basing a radar site in Georgia, commenting that
while the U.S. had the right to do so, this would be viewed
by Russia as a red flag. Edelman acknowledged that, to be
fully effective, the system would eventually need a forward
radar site, but this could be in Turkey, Georgia, or even
Azerbaijan. Noting that the Russians themselves had a radar
site in Azerbaijan, he explained to Araud that the U.S. at
one point had proposed a cooperative arrangement at the same
site with the Russians (the Russians had yet to respond).
Araud asked whether the U.S. would be pushing to admit
Georgia into the NATO MAP process in 2008, which he said
would pose new difficulties for Russia. Carre added that
eventual NATO membership for Ukraine was also a
consideration. Edelman registered the French concerns,
noting that Russia had not raised concerns about Georgia and
Ukraine in its discussions with the U.S. of MD.

AFGHANISTAN
--------------


8. (C) Edelman described the improving economic situation in
Afghanistan; noted his just-held talks with the Afghans on
security, economic development, counter-narcotics, and
governance; and noted the Administration's USDOL 11.8 billion
assistance request for Afghanistan. Afghan military
capabilities were improving, with police capabilities still
lagging. President Karzai was feeling encouraged by U.S. and
NATO support. Additional UK and Polish battalions would be
arriving soon in advance of any potential Taliban "spring
offensive." Edelman explained that this was not a "military"
campaign at all, but more a terrorist one directed against
schools, health clinics, police stations, and economic
development -- in short, the fundamentals of civilization.


9. (C) Edelman recounted his visit to a U.S.-led PRT in
Jalalabad, an operation which he described as proving
effective. In response to a number of Araud's questions,
Edelman explained how PRT activities were nested in brigades
in order to serve as an enabler for reconstructive activity.
Araud noted that the current French Administration "did not
believe in PRTs," but indicated that this might change after
the elections. He asked if the U.S. had documentation on and
analyses of the PRTs that it would be prepared to share (with
the eventual aim of changing minds). Edelman undertook to
provide him materials as quickly as possible. (NOTE: As a
first step, Post provided Araud's office March 16 with USIP
reports and USAID's June 2006 interagency study on PRTs in
Afghanistan.)


10. (S) Araud asked if the Achilles operation was a response
to current Taliban activity or was designed to preempt it.
Edelman and Gen Sattler explained that it was essentially
intelligence driven and designed to block Taliban
infiltration routes and protect infrastructure.
Carrel-Billard asked whether Afghan troops had a significant
role in the operations and were gradually taking over.
Edelman and Gen Sattler responded that Afghan troops fought
well, but that they lacked enablers and mobility; it was for
this reason that U.S. trainers were embedded in them.


11. (C) In a brief exchange, Araud reiterated familiar

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French concerns that French political authorities be informed
in advance of major ISAF operations. U.S. participants noted
that the issue had been raised and appeared to have been
satisfactorily addressed at the March 14 NAC.


12. (C) Edelman and Sattler noted that there would be a
rotary wing shortfall in the south with the rotation out of
U.S. equipment and hoped France might be able to think about
helping there or in other areas. Araud expressed the hope
that the U.S. properly recognized the contributions France
was already making, including the recent decision to move an
aircraft carrier into the Arabian Sea. Edelman assured him
that this was the case.


13. (C) Araud raised Turkey's decision to cease providing
blanket overflight authorization for ISAF missions, saying
that this affected Alliance operations and was therefore a
matter of principle. Edelman agreed with the French position
that Allies should adhere to their NATO responsibilities.
Araud expressed the hope that France and Turkey would resolve
their differences at a meeting scheduled for March 20. If
not, he said, France would take the issue to the NATO Council
(NAC).

IRAQ
--------------


14. (C) Edelman noted that while it was still early to draw
definitive conclusions about current operations in Baghdad,
the initial phases were proceeding well. Operations had
proceeded effectively, and there had been no political
interference by the PM with operations. Sectarian killings
had declined somewhat. Economic activity appeared to be on
the increase. On the political side, the hydrocarbon law had
passed the Council of Ministers, an important step forward.
The key to future success hinged on being able to build in
the areas cleared and held, but the U.S. had plans to deploy
ten additional PRTs in the near future.


15. (S) Araud asked about the Iranian role. Edelman noted
that, while an Iranian hand was still visible in IED attacks,
the U.S. decision to pursue Iranian agents more actively and
to deploy an aircraft carrier to the region appeared to be
have catalyzed a process of reassessment. Araud agreed,
affirming that Iran was worried about a possible military
operation. Edelman agreed this was probably the case, while
reiterating that the U.S. had no current plans for attacking
Iran. Araud discerned signs of Iranian willingness to
negotiate, although they continued to refuse suspension of
their nuclear activities. They were obsessed by enrichment,
he said, and were now citing the Russian refusal to deliver
fuel to Bushehr as a justification for an indigenous
capability.


16. (U) This message was cleared by USDP Edelman.




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STAPLETON