Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07OSLO1055
2007-10-23 11:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

NORWAY DISMISSES U.S. CONCERNS ON CLUSTER

Tags:  MOPS PARM PREL NATO NO 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #1055/01 2961159
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231159Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6375
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0140
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1065
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0218
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 7947
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0798
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 3213
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1620
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0300
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0388
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
POLO
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 001055 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PM, EUR/NB, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: MOPS PARM PREL NATO NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY DISMISSES U.S. CONCERNS ON CLUSTER
MUNITIONS

REF: A. STATE 64981

B. OSLO 525

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 001055

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PM, EUR/NB, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: MOPS PARM PREL NATO NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY DISMISSES U.S. CONCERNS ON CLUSTER
MUNITIONS

REF: A. STATE 64981

B. OSLO 525

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d

1.(C) Summary: During his October 15-17 visit to Oslo, PM
DAS Richard Kidd presented two papers outlining in detail
U.S. concerns on Norway,s initiative to ban some cluster
munitions (CM),called the Oslo Process. Kidd met with the
Norwegian MOD and MFA, leading Parliamentarians and NGOs. The
leading MFA official on the Oslo Process brazenly rejected
U.S. concerns and did not respond to Kidd,s request for
additional dialogue on potential implications of the Oslo
Process. MOD officials stressed their agreement on the
importance of avoiding alliance issues and stated that they
would be careful to avoid a total ban on CM. However they
also reiterated their support for the basic principles of the
Oslo Process. The MFA,s response to Kidd,s visit raises
concerns over the transparency of the Oslo Process as well as
Norway,s willingness to objectively discuss U.S. concerns or
accept differing views on the issue of CM. END SUMMARY

U.S. Concerns Presented
--------------
2.(C) In response to a previous request from Norway, reftel
B, DAS Kidd presented two papers on the core U.S. concerns
over the Oslo Process. The first paper highlights a
problematic clause in the latest discussion text which would
criminalize CM and have a huge impact on NATO/coalition
operations. The second paper explains why CM have continued
military utility. In all his presentations, Kidd stressed the
U.S.,s unity with Norway on humanitarian concerns and a
willingness to work together to make the Oslo Process a
positive story. He stressed that in order to do this it was
necessary to outline potential problems the U.S. sees in the
Oslo Process and to discuss possible solutions.

MFA, Bordering on Rudeness, Unwilling to Listen
--------------

3.(C) At the MFA, Kidd met with the CM working group
responsible for steering the Oslo Process, headed by Stephan
Kongstad. Concerns presented in the papers and by DAS Kidd

personally were rejected in a manner bordering on rudeness by
the head of the CM Working Group, Stephan Kongstad. Despite
Kidd,s appeal for dialogue, Kongstad brazenly dismissed U.S.
concerns and clearly intends to proceed with the Oslo Process
using the Ottawa land mine process as a model on how to push
an issue despite U.S. and other nation's opposition.
Kongstad stated that CM are a humanitarian issue, and only
secondarily a military issue. He indicated that the CCW
process is dysfunctional and will not yield any progress
towards an acceptable resolution on CM. He made it quite
clear that the purpose of the Oslo Process is to make it
politically impossible to use CM, a strategy shared by most
of the NGOs involved in the process.

4.(C) Kongstad did not directly address U.S. concerns over
interoperability but stated that any alliance issues are
insignificant when measured against the humanitarian need.
When reminded that even the land mine treaty caused
significant problems for NATO, Kongstad said that this was
not relevant. He also claimed that the U.S. raised the same
concerns with the Ottawa land mine treaty, which proved to be
unfounded. The MFA also outright rejected the U.S. position
that CM have military utility and refused to answer DAS
Kidd,s request for Norway,s assessment on how
interoperability problems could be solved and on what type of
military resource could be used to replace CM. Kongstad also
rejected concerns over the Lima text saying that the text was
only a discussion text and would be changed for the next
meeting. He did not provide an answer to Kidd,s repeated
questions on how states, concerns would be incorporated into
the text. Comment: Other members of the working group did
not display the same amount of hostility to the U.S.
positions leading us to suspect that Kongstad,s

unprofessional behavior may stem from deep personal
commitments to the cause or from personal dissatisfaction
with the U.S. End Comment.

5.(C) The next day Kidd met privately with Jorg Wily
Bronebakk, Special Coordinator for North American issues at
the MFA. In this meeting Kidd and the Political Counselor
stressed that the meeting with Kongstad and the CM group was
of great concern. The U.S. expected a mature dialogue with a
close ally regardless of differences over an issue. Kidd
explained the need for a response to the USG papers and
questions. Bronebakk took on board the need for a respectful
dialogue, the U.S. concerns about the issues the present text
poses and the questions about the process for reaching a
final text. He explained how difficult the issue is
politically due to language in the governing coalition's
policy platform but argued that regardless all care must be
taken to prevent damage to the bilateral relationship and
NATO.

MOD: Less Ideological but Still Committed to Process
--------------

6.(C) At the MOD, Kidd met with Espen Barth Eide, the Deputy
Defense Minister, and members of the Security Policy Section.
Barth Eide reaffirmed the MOD,s commitment to the Oslo
Process and its belief that CM need strong regulation citing
internal MOD studies which have shown that even Norway,s CM
have higher than expected failure rates and represent an
unacceptable humanitarian risk. However, Barth Eide and the
other MOD officials displayed none of the hostility which
characterized the Kongstad meeting, instead making it clear
that they were also concerned to avoid any NATO problems and
that they appreciated the chance to exchange views with the
U.S. on this issue. Key differences from the MFA were the
repeated MOD stress that a complete ban is not on the table
and MOD's statement that Norway would be open to bringing the
Oslo Process back into the CCW if there is a chance for
progress in that forum. When these differences were pointed
out, the MOD promised to meet with the MFA to explore reasons
for these discrepancies.

Parliament and NGOs
--------------

7.(C) Kidd also met with leading Parliamentarians from the
Labor Party, the largest government party, and from the
opposition. Although not as familiar with the Oslo Process
as the MFA and MOD, the Parliamentarians were open to U.S.
concerns and promised to raise the issues within the Labor
Party and with fellow opposition members. NGO discussions
focused primarily on coordination of mine clean up efforts.

Comment and Follow Up Items
--------------

8.(C) Despite DAS Kidd,s clear and patient description of
U.S. concerns, it is clear that some in the MFA see this
process as Ottawa II and will continue to work closely with
NGOs to pursue as close to a total ban on CM as possible.
Kongstad,s response to DAS Kidd,s questions on the
discussion text was disingenuous and raised concerns that the
process is designed to exclude state,s perspectives. The
disregard of Kidd,s reasonable request for information on
how to overcome interoperability issues and generally hostile
reception call into question previous statements by the MFA
that they welcome discussions with the U.S. over the process.
The reception of U.S. positions and discussions was much
better from the MOD but it remains unclear what influence
they wield on this issue.

9.(C) In order to positively impact the Oslo process it will
be important to have other NATO allies raise objections with
the GON. It would also be helpful if key officials from
allied militaries were invited to U.S. tests of CM under
development to demonstrate both their continued utility and
measures designed to minimize duds. Perhaps most importantly,

this issue needs to be raised in broader USG discussions with
the GON and the potential negative impact it could have on
the overall relationship must be flagged.

10.(C) Post will continue to engage on this issue and seek to
obtain a draft of the proposed discussion paper for the
December meeting in Vienna. We will also push the Norwegians
for a paper in response to DAS Kidd,s request for the GON,s
perspective on how to avoid interoperability issues.

11.(U) DAS Kidd has cleared this cable.
JOHNSON