Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARAMARIBO501
2007-09-19 21:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paramaribo
Cable title:  

(C) SCENESETTER AND READ-AHEAD FOR THE VISIT OF DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES TO PARAMARIBO, SURINAME SATURDAY AFTERNOON OCTOBER 6, 2007

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR NS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2537
RR RUEHAO
DE RUEHPO #0501/01 2622109
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 192109Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9682
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1487
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 1163
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARAMARIBO 000501 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES
FROM AMBASSADOR LISA BOBBIE SCHREIBER HUGHES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, NS
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER AND READ-AHEAD FOR THE VISIT OF
DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES TO PARAMARIBO, SURINAME
SATURDAY AFTERNOON OCTOBER 6, 2007


CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR LBSH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARAMARIBO 000501

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES
FROM AMBASSADOR LISA BOBBIE SCHREIBER HUGHES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, NS
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER AND READ-AHEAD FOR THE VISIT OF
DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES TO PARAMARIBO, SURINAME
SATURDAY AFTERNOON OCTOBER 6, 2007


CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR LBSH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Everyone at Embassy Paramaribo
joins me in welcoming you to Suriname. During your half-
day visit we plan a bilateral meeting between yourself and
Surinamese Defense Minister Ivan Fernald (briefing
material will be sent SEPTEL),a short courtesy call
with Surinamese President Runaldo Ronald Venetiaan
(briefing material will be sent SEPTEL),and of course, a
visit, together with Minister of Defense Fernald, aboard the
USNS Comfort. END SUMMARY

--------------
Suriname Overview and International Relations
--------------

2. (SBU) Suriname, formerly known as Dutch Guiana and
independent from the Netherlands since 1975, lies on the
northeastern coast of South America. It is approximately
the size of Georgia, has a population of less than half a
million, and has traditionally been the Dutch-speaking
"misfit" of the Western Hemisphere. A member of the UN,
OAS, CARICOM, NAM, and the Islamic Conference,
Suriname's political traditions, culture, history, and
immigration ties are neither Spanish/Portuguese (like most
of South and Central America),nor British/French
(like most of the Caribbean). Although migration trends,
economic assistance, and remittances still keep Surinamers
looking to the Netherlands (home to an estimated 300,000
Dutch/Surinamese),historic resentments and ethnic and
cultural differences also mean that Suriname does not align
easily with Europe. Consequently, it seeks to expand
its ties with China, India, and Indonesia as part of a foreign
policy initiative to reduce dependency on the Dutch.

3. (SBU) In the region, Suriname has received sustained,
well-publicized medical assistance from Cuba, in part
funded by Venezuela. This very successful program seems
to be helping Cuba and Venezuela gain popular support
among ordinary Surinamers. Suriname enjoys good
relations with neighbors Brazil and France (French
Guiana). A bor
der dispute in the interior and a maritime
dispute (to be decided imminently by ILOS) complicates
Suriname's relationship with Guyana, and remains an
emotional issue for many Surinamers. An anti-Guyana bias
permeates Surinamese society, in part due to the border
dispute.

--------------
U.S.-Suriname Bilateral Relations
--------------

4. (SBU) Except in the 1980's, when then-military dictator
Desi Bouterse's friendly relationship with Daniel Ortega
and Fidel Castro kept Suriname on the map of U.S. foreign
policy priorities, in recent years the country has received
scant attention from U.S. policy makers. Nor does
Suriname receive appreciable development assistance from
the United States.

5. (SBU) For its part, the Government of Suriname (GOS)
often demonstrates a lack of affinity for United States
Government (USG) foreign policy priorities. For example,
Suriname supports the one-China policy. It either
abstained, or voted against, virtually every issue important
to the USG in the 2006 UN General Assembly. U.S.-
Suriname relations are "cordial and correct," but they are
not "warm." There are, however, two exceptions to this
generalization: our defense relationship with the Ministry
of Defense (MOD) and the Suriname Defense Forces
(SDF),and with the law enforcement community of the
Ministry of Justice and Police. Not coincidentally,
these are the only two Ministries that in the past could
regularly count on USG development assistance (modest
amounts of IMET, FMF, and INCLE).

6. (SBU) Through our Embassy in Paramaribo, the USG's
short-term goals in Suriname remain four-fold:
strengthening the police and judiciary; helping
professionalize journalists and the military; investing in
people (including the fight against HIV/AIDS) and the
environment; and encouraging measures to facilitate
economic growth and investment. However, our longer-
term strategic goal is to transform our bilateral relationship

PARAMARIBO 00000501 002 OF 003


into an overall positive partnership whereby the United
States can count on Suriname as a friendly partner (on a
case-by-case basis) in international forums such as
the UN and OAS, and Suriname can count on the United
States to recognize that this tiny country can be relevant to
U.S. strategic interests in both the Caribbean region and the
South American continent.

--------------
Military Coups, Desi Bouterse, and the
December Murders of 1982
--------------

7. (C) Independent in 1975, Suriname suffered military
coups in 1980 and 1990; civilian rule was re-established in
1992. Under the control of Desi Bouterse, who
led the first military coup, the military government
executed 15 prominent citizens in 1982 for their opposition
to the regime. In early 2005 the Government of
Suriname notified Bouterse, who remains active in politics
and is a sitting member of Parliament, of its intent to
prosecute him and 23 other suspects for the murders. The
start date of the trial is now projected for October 2007,
but the GOS is unlikely to adhere to this timeframe. If the
trial proceeds and a guilty verdict for Bouterse looks
possible, there are concerns that Bouterse might take
destabilizing actions to avoid incarceration, although some
question his financial and logistical capacity to do so.
Nevertheless, the government's willingness to hold the
trial will depend both on its fear of Bouterse's political
calculation and on judicial procedure.

--------------
Civilian / Military Relations
--------------

8. (U) Since military rule ended in Suriname, there has
been a strained relationship between the civilian
government and the armed forces. In 1992, during President
Venetiaan's first of three terms, the civilian authority
took bold steps to strip the military of its overreaching
constitutional powers, despite strong protests from the
military. Venetiaan and several of his close associates
had been detained by the military during the military regime.
During Venetiaan's last term, his Minister of Defense was
disliked by many in the armed forces who perceived him as
unresponsive to their needs. Since being installed two
years ago the current Minister, Ivan Fernald, has been more
engaged with members of the armed forces. However, to
date he has failed to bring much-needed resources and
training, nor any noticeable change in civilian-
military relations.

-------------- --------------
Criminal activity pervasive, just below the surface
-------------- --------------

9. (C) Although Suriname is not an openly violent society,
the rule of law is nevertheless under threat. Suriname
is a major transshipment point for South American cocaine
en route to Europe and, to a lesser degree, to the United
States. Members of the Colombian terrorist group the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are
widely believed to operate arms-for-drugs activities here.
The government's inability to control its borders and the
lack of a law enforcement presence in the largely
unmonitored interior allow traffickers to move drug
shipments via sea, river, and air with little if any
resistance. Suriname lacks the resources to properly equip
the marine and air wings of its national military, which
are responsible for protecting its borders--a mission which
may be transferred to a yet-to-be established Coast Guard.

Note: There is some skepticism amongst experts of GOS's
ability to stand up a Coast Guard. These problems are
compounded by inadequate resources and legislation,
complicated bureaucratic requirements, drug related
corruption, relative geographic isolation, and weak
judicial institutions.

--------------
Economy Stable, but not Sustainable
--------------

10. (U) The United States remains Suriname's largest

PARAMARIBO 00000501 003 OF 003


trading partner. Largely thanks to high commodity prices,
the Surinamese economy has stabilized over the last six
years after the deep economic decline and high inflation of
the late 1990s. However, the GOS has not implemented the
reforms necessary to liberalize its economy and realize its
full economic potential, particularly should commodity
prices fall. Income from the bauxite sector, dominated by
SURALCO, a subsidiary of U.S. based ALCOA, accounts
for more than 30% of GDP and about 60-70% of export
earnings. Higher world prices for gold have led to
the increased value of Suriname's second-most mined
mineral. Lumber, fishing, and agriculture are other major
industries. Three international oil companies, Occidental,
Repsol YPF, and Noble Energy, have formed a joint
venture with the state oil company, Staatsolie, to prospect
offshore for the significant oil and gas reserves predicted
by a recent U.S. Geological Survey study.

--------------
Internal Politics
--------------

11. (U) With an area previously noted as roughly equal to
the state of Georgia and a population of only 492,000,
Suriname is one of the least densely populated countries in
the world. It is an ethnically diverse land with people of
East Indian, African, Indonesian, Chinese, and European
descent whose constant wrangling for pieces of the pie
color Suriname's economic and political atmosphere. On
May 25, 2005 Suriname held its third successive free and
fair election since the restoration of democracy. President
Ronald Venetiaan's ruling New Front coalition, which
consisted of three ethnically-based parties and one labor
union party, lost its simple majority in the National
Assembly. Desi Bouterse's NDP (National Democratic
Party) better than doubled its representation in the National
Assembly but still fell short of an effective governing
majority. To form a working majority, the New Front
joined with a Maroon-based coalition (Maroon is the
term to describe the descendants of escaped slaves) which
had parliamentary seats for the first time, and with a one-
seat progressive party. After two National Assembly votes
for president, no candidate received the required two-
thirds of votes, pushing the final decision in August 2005 to
the United Peoples' Assembly (a special, expanded
body including national, district, and local level
representatives),where President Venetiaan won another
five-year term with a significant majority of votes.
Presidential elections are next scheduled for
2010.

--------------
Visit of Secretary Gates and USN Hospital
Ship Comfort will demonstrate USG
commitment to Suriname, and to the region
--------------

12. (SBU) We expect that the week-long deployment of
the USNS Comfort together with your arrival as our only
Cabinet-level visitor in recent memory will demonstrate to
President Venetiaan, Defense Minister Fernald, and the
government and people of Suriname that the United States
has a strong commitment to this country, and to the region.
Moreover, we hope that your visit will be further evidence
that the USG is committed to support the professionalization of
Suriname's armed forces, to strong civil-military relations,
and to democracy and the rule of law in Suriname. We
welcome your visit.

SCHREIBER HUGHES