PANAMA: IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM BRIEFING HAS MAJOR IMPACT ON MFA THINKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 001838

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PREL, UNSC, IR, PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM BRIEFING HAS MAJOR
IMPACT ON MFA THINKING

REF: PANAMA 1829

Classified By: POLCOUNS Brian R. Naranjo. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------

1. (C) "I fail to understand what legitimate civilian
purpose Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities could possibly
have," Panamanian MFA Senior Advisor for UN Security Council
(UNSC) matters Nils Castro said at the conclusion of a
December 5 briefing by State Bureau of International Security
and Nonproliferation (ISN) expert Richard Nephew. "It's in
comprehensible how Iran could spend so much money and effort
on these concealed nuclear programs, resources that could be
better spent addressing Iran's pressing social and economic
needs." Mr. Nephew's briefing educated Panama's UNSC policy
makers on the technical aspects of Iran's nuclear program and
underscored the reasons for continued concern about the
threat Iran's nuclear programs. MFA interlocutors -- who
included DG for International Policy Javier Bonagas, DG for
International Organizations and Conferences Delia Villamonte,
and subject matter experts from across the MFA -- all
expressed their profound appreciation for the education on
the technical issues involved in nuclear weapons development
in general and aspects of Iran's program in particular. This
briefing had a major positive impact in winning over key
Panamanian policy makers and will hopefully yield positive
results in support of USG views if and when this matter
returns to the UNSC. In the discussion that followed the
briefing, Castro noted that while additional sanctions would
likely be necessary to sustain pressure on Iran, positive
inducements to change their behavior should also be provided.
End summary.

-------------- --------------
UNSC Policy makers Get Arms Around Technical Issues
-------------- --------------

2. (C) Castro prefaced several questions with "this may by a
naive question, but . . . ." Basic questions by Castro and
his colleagues included: "What is a centrifuge?;" "How does
it work?;" "How much fissile material can one centrifuge
produce?;" What is a centrifuge cascade system?;" "What is
'heavy water?';" "What is yellow cake "What is an isotope?;"
and "What is a fuel cycle?" Mr. Nephew's explanations in
clear, layman's terms brought a great deal of relief to
Panama's UNSC team (and to Embassy Panama's POL team.)

--------------
What Struck the Panamanians the Most
--------------

3. (C) Having grasped some of the basic concepts regarding
the ways to develop the materials necessary, Panama's UNSC
team was most struck by the following elements of Mr.
Nephew's briefing:

a) Iran cannot develop a "self-sufficient" in uranium fuel
cycle to supply its civilian nuclear power industry.
Geologically poor in natural uranium, even given the most
optimistic estimates of uranium deposits that Iran might
have, Mr. Nephew explained that Iran did not have the ability
to supply enough raw uranium to sustain even half of Iran's
existing civilian nuclear power industry. Though not
sufficient to supply a civilian nuclear power industry, Iran
has enough raw uranium to build seven to eight nuclear
weapons.

b) Iran could more cheaply acquire nuclear fuel for its
civilian nuclear power industry on the open market than
develop its own fuel cycle. Castro immediately jumped in to
note that Iran could have put the USD 1 billion invested in
fuel cycle development to address Iran's social and economic
challenges.

c) By already successfully developing lowly enriched uranium
(LEU),as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA),Iran had completed the hardest part of the enrichment
process essentially going 70-75 percent of the way to
achieving the highly enriched uranium (HEU) necessary for
weaponization. International Policy Advisor Ernesto Cerrud
quickly summarized that Iran could then move quickly from

holding a stockpile of LEU to developing HEU.

d) Iran's heavy water plutonium development plant had no
rational peaceful use, including for medical or agricultural
purposes as asserted by Iran.

e) Though Iran, as noted in the NIE, had ceased its nuclear
weaponization activities, its efforts to enrich uranium and
develop plutonium continued in violate of IAEA commitments
and UNSC obligations.

f) Iran has gone to enormous lengths to conceal its nuclear
activities for years.

g) Iran has a way to come clean with the international
community as laid out in the Work Plan with the IAEA. Iran
has violated the NPT, IAEA commitments and failed to comply
with UNSC obligations. The P5 1 stand ready to provide Iran
access to advance civilian nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel
guarantees, better access to the international economy and
energy, telecommunications, and agricultural assistance. The
U.S. would enter into direction talks "anywhere, any time" if
Iran suspended its activities. UNSC sanctions could be
lifted.

--------------
Comment
--------------

4. (C) ISN's briefing on Iran's nuclear weapons program was
greatly appreciated and appears to have won additional
support for U.S. views and position on this matter. Several
"Eureka!" and "Aha!" moments were witnessed around the table
as members of Panama's UNSC team grasped technical details
and internalized an understanding of the threat posed by
Iran's nuclear arms activities. Panama's desire to grapple
with this tough political issue in the Council is promising
given that Panama's default setting is normally to run for
the center of whatever emerging consensus there might be and
avoid any controversy. Nurtured properly, in post's
estimation, Panama's support for the U.S. position can be
sustained and strengthened to the point where Panama may have
the confidence to take a stand on this matter that very well
may split the Council. Finally, post is extremely grateful
to Mr. Nephew and ISN for their support and assistance in
educating not only our Panamanian counterparts but this
Embassy's POLOFFs as well.
ARREAGA