NORWAY'S VIEWS ON SRI LANKA PEACE PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000195

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

MOLLY GOWER, SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER CE NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY'S VIEWS ON SRI LANKA PEACE PROCESS

REF: CONFIDENTIAL 2/27/07 EMAIL FROM M.GOWER TO

E.CANUEL

Classified By: DCM Kevin M. Johnson, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. On February 28, DCM and Pol Officer met
with Norwegian Special Envoy to Sri Lanka Jon Hanssen-Bauer
and Sri Lanka Adviser Tomas Stangeland at the MFA. The
Norwegians stressed the importance of USG involvement in the
peace process, outlined views on the Indian and the U.K.
perspectives, and discussed future political and military
scenarios. Hanssen-Bauer had been in contact with Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) representatives following the
attack injuring Ambassador Blake, and believes the mortar
barrage followed the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)'s failure
to properly report the Eastern province visit. The Special
Envoy asked for USG analysis of potential Chinese or
Pakistani involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process.
Valuing the February 21 Co-Chairs conference call,
Hanssen-Bauer seeks clarification as to when the USG would
favor the next call. End Summary.

Reporting Lapse Blamed for Attack
--------------


2. (C) After expressing clear concern and relief for
Ambassador Blake's condition, the Special Envoy stressed that
Ambassador Brattskar immediately contacted the LTTE upon
hearing of the attack, seeking to halt the shelling and
guarantee the safe transport of the helicopter's passengers.
After speaking with LTTE contacts, Hanssen-Bauer believes
their claim that the Tigers were unaware of the passengers'
identities, as the GSL did not apparently follow an
established, normal reporting procedure. Specifically, the
LTTE claims that the GSL did not inform the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) of the flight which, in turn, would
have contacted the Peace Secretariat. The Secretariat would
guarantee that the LTTE recognize the visitors' safe passage.


3. (C) When DCM questioned why the normal reporting
procedures were not followed, Hanssen-Bauer interprets the
failure to notify as a result of the GSL's confidence that
its military forces had "absolute control" in the East. The
Norwegians confirmed with the SLMM that no message was
transmitted to the LTTE. The local LTTE commander called off
the attacks following Ambassador Brattskar's call, and
claimed that the airport struck by mortar fire was located in
an area where recent fighting occurred. Emphasizing that the
Norwegians were not defending the LTTE's actions,
Hanssen-Bauer stressed that the incident would at least
provide a better understanding of the reporting procedures,
to avoid future incidents.

The Special Envoy's India Meetings
--------------


4. (C) Hanssen-Bauer outlined his recent travels to India,
in advance of Norwegian Development Minister Eric Solheim's
March 8 New Delhi visit. He found his Foreign Office
meetings concerning Sri Lanka direct, with his Indian
colleagues "outspoken." The Indians singled out the
importance of the U.S. and Norway among the Co-Chairs, and
did not find advantageous the involvement of other countries
in the peace process. From India's perspective, the EU is
losing influence and leverage with the GSL, given that the
EU's LTTE terrorist ban did not result in the GSL feeling any
pressure to more closely cooperate with the EU.

Seeking US. Perspectives on Chinese, Pakistani Involvement
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In Hanssen-Bauer's view, GSL President Rajapaksa is
looking beyond the EU, and considering countries such as
China, Pakistan and perhaps South Korea for roles in the
peace process. Hanssen-Bauer perceives that the U.S. has
better relations and influence with Pakistan and China, and
seeks USG support in ascertaining the intentions and plans of
both countries with respect to the Sri Lankan conflict.
Using attendance at an international Peace and Reconciliation
meeting in Beijing this month as a pretext, Hanssen-Bauer

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will seek bilateral discussions with the Chinese concerning
the Sri Lanka conflict. Although not hiding this meeting from
the GSL and LTTE, he will not "announce" trip details and
specifics to the conflict parties.

UK Involvement?
--------------


6. (C) Hanssen-Bauer spoke of his London trip, and possible
UK "back-channel" involvement. He recently met with John
Dennis, Additional Director for Asia in the UK Foreign Office
and Jonathan Powell, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff.
The Special Envoy notes a revival of interest from the UK
side. A possible UK role could include serving as a
back-channel messenger to the GSL. Given the EU's LTTE ban,
Hanssen-Bauer reiterated that the UK could not act as an LTTE
mediator. He emphasized to the British that the lack of back
channels is not hindering talks; rather, the increasing
violence is.

Reviewing Political Options, Assessing Military Situation
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The Special Envoy believes a political opening for
talks is unlikely to occur unless the military situation
changes. He had high praise for Ambassador Blake's recent
speech which emphasized no military solution to the conflict,
and that the GSL must present a clear, credible political
platform as a starting point for talks. Moreover, he fully
backed the Ambassador's statement that the U.S. would not
support an independent LTTE state. Rather, a federal
solution must be found. Norway still advocates political
solutions with the LTTE even if, given recent GSL military
successes, the LTTE is perceived as militarily weak.
Following any more LTTE defeats, its leader Prabhakaran would
have difficulty within the LTTE to pursue non-military
solutions. Hanssen-Bauer emphasized that the LTTE is
unwilling to come talks in the middle of military actions,
viewing cessation of fire as a prerequisite. On March 5 and
6, Ambassador Brattskar will visit Kilinochchi, which is
viewed by Hanssen-Bauer as a positive step, indicating that
the LTTE seeks to continue talking. The Special Envoy also
agrees with India's opinion that a devolution of power should
occur, similar to what the Tamils had in 2000, with the North
and East still merged.


8. (C) The Special Envoy doesn't see any clear military
solution down the road. Despite its losses, the LTTE military
strength cannot be underestimated. For example, GSL forces
in the East are not fully in control, and the LTTE can still
employ guerrilla tactics in that region. In addition, the
LTTE cannot be ruled out from undertaking an offensive, as
Vakarai and the East are still under an LTTE declaration of
war.


9. (C) Following military setbacks, the LTTE may view the
international community as responsible for the Cease Fire
Agreement crumbling, further destabilizing chances of a
political solution. If a suitable pretext for the LTTE to
launch an offensive is found, Hanssen-Bauer postulated on
potential LTTE military strategies. Namely, the Tigers could
launch direct military assaults in the North and undertake
guerrilla warfare in the South. Alternatively, the LTTE could
conduct military guerrilla strategies in the East, and then
advance in the North.


10. (C) Hanssen-Bauer warns that the GSL, ripe with recent
military successes, may overly value its position. Political
problems could erupt should the violence continue. He
reasons that if the LTTE is perceived as militarily weak, and
the GSL forces advance into the North (as it has with the
East),the situation will deteriorate. LTTE insurgents will
have no home base, and spread out, resulting in fractured
guerrilla groups which will be difficult to deal with.

Clarifying Co-Chair Telephone Conferences
--------------


11. (C) The DCM asked the Special Envoy's impressions of
the February 21 Co-Chairs conference call. Finding the

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conference very positive and a forum for frank assessments,
Hanssen-Bauer also noted Japan's decision to pursue its
continued line of diplomacy. Specifically, he viewed Japan
as maintaining its bilateral aid and assistance to the GSL,
while not changing its established views of either the GSL or
the LTTE.


12. (C) Per ref A, the DCM also questioned why the
Norwegians have asked the USG to host the Co-Chairs telephone
conferences. Political and technical reasons contributed to
the requests. Stating that it is "very important that the
U.S. takes the lead," Hanssen-Bauer reiterated the political
importance of USG involvement through hosting meetings in
Washington. The GSL also recognizes that a USG-hosted call
sends a "strong message" to the conflict parties. He pointed
out that the GSL views the EU, for example, as "not on the
same level." However, Stangeland noted the Norwegians
attempted to host the recent conference call, but technical
difficulties and scheduling issues prompted the Norwegian
request for the USG to instead act as host.


13. (C) Hanssen-Bauer seeks USG clarification regarding the
frequency of future Co-Chair telephone conferences.
Emphasizing the value of the conferences, Hanssen-Bauer
requests that they be held regularly. He understands that
another telephone conference would occur after the
forthcoming All Party Conference, but sensed USG ambivalence
as to regular conference calls. He wants to know whether the
USG prefers to have such calls on a regular basis, or only
when/if progress is made through the All Party Conference.
He recognizes the technical difficulties and scheduling
hurdles involved.


14. (C) Comments: Hanssen-Bauer continues to seek
political solutions for the Sri Lankan crises. He clearly
values USG support, and seeks USG input on potential roles
for China and Pakistan in the process, while hoping the USG
agrees to regular Co-Chair telephone conferences. Seeking UK
involvement as a back-channel messenger is not surprising.
As with the 2006 Geneva conference, we suspect that the
Norwegians are overwhelmed with minor requests from both the
LTTE and GSL, which tie them up from focusing on more
substantive issues. In addition, following the 2006
exclusion of EU powers from the SLMM, the Norwegians
previously voiced concerns that the thinly-staffed force
could not effectively handle many challenges. Hanssen-Bauer
stated that no SLMM forces were in the East during the attack
involving Ambassador Blake, which leads us to question
whether the Norwegians will soon raise SLMM staffing level
concerns.

WHITNEY