Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07OUAGADOUGOU1080
2007-12-10 17:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ouagadougou
Cable title:  

Burkina Faso Believes Cote d'Ivoire Ready for Peace,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PBTS MASS UNGA UV IV 
pdf how-to read a cable
R 101723Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3185
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
USUN NEW YORK
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 001080 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL:12-10-2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS MASS UNGA UV IV
SUBJECT: Burkina Faso Believes Cote d'Ivoire Ready for Peace,
Ouagadougou Peace Accord (OPA) is the Way

Reftel: Ouagadougou 0995

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 001080

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL:12-10-2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS MASS UNGA UV IV
SUBJECT: Burkina Faso Believes Cote d'Ivoire Ready for Peace,
Ouagadougou Peace Accord (OPA) is the Way

Reftel: Ouagadougou 0995


1. Classified by Amb. Jeanine Jackson for 1.5 (b)


2. (C) Summary. Intense diplomacy by Burkina Faso's President
Compaore led to the November 29 signature by Ivorian President Gbagbo
and Prime Minister Soro of two side agreements to the Ouagadougou
Peace Accord (OPA). These side agreements provide for:

-- Presidential elections by June 30, 2008;
-- a framework for returning former rebels to civilian life or the
armed forces; and
-- reestablishment of government services in northern Cote d'Ivoire.


3. (C) MOFA's Cabinet Director, a direct participant in this
diplomacy, was optimistic the OPA would work because Ivorians had
grown tired of the neither-peace-nor-war status quo, and because
Compaore had convinced each main Presidential hopeful in Cote
d'Ivoire that they could win the June elections. Progress was also
made November 29 in designating a contractor for the issuance of ID
cards. Working groups -- despite difficulties including an angry
exit by the Ivorian Interior Minister -- continue to seek consensus
on technical details related to ID cards and electoral lists;
Compaore's Personal Representative for Cote d'Ivoire plans a January
meeting to discuss mobile tribunals. Compaore and the UN Secretary
General's Special Representative for Cote d'Ivoire met November 29;
the UN's role since the OPA's advent has been secondary, but
supportive. At the request of other heads of state, Compaore delayed
until January ECOWAS/WAEMU meetings where Cote d'Ivoire will be
discussed. A former rebel now exiled in Benin does not pose a threat
to the OPA. End Summary.

-------------- -
Intense Diplomacy Leads to OPA Side Agreements
-------------- -


4. (C) The approximately 10-day period ending November 29 was a
period of intense Burkinabe diplomacy about the Ouagadougou Peace
Accord (OPA),with five discussions or events about:

-- identity cards, whose talks in Ouagadougou were ended abruptly and

angrily on November 22 by Ivorian Interior Minister Desire Tagro, who
wanted to have the Ivorian National Institute of Statistics (INS)
replace a neutral, third party contractor, the French company SAGEM,
in carrying out the technical work of issuance ID cards;
-- financing of the OPA, with Charles Koffi Diby and Amadou Kone,
respectively Ivorian Ministers of Economy and Finance, and of African
Integration, who met November 24 in Ouagadougou with Burkina Faso
President Blaise Compaore;
-- two complementary side agreements to the OPA concerning SEGEM and
key OPA implementation issues, with Compaore hosting Ivorian
President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Guillaume Soro in
Ouagadougou on November 27;
-- the United Nation's role in supporting the OPA, with a November 29
meeting in Ouagadougou between Young Jin Choi, the UN Secretary
General's Special Representative for Cote d'Ivoire and President
Compaore; and,
-- the signing of two side agreements, on November 29, in the
northern Ivorian city of Korogho by Gbagbo and Soro, in the presence
of Burkina Faso Foreign Minister Djibril Bassolet and MOFA Cabinet
Director Vincent Zakane.

--------------
Ivorians, Africans, World Tired of Standoff
--------------


5. (C) Zakane, who is also a University of Ouagadougou law
professor, told DCM and PolOff December 6 that the OPA's
implementation had been blocked by "technical" difficulties, but was
firmly back on track with the November 29 signature of the side
agreements. Zakane was hopeful that elections in Cote d'Ivoire would
be held by the end of June. The fundamental reason for optimism was
that, in his view, all concerned had grown tired of a
neither-peace-nor war status quo since the rebellion ended in 2005.
The people of southern and northern Cote d'Ivoire wanted peace,
Zakane felt, and many had forgotten why the rebellion started in the
first place. They were demanding basic government services, such as
education and transport. Other African countries and the broader
international community had also grown tired with the current
standoff, whose peacekeeping costs were expensive for the UN and
France, he said.

-------------- --
Gbagbo, Rebels: Elections Needed For Legitimacy
-------------- --


6. (C) Gbagbo wanted the elections to be held because his legitimacy
as President of Cote d'Ivoire was increasingly at risk of being
questioned by his fellow citizens, Zakane said. Gbagbo was elected


for a five-year term that ended October 30, 2005, Zakane explained.
Gbagbo thus had "no constitutional basis" to be President, and only
the UN Security Council's backing through resolutions. Gbagbo
yearned for the political legitimacy that could only come with an
election, Zakane felt, and wanted to be President of a whole country,
not half of one. Gbagbo's late November trip to Korogho was salutary
for Gbagbo, because this visit to northern Cote d'Ivoire allowed him
to "feel legitimate," Zakane felt.


7. (C) The Forces Nouvelles, on the other hand, were incapable of
governing, e.g. because there was no legal basis for them to do so,
Zakane stated. They had successfully made demands on the Ivorian
Government, such as pressing for ID cards, but this was not the same
thing as governing. Their financial situation had also become "less
comfortable," because they now had more difficulty in levying illegal
taxes from zones in the north, he said.

--------------
Secret to OPA Success: Make Ivorian

SIPDIS
Political Camps Believe They Can Win Election
--------------


8. (C) The "secret" to the success of the OPA, Zakane confided, was
for its Facilitator, President Compaore, to make each Ivorian
political camp believe it had a real chance to win the Presidential
elections. For now, Compaore had been successful in doing this. The
"Presidential camp" thinks Gbagbo will win; the Democratic Party of
Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) believes Bedie can win; and the Rally for
Republicans (RDR) Party thinks that its leader (Alassane Ouattara)
can win. However, each time one of the main political parties began
to think that it has lost hope of winning the election, Zakane
explained, it sounded the alarm and the OPA re-fell off track.


9. (C) After UNSC 1765 was adopted, for example, the RDR protested
and wrote to Compaore and Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to denounce
the elimination of the High-level Electoral Representative (HRE)
because it thought this would allow Gbagbo to fix the elections,
Zakane recalled. Compaore was obliged, working with the Secretary
General, to convince the RDR that this was not the case since the
roles of electoral certification and arbitration still existed and
were shared, respectively, between the UN Special Representative and
the Facilitator.

-------------- --
OPA's 2nd, 3rd Side Agreements:
ID Cards, Rebel Reinsertion or (Re-)Integration
-------------- --


10. (C) Zakane explained that the first complementary side agreement
to the OPA had been signed back in March, so that the two agreements
signed on November 29 were known as the second and third side
agreements. The second side agreement designated SAGEM as the
contracted company for technical aspects of creating ID cards. The
third side agreement called for Presidential elections by June 30.


11. (C) Two other key elements of the third side agreement related
how rebel soldiers would be "re-inserted" as civilians, or
"integrated" (or "re-integrated" in the case of rebels who were
former Ivorian soldiers) into the new defense and security forces
(FOS),Zakane said. Both the Ivorian security forces and rebel
forces (FAFN) will contribute soldiers who will become part of the
FOS's Integrated Command Center (CCI). 600 former rebels will be
given police or gendarmes positions, in accordance with the terms of
the earlier Pretoria Accord (which preceded the OPA),Zakane
explained. There would be a quota of rebels who will be reintegrated
into the army, he said, while those not joining or returning to the
defense and security forces would also be given civil service jobs.
It was still unclear how many rebels will need to be taken care of,
Zakane added, but the current plan was to grant payments to "former
rebels and other sympathizers" to encourage their demobilization.

-------------- -
Other Key Elements of Third OPA Side Agreement
-------------- -


12. (C) Other key elements of the third side agreement, per press
reporting, are:

-- adoption by December 15, 2007 of legal texts fixing FOS's
structure, composition, and functioning;
-- disarmament, dismantling, and regrouping of former rebels by
December 22, under CCI command;
-- monthly payments by Ivorian Government to former rebels while
(re)integration and reinsertion are on-going;
-- payment to former rebels re-integrated into the Ivorian armed
forces, gendarmerie or paramilitary corps of back pay starting on an
April 12, 2007 amnesty ordinance.
-- arbitration by OPA "Facilitator" President Compaore of a quota for
the number of former rebels to be integrated into the FOS, and their
ranks;
-- recruitment for the civil service, including reinsertion of former
rebels, to start by December 22;
-- redeployment of customs and tax administration, under the
principle of equal application of assessments/duties throughout the
country, in the north starting by December 30;
-- restart of public administration in the north, to be completed by
January 30, 2008;
-- restart by December 31 of the process of reconstituting civil
registers destroyed during the rebellion, concomitant with the
"audience foraines" (mobile tribunals) determining nationality;
-- Ivorian Government commitment to fund the above operations on a
calendar consistent with the side agreement's dates.
-- weekly consultations in Abidjan with the Facilitator's
representative, Boureima Badini, about OPA implementation;

--------------
Mobile Tribunals: Donors Wait
for Proof of Progress Before Opening Purses?
--------------


13. (C) Regarding the audiences foraines, Zakane recalled that the
OPA had called for 111 mobile tribunals, which were to have completed
their work by December 24, 2007. Because of insufficient resources,
however, only 25 audience foraines were operational. Badini plans to
hold meetings in January with the Evaluation and Accompaniment
Committee (CEA) and the International Consultative Body (OCI),during
which, inter alia, he hoped to review progress made by the audiences
foraines, and encourage donors to disburse financing. Donors had
been hesitating in fulfilling their financial pledges while they
waited for evidence that the OPA was being implemented, Zakane felt,
but should now be more optimistic about its prospects.

--------------
Heads of State Review on
Cote d'Ivoire Delayed to January
--------------


14. (C) Zakane explained that President Compaore had planned to
discuss Cote d'Ivoire on the margins of West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU) and Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) meetings scheduled for December 16 and 17. However, these
meetings had been delayed at the request of other heads of state and
will most likely be held in January, he said.

--------------
UN Adjusting Well to Supporting Role in OPA
--------------


15. (C) When asked how the United Nations was accommodating what some
observers have considered a diminished role following the signing of
the OPA, Zakane recalled that, historically, the UN Security Council
had stepped in to address the Ivorian crisis when ECOWAS and, in
turn, the African Union (AU) had been unable to tackle it. UNSC
resolutions 1366 and 1721 on Cote d'Ivoire had been indispensable,
particularly 1721, which had allowed for a rebalancing of power
between the Ivorian President and Prime Minister.


16. (C) The Ouagadougou Peace Accord merely returned leadership in
resolving the Ivorian crisis to the regional level, Zakane said. The
Parties to the OPA expect that the UN would continue to play a
secondary but supportive role, e.g. through its peacekeeping
operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI),aided by the French military
efforts there (LICORNE). While Resolution 1765 had eliminated the
(UN) role of the High-level Electoral Representative (HRE),Zakane
felt, the roles of election certification (the responsibility of the
UN Special Representative, Choi) and arbitration (the role the
Facilitator, Compaore) were now shared under the OPA. The
Facilitator also shares certain responsibilities with the Evaluation
and Accompaniment Committee (CEA). The Facilitator will continue to
have a collaborative relation with the UN; Choi, for his part,
understands his role and that Resolution 1765 has language supporting
the OPA, Zakane concluded.

-------------- --------------
Tagro's Gambit Fails; Gbagbo Arrives to "Clean Up"?
-------------- --------------


17. (C) Providing background on the late November series of talks,
Zakane admitted that they had started off poorly. Tagro, according
to press reports, tried to introduce a last-minute proposal on INS,
and left abruptly when it became clear this was a non-starter for the
Forces Nouvelles opposition, and for Compaore. (The OPA created two
working groups led by Soro as "President," and Tagro as "Vice
President" to address 1) ID cards; and 2) election lists, Zakane
explained. The first working group also has members from the INS and
the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI),while the second has
members from CEI and the Office of National Identity.)



18. (C) The press here, clearly routing for the OPA's success,
described Tagro's failed gambit as "L'Affaire Tagro," and Tagro as a
"Black Sheep in Gbagboland." Diby and Kone's statements to the press
on November 24 indeed give the impression that they were trying to
repair damage caused by Tagro's blowup. In this regard, Zakane
stated that President Gbagbo had come to Ouagadougou in November 27
to "clean up the situation" left by Tagro, and finalize a deal with
Soro on side agreements.

-------------- --------------
Former Rebel Coulibaly in Benin, no Threat to OPA
-------------- --------------


19. (C) Regarding former Ivorian rebel leader Ibrahim B. Coulibaly,
Zakane confirmed his understanding that "Master Sergeant I.B." was
currently exiled in Benin. He explained that Coulibaly had been
exiled in Burkina Faso and France prior to arriving in Benin.
Ivorian President Gbagbo pressed Benin's Defense Minister without
success to have Coulibaly extradited. Beninese security officials
had Coulibaly under surveillance, and he did not pose a threat to the
Ivorian peace process, Zakane felt. Zakane also noted press
speculation that Coulibaly was behind the June 29 rocket attack on
the plane of Prime Minister Soro, but claimed not to know whether
this was true.


20. (C) Personal relations between Compaore and Benin President Yayi
Boni were cordial and not strained because of Coulibaly's exile, as
had been asserted in the press, Zakane believed. Part of the
perception of strained ties may have been caused by recent press
reports of skirmishes along the roughly 15 kilometers of border
between the two countries. These incidents were relatively
unimportant, Zakane felt, adding a prediction that the two countries
would eventually refer the case for arbitration by the International
Court of Justice in the Hague.

Jackson