Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA994
2007-12-17 14:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

TURKISH CYPRIOT PARTIES HEAD FOR DECEMBER SHOWDOWN

Tags:  PGOV PREL TR CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNC #0994/01 3511431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171431Z DEC 07 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8416
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1033
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000994 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT PARTIES HEAD FOR DECEMBER SHOWDOWN

REF: A. NICOSIA 836

B. NICOSIA 971

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons 1.4(b) and
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000994

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT PARTIES HEAD FOR DECEMBER SHOWDOWN

REF: A. NICOSIA 836

B. NICOSIA 971

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.
4 (d)


1. (C) Summary: An October agreement between the "governing"
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the opposition to amend
the "TRNC constitution" and consider early elections may
derail before January 1 given the wildly differing goals of
the participants. CTP considers the ad hoc committee
agreement useful in luring the opposition back to
"parliament," creating the appearance of reconciliation with
opposition parties, and democratizing an outdated
"constitution." The opposition National Unity Party (UBP)
and the Democrat Party (DP),boycotting the "parliament8
since October 2006, are not against amending the
"constitution," but are demanding as quid pro quo early
elections in 2008, a CTP non-starter. CTP appears unlikely
to back down, given its strong majority in "parliament,"
meaning UBP and DP--unless saved by a deus ex machina of
Ankara-imposed early elections--seem headed for another
political defeat. End Summary.

--------------
Background
--------------


2. (SBU) On October 9, the "governing" CTP and the two main
opposition parties, the National Unity Party (UBP) and
Democrat Party (DP),agreed to amend the "TRNC constitution"
and a number of other "laws" (concerning political parties,
elections and referendums, and "parliamentary" by-laws),as
well as discuss transition to a &presidential8 system in
the Turkish Cypriot-administered area. CTP also accepted DP
and UBP's demands to consider early "parliamentary" elections
(the next vote is scheduled for 2010). The parties agreed to
work in ad hoc committees until December 20, then take stock
and, if all concurred, set a date by January 1 for both early
elections and a referendum on the changes (the "presidential"
transition was outside of the equation, however). The
opposition's agreement to work in ad hoc committees was its
first foot back in "parliamentary" waters after it stormed
out in October 2006 (Note: Both UBP and DP have accused CTP
of violating political ethics when it dumped DP as its

"junior partner" 15 months ago in favor of the
newly-founded--some say with support from Ankara--"Freedom
and Reform Party" (OP). OP ranks include defectors from both
DP and UBP. End Note)

--------------
What they agree on
--------------


3. (C) The parties concur that the "TRNC constitution," not
amended since its adoption in 1985, is outdated and not in
tune with twenty-first century demands. Most of the ad hoc
committee work to date, in fact, has focused on amending it.
Ahmet Kasif, a UBP "MP" and member of the "constitutional" ad
hoc committee (CAHC),told Poloff on November 14 that the
"constitution" is twenty-two years old and not reflective of
the "TRNC's" desire to "open up to the world." CTP General
Secretary Omer Kalyoncu, chair of the CAHC, joked with Poloff

SIPDIS
on November 22 that his party had even accepted UBP's
proposal to amend "Article 12," which forbids changing "the
rights and status of the 'TRNC'" Kalyoncu was optimistic,
however, that the parties would eventually agree on all the
"articles" but "Temporary Article 10" (army/police control)
and "Article 156" (Military Judicial Power). Others we spoke
with share this view as well.

--------------
What they don,t agree on
--------------


4. (C) As noted above, the parties appear less willing to
compromise on two key "articles" dealing with
civilian-military relations: "Temporary Article 10," which
gives Turkey control of the police and armed forces, and
"Article 156," which, in certain circumstances, allows
military courts to try civilians. "Temporary Article 10"
appears the most difficult to change. CTP &Minister of the
Interior8 Ozkan Murat told us December 5 that CTP favors
putting the police under civilian control and leaving the
armed forces, for the present, under Turkish command. In
contrast, UBP Party President Tahsin Ertugruloglu told us on
November 27 that UBP "never" would agree to changing

NICOSIA 00000994 002 OF 003


"Temporary Article 10." DP "MP" Ertugrul Hasipoglu, a CAHC
member, took a more nuanced if equally obstructionist path,
telling us November 14 that amending the article must be
discussed with Turkey first. CTP is unlikely to back down,
however. Kutlay Erk, a CTP insider and former mayor of
Nicosia, asserted November 19 that "democratizing" the
"constitution" is "as important to us as early elections are
to UBP and DP." (Note: UBP and DP also fear that CTP would
pack the police with party faithful, should command be
transferred to the "TRNC.")

--------------
And what they really don,t agree on
--------------


5. (C) The real obstacle between the parties has nothing to
do with the "constitution," and everything to do with their
radically differing goals and expectations of the committee
process. For the opposition, the ad hoc committee work has
one aim: to force early elections in 2008. UBP General
Secretary Nazim Cavusoglu, another CAHC member, told the

SIPDIS
Embassy December 4 that the "constitutional" work of the
committee was necessary, but the real goal was early
elections. For CTP, just the opposite is the case. Bayram
Karaman, a CTP "MP" and also a committee member, told us on
November 30 that CTP had "thrown the opposition a life
preserver" by forming the ad hoc committees, and that there
would be no early elections in 2008. DP's Hasipoglu,
however, told us that he &would take his hat and leave8 if
the committee's work did not lead to early elections in 2008.

--------------
Hard fall for the Opposition?
--------------


6. (C) Kalyoncu of CTP told us the CAHC would not be able to
finish its work by December 20 and would need to continue at
least another three months. If pressed by the opposition for
early elections as a price for continuation, he continued,
CTP would name some date in 2009, and "parliament"
subsequently would pass an early-election resolution. (Note:
The CTP/OP "government" enjoys a strong majority, with 29 of
50 "seats.") Kalyoncu strongly hinted that CTP would use
ongoing 2008 "parliamentary" budget debates to delay the work
of the CAHC. Barely containing his anger, he added that the
opposition "should have thought of this before starting its
completely unfounded boycott."


7. (C) DP leader Serdar Denktash told us that, absent early
elections in 2008, he and his five "MPs" would resign from
"parliament" in January, after the party receives the first
tranche of its "state" budgetary support. Kudret Akay, a
former DP insider who recently broke from the party, said
November 29 that he doubted all the DP deputies would resign,
however. UBP boss Ertugruloglu, who personally is against
the boycott, nevertheless revealed that early elections in
2008 are a must for the party. In contrast to Denktash,
Ertugruloglu saw no logic in resigning from "parliament" even
if the opposition did not obtain early elections in 2008.
UBP General Secretary Cavusoglu, however, told us that their
situation "would turn into a comedy" if they did not resign
in such a case.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) The true reason behind the ad hoc committee /
"constitutional" debate has always been about holding--or not
holding--early elections. In that sense, CTP is holding all
the cards. It enjoys a strong majority in "parliament," and
the UBP/DP boycott of that institution has not found support
among the general populace. Moreover, many in the opposition
itself are unhappy with the boycott and think it is hurting
them. To illustrate, one boycotting UBP "MP" told us that
politics was not just "shouting in villages," but getting
down to the business of "legislating." Thus, opposition
threats to resign from "parliament" or continue to boycott it
do not scare CTP. That said, it is unclear how long CTP,
and, more importantly Turkey, will tolerate the near total
absence of an opposition from "parliamentary" life here. In
his September 19 speech before the "TRNC parliament," Turkish
President Abdullah Gul pointedly noted that "political
controversies" in northern Cyprus should not weaken the
legitimacy of the "state." Gul's comments lend some credence
to rumors we have heard recently (Ref B) that Turkey supports
2008 elections here (other rumors claim it prefers a a 2009

NICOSIA 00000994 003 OF 003


date, however, in order to favor newcomer and alleged AKP
favorite OP.) We expect some type of behind-the-scenes
intervention from Ankara to end the present political crisis,
either by triggering early elections in 2008 or by
strong-arming the opposition--or at least UBP--back into
&parliament." Barring that, UBP and DP will continue their
self-inflicted downward spiral. As we continue to monitor
events, we need to make sure that T/C nationalists and Turkey
do not use the issue of early elections as a means of
delaying engagement in a renewed UN negotiating track in

2008.
SCHLICHER