Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07OTTAWA2295
2007-12-20 16:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

CANADIAN OPPOSITION LEADER OPPOSES EXTENSION OF

Tags:  PREL MOPS MARR AF CA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 002295 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADIAN OPPOSITION LEADER OPPOSES EXTENSION OF
COMBAT TROOPS IN KANDAHAR

REF: OTTAWA 2135

Classified By: Ambassador David H. Wilkins. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (c).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 002295

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADIAN OPPOSITION LEADER OPPOSES EXTENSION OF
COMBAT TROOPS IN KANDAHAR

REF: OTTAWA 2135

Classified By: Ambassador David H. Wilkins. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (c).


1. (C) Summary: Opposition leader Stephane Dion ruled out
Liberal Party support for the extension of Canadian combat
troops in Kandahar during a discussion of Afghanistan with
Ambassador Wilkins, the British High Commissioner, and
RC-South country diplomats on December 18. Dion criticized
the government for its call to extend the Canadian Forces'
mission in Afghanistan by two years to February 2011, its
decision to make that country Canada's largest aid recipient,
and for being "dishonest" when it drafted the Manley Panel's
terms of reference (reftel). The opposition leader indicated
a disappointing willingness to live with the possibility of
Afghanistan "going under" and the attendant damage to NATO
and its credibility. Even in the face of Dion's weak and
unpopular leadership, the Conservatives will have to maneuver
carefully to get sufficient Parliamentary support for an
extension of the combat mission in Kandahar. Any good news
they can share about additional burden-sharing within NATO
and enhanced materiel capabilities could strengthen their
prospects considerably. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Wilkins and several of his Ottawa-based
counterparts from countries in ISAF Regional Command - South
(RC-S) discussed Afghanistan with opposition Liberal Party
leader Stephane Dion at a December 18 breakfast at the
invitation of the British High Commissioner. The High
Commissioner had billed the event as an informal setting
where diplomats from RC-S countries could make Dion aware of
the wider foreign policy implications of Canada's role in
Afghanistan. The senior diplomats urged Dion to support the
extension of Canada's combat role in RC-S beyond February

2009. After expressing great appreciation for Canada's
"heavy lifting" in Kandahar, Ambassador Wilkins reviewed U.S.
policy towards Afghanistan, stressed that artificial
timelines were harmful and played into the hands of the
Taliban, and urged Dion to give full and fair consideration

to the recommendations in the forthcoming "Manley Panel"
report.


3. (C) Dion responded with criticism of Conservative Prime
Minister Harper's handling of the war effort to date,
complaining that the government had not been "candid" with
Canadians and the opposition parties. The lack of candor, he
said, extended to the formulation of the Manley Panel's terms
of reference (TOR). None of the four options outlined in the
TOR contained a plain language call for combat troops to
remain in RC-S, even though the Conservative government was
"committed" to extending the combat mission, he claimed.


4. (C) The Liberal leader also criticized the government for
refusing to permit "real debate" in Parliament, and argued
that the overwhelming majority of Canadian foreign assistance
was wrongly going to Afghanistan rather than other countries
such as Lebanon that, he said, "had more ties to Canada."
Dion also expressed frustration at the government's alleged
QDion also expressed frustration at the government's alleged
unwillingness to organize his travel to Afghanistan to see
things for himself. (Note: In a follow-up call, Department
of National Defence (DND) officials said that they had made
arrangements for Dion to travel to Afghanistan on January 9.
End note.)


5. (C) Near the end of Dion's remarks, the Ambassador
observed that it seemed Dion had not yet made up his mind
about the way ahead in Afghanistan, and would, perhaps, wait
for the Manley Panel's report and recommendations before
doing so. Dion demurred, saying that while Canada had
committed troops to the mission until February 2009 the
combat mission should not be extended. The Liberals might
agree to some kind of training role for Canadian Forces (CF)
elsewhere in Afghanistan, he said, but they would not support
a combat role for the CF in Kandahar, or training that occurs
in combat situations. "Training is not combat," Dion said,
explaining that, for the Liberals, this is not just a
question of semantics.


6. (C) Ambassador Wilkins asked Dion what he thought would
happen to Afghanistan if Canada withdrew the CF and other

OTTAWA 00002295 002 OF 002


allies followed Canada's example and left. Dion shrugged his
shoulders, acknowledged that Afghanistan would likely "go
under" and remarked that NATO would be "severely damaged."
Dion then expressed great pessimism about the overall mission
in Afghanistan.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Dion was poorly briefed -- one diplomat later
characterized his performance as "deeply unimpressive" -- and
clearly not in a true listening mode about the value of the
CF role in Kandahar or about the need for NATO solidarity.
Like many others in the Liberal Party, he seems to have made
up his mind and will not be swayed by the Manley Panel.
However, as an unpopular leader nationally and heading up a
still deeply divided Liberal Party, the party ranks may not
hold on this issue and he could end up having to accept a
free vote on the next extension or, more likely, compromise
language that could allow both parties to claim victory and
permit the CF to extend their mission possibly only one or
more ideally two more years. Alternatively, this could be
the issue that leads to a confidence vote bringing down the
government in the next several months -- without either the
Conservatives or the Liberals yet having solid grounds for
hope that they could win a solid enough majority to make the
CF extension vote a sure thing even in a new Parliament. PM
Harper and his strategists have some tricky tightrope walking
ahead as they decide when and under what terms to bring this
issue to a vote (while also facing the prospect of losing a
confidence vote in the meantime on an unrelated issue, such
as the budget). Any good news they can share about additional
burden-sharing within NATO and enhanced materiel capabilities
could strengthen their prospects considerably.

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