MAURITANIA SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000334

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/W
NSC FOR AF MR. PITTMAN
CDR USEUCOM FOR DCDR GEN WARD
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS: OVIP PGOV ECON EAID PREL KMCA MARR MASS ASEC
MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION
ATTENDING THE APRIL 19 INAUGURATION

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 294

B. NOUAKCHOTT 295

C. NOUAKCHOTT 303

D. NOUAKCHOTT 309

E. NOUAKCHOTT 310

Classified By: CDA Steven C. Koutsis. Reasons: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) After almost 30 years of military rule, Mauritania's
first credibly elected president since independence will be
sworn in on April 19. The U.S., in cooperation with its
international partners and the Mauritanian transitional
government, worked actively to bring about this historic
transition. While celebrations are in order, Mauritania,
which straddles West Africa and the Arab World, faces many
challenges, and our efforts to ensure long-term democratic
success have only just begun.

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-- THE CHALLENGES AHEAD --
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2. (C) When Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi takes power on
April 19, he will begin a new era for Mauritania, and if he
acts wisely and decisively, he will make Mauritania a model
for the region and perhaps for the Arab World and Africa.
But this may be a lot to ask from this humble, intellectual
politician, who is anywhere from 68-71 years old, and rumored
to be in frail health (although he looks fit enough to us).
He knows that two years of a democratic transition have
heightened people's hopes, and he must now work to manage
these expectations. He knows his first task is to form a
government that will not only be at least as competent as the
previous transitional government, but also satisfy his
supporters and pass muster with a freely elected parliament
made up of several parties and Independent deputies. Gone
are the days of a Parliament dominated by the state party.
Abdallahi was able to cobble together a Parliamentary
majority through his "Mithaq" coalition during the election,
but it remains to be seen if the Parliament will take on a
truly independent role in government.

A History of Military Control
--------------

3. (C) The military should be applauded for turning over
power peacefully to a civilian government. This
accomplishment is in great part linked to the character of
outgoing Military Council for Justice and Democracy (CMJD)
President Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall. Vall has said he
will retire. The rest of the CMJD members, however, will
stay on in their functions at the pleasure of the new
president. While it appears likely that the military will
give the new government some time to prove itself,
President-elect Abdallahi will need to manage carefully the
civil-military relationship. He must ensure that proper
equipment and training are provided for his envisioned
republican army, while making sure the officers' personal
interests are protected. The officer corps is widely
believed to be suffering from infighting among its key
members. CMJD members were reportedly divided along party
lines, with some having supported second place finisher Ahmed
Ould Daddah, and others having backed President-elect
Abdallahi. It is feared that those officers who supported
Daddah will resent the newfound influence of those who
supported Abdellahi. While these rivalries do not pose a
substantial risk in the short-term, Abdallahi is well aware
of the long-term potential for conflict.

Ethnic Tensions
--------------

4. (C) Ethnic and racial tensions are palpable in Mauritania.
White Moors (Arab-Berber) control the lion's share of the
country's wealth and power; Black Moors (Arabized black
Africans) profit from their close relationship with the White
Moors; and Afro-Mauritanians (Black Africans who have kept
their sub-Saharan languages and cultures),compete for the
leftovers. Afro-Mauritanian resistance to Moor dominance in
the 1970s and 80s occasionally flared up into violence, most
notably in 1989, when hundreds of Afro-Mauritanians were
killed, and tens of thousands forced to flee to Senegal and
Mali. These "89 Events" left residual tensions that have
never been resolved, and an estimated 20,000 - 30,000

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Afro-Mauritanian refugee are still living in Senegal and
Mali.

Trafficking in Persons
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5. (C) Mauritania is both a source and destination for people
trafficked for forced labor, with slavery-related practices,
and possibly slavery itself, persisting in rural and urban
areas. Slavery was traditionally practiced between White and
Black Moors (with the former exploiting the later),however,
the practice has also existed within the Afro-Mauritanian
ethnic groups. Regardless of its label, this largely
poverty-induced exploitation tears at Mauritania's social
fabric, and exacerbates already tense inter-ethnic relations.

Corruption and the Economy
--------------

6. (C) Overcoming rampant corruption is perhaps Mauritania's
largest economic and development challenge. While the
transitional government made significant progress in making
its finances more transparent in order to benefit from debt
cancellation under MDRI, institutional corruption permeates
both the private and public sectors. Mauritania remains one
of the world's poorest countries, with high rates of
illiteracy and unemployment (particularly among the rapidly
expanding youth population),a weak public education system,
feeble social services, and a lack of water for drinking and
irrigation. While oil production remains a positive economic
factor, original hopes for the discovery of vast oil reserves
are still unrealized. The one functioning field is not
producing as expected, and no other fields are being
exploited at this time. While ongoing mineral exploration
efforts show promise, it appears clear that the extractive
sector will not generate sufficient funds to cure
Mauritania's economic woes single-handedly. At the same time
the government has already begun spending based on false
revenue estimates, such as taking out new loans and providing
pay raises to its bloated civil service.

Islamism
--------------

7. (C) While the vast majority of Mauritania's Islamists are
moderate, even having participated in the democratic
transition, Islamic extremists continue to operate here.
Former President Taya was successful in countering these
extremist elements, often through harsh and extrajudicial
means. However, with a new government coming to power,
extremists may well be looking to test the waters.

Terrorism
--------------

8. (C) Mauritania has been the target of several plots by the
Al-Qaida Organization in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) starting in June 2005 when an isolated military
outpost in northern Mauritania was attacked by AQIM (then
known as GSPC) elements. Unlike Mali and Senegal, which
tolerate the presence of AQIM operatives in their territory,
Mauritania has been very pro-active in taking action against
AQIM elements in the region, despite limited resources. As a
result, Mauritania appears to be a prime target of AQIM
planning. Although considered a target, Mauritania has also
been used by AQIM for logistical support, as well as fertile
recruiting ground. AQIM has recruited dozens of young
Mauritanians to join their ranks and sent them to Mali for
terrorist training, and Mauritanians are the second largest
nationality in AQIM after Algerians. In addition, a small
number of Mauritanians have been located among Al-Qaida
forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

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-- HOW WE CAN HELP --
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9. (C) With so few democratic success stories in Africa and
the Middle East, we cannot afford to let Mauritania's
democratic experiment fail. Developing a strong and
influential relationship with Mauritania, a country with an
almost exclusively Muslim population and a strong partner in
the Global War on Terror, is a vital U.S. interest. The new
government will be given some time by its people to
demonstrate that it is up to the challenge. If it is not, it
will be in serious trouble, and the future of this new

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democracy will come into question. We believe the moment is
critical for us and other countries with an interest in
promoting peace, stability, and democracy, to show our
support.

TSCTP

SIPDIS
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10. (C) Through fully incorporating Mauritania into the
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP),we can
help the Mauritanians defeat terrorist organizations and
diminish their ability to gain recruits, as well as promote
good governance and reinforce our bilateral military ties.

Military Cooperation
--------------

11. (C) Military cooperation will resume with the new
government. We are preparing for three JCETs this summer.
We intend to engage across normal security lines within
OEF-TS. We will build small pockets of excellence within the
National Guard, National Gendarmerie and within the Military.
This will provide balance within the security services, be
cost effective and will not shift the balance of power in the
region. We will look to develop a unit in the National
Guard, National Police, National Gendarmerie and with the
military. We also have two military initiatives under way
regarding maritime safety and security that will be
supportive in the counter-terrorism and economic arenas. We
will recommence training under the State Department's
Anti-Terrorist Assistance program and will seek other ways to
help.


12. (C) Given its cultural make-up, Mauritania is in a unique
position to work as peacekeepers in both Sub-Saharan and
North Africa. The capabilities of the Mauritanian military
are low. However, brining African Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) to Mauritania will assist
with professionalizing its military. In addition to
increasing capabilities, bringing Mauritania into ACOTA will
strengthen its position as a long-term democratic partner in
the region. That training, especially with personnel from
neighboring countries, will enhance cooperation among the
region's security forces, further weakening terrorists'
efforts. We should encourage Mauritania's active
participation in the AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) as a concrete measure of Mauritania's interest in
joining the democratic club of nations.

Democracy Promotion
--------------

13. (C) The U.S. and its partners worked actively during the
transition to bring democracy to Mauritania; ensuring
long-term democratic success will require an equal or greater
effort. We must focus on strengthening Mauritania's weak
democratic institutions such as its newly elected Parliament,
the press, civil society, and a responsible political
opposition. Efforts to support these key institutions have
been underway for many months, but important work remains.
The National Democratic Institute (NDI) played a key role,
and is currently preparing an important program to train new
legislators. NDI's role here will remain essential for the
foreseeable future.

Anti-Corruption and Economic Development
--------------

14. (C) The transitional government made significant
anti-corruption and economic achievements during the past two
years, and these achievements must be secured and built upon
if Mauritania is to continue its integration into the global
economy. We must encourage the new government to remain
committed to economic and anti-corruption reforms, and to
follow through with Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) implementation, establish an appropriate
oil revenue management mechanism with IMF and WB support, and
pursue prudent monetary and fiscal policies. In addition,
with the return of rule of law, Mauritania's eligibility for
AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) benefits should be
reinstated. With the return of rule of law and the
transitional government's achievements in economic reforms,
Mauritania's indices appear to make it competitive for
qualification for the Millennium Challenge Account Threshold
program. We should encourage Mauritania to enter into the
program.

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Return of Refugees and Restitution for 89 Events
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15. (C) Effectively resolving the lingering issues of
Mauritanian refugees and 89 Event victims will be the most
effective ways to reduce ethnic tensions and build national
unity. President-elect Abdallahi has repeatedly signaled his
intention to tackle these issues within his first year in
office. We must applaud his intentions and stand ready to
assist him in these efforts.

Humanitarian Assistance
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16. (C) The U.S. must continue to respond to Mauritania's
humanitarian needs. Mauritania needs our development
projects, humanitarian assistance, and food aid if it is to
confront high rates of illiteracy, widespread poverty,
pockets of serious malnutrition, and a potential explosion in
HIV/AIDS. All these issues have the potential to weaken the
new democracy and undermine our efforts to deny terrorists a
fertile recruitment ground.
Koutsis